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Executive summary 
 
In a context of renewed general interest in agriculture, emphasized by the recent food 
price increases, the RuralStruc Program provides an additional perspective to an 
international debate that was long-focused on trade liberalization. Beyond trade, the 
program addresses the structural dimensions of globalization and their implications for 
the agricultural sector in perspective with the economic transition of developing 
economies.  
The objective of this three-year program, launched in 2006, is to strengthen the policy 
debate on renewed thematic issues. Adopting a comparative approach, the program 
engages seven countries that correspond to different stages of the process of economic 
transition and where agriculture plays different roles (Senegal, Mali, Kenya, and 
Madagascar; Morocco, Nicaragua, and Mexico). It focuses on the changes underway 
within each respective rural economy and aims at discussing the consequences of these 
changes in terms of policy implications.  
Activities in each country are conducted by local research teams and supported by local 
institutional partners. Desk studies and knowledge-sharing workshops implemented 
during the first phase of the program provide first insights on what is known and allow 
the highlighting of several decisive issues for policy-making. 
The central role of agriculture in the process of development 
In many developing countries, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), agriculture still 
plays a central role in both the global economy (GDP, trade, and labor force) and in the 
livelihood of the majority of the population. This evidence – so often trivialized – is not 
insignificant: it means that the debate on agriculture must be put into perspective with the 
existing economic alternatives in terms of growth and employment.  
Due to the current stage of structural transformation of many low-income and lower-
middle-income countries and to the difficulties of economic diversification within the 
high competition of a global open economy – if compared to other periods of the world 
history – the evolution of agriculture in the next decades remains critical for 
development. Presently, this evolution is occurring in a unique situation where the 
process of economic development must deal with the challenges of globalization and 
unachieved demographic transitions.  
The challenge of on-going demographic transitions 
The RuralStruc Program countries illustrate very different situations regarding 
demographic transition. While Mexico, Morocco, and also Nicaragua, are deeply engaged 
in their demographic change, with decreasing population growth rates, the SAA countries 
face a booming evolution – the fastest in the world today (the other rapidly growing 
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region being South Asia) – with a sub-continent population that could increase twofold 
between 2010 and 2050 (reaching 1.7 billion people in the mid-century). 
This population growth should translate in a massive increase of the labor force: 
presently in Sub-Saharan Africa the yearly cohort of new economically active population 
is around 10 million people and should reach a peak near 20 million in the 2030s. For a 
median SSA country – e.g. 15 million people today – the yearly cohort is 250,000 in the 
2000s and is expected to be 450,000 in the 2030s. 
This predicted “demographic dividend” follows several decades of extremely low activity 
ratios (with around only one active person for one inactive), which appears to have been a 
heavy burden on Sub-Saharan Africa’s growth, as the African economies were dealing 
concurrently with liberalization and structural adjustment processes. This demographic 
dividend can be a major opportunity, provided that the engines of growth are strong 
enough to absorb the expansion of the labor supply. It requires a strong economic 
diversification, while the economic structure of the Sub-Saharan economies has little 
evolved over the last four decades. Indeed, the fast-growing urbanization of the continent 
has been characterized by very low industrialization, recurring unemployment and 
underemployment. Job creation is mainly concentrated in the informal sector, in both 
rural and urban areas, which is characterized by low productivity and low-paid jobs that 
do not ease assets accumulation and consumption increase. 
In the cases of Mexico, Morocco and Nicaragua, by contrast, international migration 
appears to be a major alternative to the insufficient pace of job creation, and hence played 
and still plays a major role in the transition process (not to mention significant 
industrialization dynamics in a country like Mexico). With around 10% of their 
population living abroad in better-off countries, these countries access a powerful 
additional alternative, which facilitates their economic transition (as European migrations 
to the “new worlds” did in someway for the European transitions). In the current context, 
this pattern appears difficult to reproduce at the same level for SSA countries. 
The challenge of agriculture facing globalization 
The growing labor force puts additional pressure on agriculture in countries where the 
sector occupies the main share of the employment structure. As a consequence, the 
evolution of agriculture and its continuing absorption capacity will be determinant in 
managing the transition, knowing that family labor and self-employment have always 
been and remain major features of the agricultural sector. This is a major issue in SSA, as 
well as in countries like Nicaragua or Morocco, where the population sustaining its 
livelihood from the sector still has a significant weight.  
In developing countries, agriculture currently faces two main processes of change related 
to globalization. The first process is a direct consequence of a more global open economy 
boosted by increasing long-distance trade, where agricultural systems with very different 
competitiveness and public support levels confront each other on the same international 
markets. Farmers around the world have to deal with productivity gaps ranging from 1 to 
1000 (e.g. in the case of cereals, the gap between manual systems without a “Green 
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Revolution package” and highly intensified, motorized, and sometimes subsidized 
systems). These gaps are a main issue because competitiveness does not only mean costs 
and quality of products, but also supply capacity, which determines market shares (and 
the ability to provide for both local and international markets). Simultaneously, public 
supports (direct income or credit supports or indirect risk management) help OECD 
producers to cope in radically asymmetric ways with economic or natural constraints. 
The second process relates to the global restructuring of agrifood systems where vertical 
integration along the value chains and the development of new distribution networks, 
related to growing demand-driven markets (the “supermarket revolution”), offer new 
major opportunities but also modify the rules of the market game. Stricter food safety and 
quality standards, strong requirements of high-value products or supermarkets’ 
procurement systems imply a significant capacity of adaptation for the producers. This 
trend reinforces differentiation among farmers, depending of their own assets (skills and 
capital) and market access (for which public goods provision – typically infrastructure 
and information – is decisive).  
The extent of these processes’ development is eminently variable among countries, 
regions, and commodity chains. High-requirement markets and the related development 
of contracts remain limited and contrasted in Sub-Saharan Africa, where they mainly 
concern horticulture in a broad sense. In Mexico and Nicaragua, procurement systems are 
more developed and also include dairy and other animal products. In SSA, a few tens of 
thousands of farmers are concerned in each country while hundreds of thousands and 
millions are engaged in traditional staple or export productions. 
Agriculture, its alternatives and the reshaping of rural economies 
In this context of uneven opportunities, a vital issue for producers is their ability to 
accommodate a competitive economic environment and its existing and growing 
constraints: increasing prices of inputs, difficulties of access to production factors, or 
consequences of degradation of natural resources (the two latter being sometimes 
exacerbated by demographic pressure). 
Even if the current food price increases can strongly improve the situation of the net 
producers, the core issue is the capacity of different groups of farmers to cope with an 
evolving context where risk management depends heavily on their assets. While some 
producers are able to deal with both opportunities and constraints and others are forced to 
diversify their activities and income sources to sustain their livelihood, many are not able 
to adapt and are pushed out agriculture and, sometimes, from the countryside. 
Of course, the patterns of these adaptation processes mainly rely on the existing 
economic alternatives, locally, regionally and nationally, and sometimes abroad, through 
internal and international migration. Even if they are unevenly documented, more 
complex and diversified systems of activities and incomes are progressively reshaping 
the rural economies. However, the critical question remains the extent to which 
adaptation can occur and contribute to the global process of economic transition. 
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First lessons for policy making 
Due to the central role of agriculture in the process of economic transition of many 
developing countries, agricultural policies must be carefully designed and articulated 
with other sectoral policies. Particular attention must be paid to adequate sequencing, 
with policies facilitating economic diversification and employment creation in both urban 
and rural economies (investment climate, public goods, capacity building). This global 
approach must be part of the rehabilitation of development strategies. 
The lack of adequate information about the on-going transformation processes, which 
remain poorly studied, is a major issue for the policy-making. One priority should be to 
reengage in the design and the management of information systems, able to capture the 
new realities, because they are a cornerstone for the definition of adequate public 
policies. Similarly ownership of the policy-making process can be facilitated by the direct 
involvement of national expertise in addressing the knowledge challenge. 
Due to the strategic positioning of the employment issue, agricultural policies must target 
the “many” and address and support, as a priority, the value chains offering the largest 
opportunities in terms of activities and income generation. In this perspective, and due to 
the higher requirements of, and competition within, the demand-driven markets, national 
and regional food markets offer high potential for development with lower constraints. 
This positioning favors the promotion of an inclusive model of development dealing with 
the challenge of a growing labor force. In the same way, policy options must avoid the 
selection of stand-alone technical solutions that target one-to-one objectives. This is 
typically the case of productivity increase, which is an indisputable objective in the 
perspective of sector growth, income distribution, and poverty alleviation, but must, at 
the same time, consider the employment dimension of technical choices.  
Finally, it appears that the quality of the policy debate will be determinant in addressing 
the complexity and uniqueness of agriculture-based countries’ economic situations. The 
adoption of a broad perspective that positions the future of agriculture in the global 
picture is essential to renew the existing debates at national, regional and continental 
levels and to deal with the challenge of simultaneous economic and demographic 
transitions within globalization. 
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Résumé exécutif 
 
Dans un contexte marqué par un nouvel intérêt pour l'agriculture, largement stimulé par 
la récente augmentation des prix des produits alimentaires, le programme RuralStruc 
offre une perspective renouvelée dans un débat international longtemps dominé par les 
questions de libéralisation commerciale. Adoptant une approche globale en termes de 
transition économique, le programme s’intéresse aux dimensions structurelles de la 
mondialisation et à leurs implications sur le secteur agricole des pays en développement. 
L'objectif de ce programme comparatif de trois ans, lancé en 2006, est de renforcer le 
débat sur les politiques publiques par des questions thématiques renouvelées. Engagé 
dans sept pays correspondant à différentes étapes dans le processus de transition 
économique et où l'agriculture joue des rôles différents (Sénégal, Mali, Kenya et 
Madagascar ; Maroc, Nicaragua et Mexique), le programme met l’accent sur les 
transformations en cours au sein des économies rurales et examine leurs conséquences en 
termes d'implications politiques. 
Les activités sont mises en œuvre dans chacun des pays par des équipes de recherche 
nationales avec le soutien d’institutions et des partenaires locaux. Les travaux de synthèse 
documentaire conduits au cours de la première phase du programme et les ateliers 
d’echange entre équipes fournissent un premier état des lieux sur ce qui est connu 
localement et permettent de mettre en évidence certaines questions centrales pour 
l’élaboration des politiques publiques. 
Le rôle central de l'agriculture dans le processus de développement 
Dans de nombreux pays en développement, en particulier en Afrique subsaharienne 
(ASS), l'agriculture joue toujours un rôle central dans les économies nationales (PIB, 
commerce extérieur, emploi) et dans les conditions d’existence de la majorité de la 
population. Ce rappel n’est pas anodin, car il signifie que le débat sur l'agriculture doit 
être mis en perspective avec la discussion plus générale sur les alternatives économiques 
existantes en termes de croissance et d'emploi. 
Au stade actuel du changement structurel de nombreux pays en développement – 
particulièrement les pays à faibles revenus et un nombre significatif de pays à revenus 
intermédiaires – l'évolution de leur agriculture dans les prochaines décennies apparaît 
décisive. Cette situation particulière s’explique par les difficultés de la diversification 
économique dans un environnement international concurrentiel qui est sans commune 
mesure avec d'autres périodes de l'histoire car, dans ce contexte singulier, le processus de 
développement économique doit faire face simultanément aux défis de la mondialisation 
et, souvent, à des transitions démographiques inachevées. 
 vi 
Le défi des transitions démographiques en cours 
Le Programme RuralStruc illustre des situations nationales très différentes en termes de 
transition démographique. Alors que le Mexique, le Maroc et le Nicaragua sont déjà très 
engagés dans leur transition avec une baisse importante de la croissance de leur 
population, les pays d’Afrique subsaharienne sont confrontés à une forte poussée 
démographique, la plus rapide du monde (l'autre région à croissance rapide étant l’Asie 
du Sud) : la population du sous-continent pourrait doubler entre 2010 et 2050 et atteindre 
1,7 milliard de personnes au milieu du siècle. 
Cette croissance démographique devrait se traduire par une augmentation massive de la 
force de travail. La cohorte annuelle de nouveaux actifs, qui est d'environ dix millions de 
personnes aujourd’hui, devrait avoisiner les vingt millions dans les années 2030. Pour un 
pays d'Afrique subsaharienne médian – soit quinze millions d’habitants - la cohorte 
annuelle est actuellement de l’ordre de 250 000 personnes et devrait atteindre 450 000 
personnes dans les années 2030. 
Ce "dividende démographique" à venir fait suite à plusieurs décennies où les taux 
d’activité ont été extrêmement faibles et ont pesé lourdement sur la croissance (avec 
seulement un actif pour un inactif), alors que les économies africaines devaient affronter 
au même moment les conséquences des processus de libéralisation et d'ajustement 
structurel. Ce dividende démographique peut représenter une opportunité majeure dès 
lors que les moteurs de la croissance sont suffisamment forts pour absorber l'expansion 
de l'offre en travail. Il renforce les enjeux de la diversification alors que la structure 
économique du sous-continent a peu évolué au cours des quarante dernières années. La 
forte poussée urbaine de l’ASS a en effet été marquée par la faiblesse de 
l’industrialisation et par un chômage et un sous-emploi récurrents. La création d'emplois 
reste concentrée principalement dans le secteur informel, tant en milieu urbain que rural, 
dont la faible productivité et les faibles niveaux de rémunération ne facilitent ni le 
processus d'accumulation, ni l’augmentation de la consommation. 
En revanche, au Mexique, au Maroc et au Nicaragua, les migrations internationales 
semblent avoir été parmi les principales réponses à la faiblesse du rythme de création 
d'emplois. Sans éluder bien sûr la place de l’industrialisation dans un pays comme le 
Mexique, les migrations ont joué et jouent encore un rôle majeur dans le processus de 
transition : avec environ 10% de leur population vivant à l'étranger dans des pays à plus 
hauts revenus (ce qui n’est pas le cas des migrations intra-africaines), ces pays ont eu 
accès à une puissante alternative qui a facilité leur transition économique, à l’instar en 
quelque sorte des migrations européennes vers les « nouveaux mondes » dans les 
transitions européennes. Dans le contexte actuel, la reproduction au même niveau d’un tel 
schéma semble difficile pour les pays d'Afrique subsaharienne. 
Le défi de l'agriculture face à la mondialisation 
Cette croissance de la force de travail constitue une pression supplémentaire sur 
l'agriculture dans les pays où elle occupe encore la place principale dans la structure 
d’activité et d'emploi. Ainsi, l’évolution du secteur agricole et sa capacité d'absorption 
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seront déterminantes dans la gestion de la transition économique, sachant que le travail 
familial et l'auto-emploi ont toujours été et restent l’une des principales caractéristiques 
de l’agriculture. Il s’agit évidemment d’une question centrale pour l’Afrique 
subsaharienne mais aussi dans des pays comme le Nicaragua ou le Maroc, où 
l’agriculture a encore un poids significatif dans les conditions d’existence d’une partie 
conséquente de la population. 
Dans les pays en développement, l'agriculture doit aujourd'hui faire face à deux 
changements majeurs liés à la mondialisation. Le premier est la conséquence directe 
d'une économie globale plus ouverte, stimulée par des échanges à longue distance, où des 
systèmes agricoles ayant des niveaux différents de compétitivité et de soutiens publics 
sont mis en concurrence sur les mêmes marchés internationaux. Les agriculteurs doivent 
y gérer des écarts de productivité allant de 1 à 1000 ce qui correspond, dans le cas des 
céréales, à l'écart de productivité entre des systèmes manuels sans le « paquet technique » 
de la révolution verte et des systèmes très intensifs motorisés et parfois subventionnés. 
Ces écarts de productivité constituent un problème crucial car la compétitivité ne repose 
pas uniquement sur des avantages en termes de coûts et de qualité des produits, mais 
aussi sur les capacités de production qui déterminent les parts de marché ainsi que la 
capacité à approvisionner les marchés tant locaux qu’internationaux. Parallèlement, les 
soutiens publics directs (en appui aux revenus ou en facilités de crédit) et indirects 
(gestion des risques) aident les producteurs des pays de l’OCDE à affronter radicalement 
différemment les contraintes économiques ou naturelles. 
Le deuxième processus découle à la restructuration globale des systèmes agro-
alimentaires marqués à la fois par l'intégration verticale des filières de produits et par le 
développement de nouveaux réseaux de distribution pilotés par la demande (la 
« révolution des supermarchés »). Ces recompositions offrent de réelles opportunités pour 
les producteurs, mais elles modifient aussi radicalement les règles du jeu. Le 
renforcement des normes sanitaires et les standards de qualité des produits à haute valeur 
ajoutée ou des centrales d’achat de la grande distribution impliquent une capacité 
d'adaptation élevée des agriculteurs. Cette évolution tend à renforcer la différenciation 
entre producteurs en fonction de leurs propres atouts (en termes de compétences et de 
capitaux) et de leur accès aux marchés (où la fourniture en biens publics – notamment 
infrastructures et information - est décisive). 
Le développement de ces processus est évidemment très variable selon les pays, régions 
et filières. Le développement de la contractualisation liée au nouveau fonctionnement et 
aux exigences croissantes des marchés reste encore limité et contrasté en Afrique 
subsaharienne, où il concerne principalement les produits horticoles au sens large. Au 
Mexique et au Nicaragua, les systèmes d’approvisionnement sont plus développés et ils 
concernent aussi les produits laitiers et d’autres produits d'origine animale. Ainsi, en 
Afrique subsaharienne, ce sont quelques dizaines de milliers d'agriculteurs au maximum 
qui sont concernés par ces nouvelles filières dans chaque pays, tandis que des centaines 
de milliers d’autres - voire des millions - sont toujours engagés dans les productions 
vivrières ou les produits traditionnels d'exportation. 
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Les alternatives à l'agriculture et la recomposition des économies rurales 
Dans ce contexte offrant des opportunités très inégales, le problème central pour les 
producteurs réside dans leur capacité à s’adapter au mieux un environnement économique 
concurrentiel et à gérer les nouvelles contraintes : l'augmentation du prix des intrants, les 
difficultés d'accès aux facteurs de production, ou les conséquences de la dégradation des 
ressources naturelles, ces deux dernières étant parfois exacerbées par la pression 
démographique. 
Même si l’augmentation actuelle des prix des denrées alimentaires peut améliorer de 
manière significative la situation des producteurs excédentaires, la question cruciale reste 
la capacité des différents groupes d'agriculteurs à faire face à un contexte évolutif où la 
gestion des risques dépend principalement de leurs propres ressources : certains 
producteurs sont en mesure de simultanément tirer partie des opportunités et faire face 
aux contraintes ; d'autres sont obligés de diversifier leurs activités et leurs sources de 
revenus pour assurer leur subsistance ; d'autres encore ne sont pas en mesure de s'adapter 
et doivent quitter le secteur agricole et parfois même le mode de vie rural. 
Bien entendu, les modalités de ces processus d'adaptation reposent sur les alternatives 
économiques existant au niveau local, régional et national, et parfois à l'étranger, par le 
biais de migrations internes et internationales. Même si leur connaissance reste 
imparfaite, de nouveaux systèmes d’activités et de revenus plus complexes et diversifiés 
remodèlent progressivement les économies rurales. La question reste toutefois entière de 
savoir jusqu’à quel point ces adaptations peuvent se produire et contribuer au processus 
global de transition économique. 
Premières leçons pour l'élaboration des politiques publiques 
En raison du rôle central de l'agriculture dans le processus de transition économique de 
nombreux pays en développement, le contenu des politiques agricoles doit être 
soigneusement défini, coordonné et articulé avec les autres politiques sectorielles. Une 
attention toute particulière doit notamment être apportée à leur calage avec les politiques 
de diversification économique et de création d'emplois, tant en milieu rural qu’urbain 
(amélioration des conditions d'investissement, dotation en biens publics, renforcement 
des capacités). Cette approche globale doit s’intégrer dans une vision volontariste et 
renouvelée des stratégies de développement. 
Le manque d'informations adéquates sur les processus de recompositions en cours 
constitue un réel handicap pour l’élaboration et la définition des politiques. Le 
réinvestissement dans la conception et la gestion de systèmes d'information capables de 
saisir les nouvelles réalités devrait être une priorité car ils constituent une pierre angulaire 
pour la définition de politiques appropriées. Parallèlement, l’appropriation du processus 
d’elaboration des politiques par les acteurs locaux est essentielle ; elle peut être facilitée 
par l’engagement direct de l’expertise nationale dans ce défi de l’information et de la 
connaissance. 
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Du fait du poids déterminant des questions d’activité et d’emploi, les politiques agricoles 
doivent cibler au mieux la majorité des producteurs et s'adresser et soutenir en priorité les 
filières offrant les meilleures opportunités en termes d'activités et de génération de 
revenus. Dans cette optique, et du fait des exigences et de la concurrence au sein des 
marchés pilotés par la demande, les marchés alimentaires nationaux et régionaux offrent 
un fort potentiel de développement avec des contraintes plus limitées. Un tel choix 
permet la promotion d’un modèle inclusif de développement prenant en compte le défi de 
l’emploi. De la même manière, il convient d’éviter de recourir à des solutions purement 
techniques ciblées sur un seul objectif. C'est notamment le cas de l'augmentation de la 
productivité, qui est évidemment un objectif indiscutable dans une perspective de 
croissance du secteur, de répartition des revenus et de réduction de la pauvreté, mais qui 
doit en même temps ne pas ignorer les conséquences sur l’emploi des options techniques 
retenues. 
Enfin, la qualité du débat sur les politiques publiques apparaît déterminante pour prendre 
en compte la complexité et l’originalité de la situation économique des pays à base 
agricole. L'adoption d'une approche englobante remettant la question agricole dans la 
perspective du développement d’ensemble est indispensable pour renouveler les débats 
au niveau national, régional et continental. Elle est aussi indispensable pour répondre au 
défi des transitions économique et démographique dans la mondialisation. 
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Resumen ejecutivo 
 
En contexto de interés creciente por la agricultura, ampliamente estimulado por la 
reciente subida de precios alimenticios, el programa RuralStruc ofrece una perspectiva 
renovada al debate internacional mucho tiempo centrado en las cuestiones de 
liberalización comercial. Adoptando un tema global en términos de transición económica, 
el programa trata de las dimensiones estructurales de la mundialización y de sus 
consecuencias para el sector agrícola de los países en desarrollo. 
El objetivo de este programa comparativo de un período de tres años, iniciado en el 2006, 
es fortalecer el debate sobre las políticas públicas gracias a cuestiones temáticas 
renovadas. Llevado a cabo en siete países correspondiendo a distintas etapas del proceso 
de transición económica, y donde la agricultura desempeña diferentes papeles (Senegal, 
Mali, Kenia, Madagascar, Marruecos, Nicaragua y México), el programa hace hincapié 
en las transformaciones sucesivas de las economías rurales y analiza sus consecuencias 
en términos de implicaciones políticas. 
En cada país, las actividades de investigación son llevadas a cabo por equipos nacionales 
con el apoyo de instituciones y socios locales. Los trabajos de síntesis realizados durante 
la primera fase del programa y los talleres de intercambio entre equipos permiten 
establecer un balance del conocimiento actual sobre estos temas a nivel local, y destacar 
cuestiones centrales para elaborar políticas públicas. 
El rol central de la agricultura en el proceso de desarrollo 
En muchos países en desarrollo, especialmente en África subsahariana, la agricultura 
sigue desempeñando un rol central tanto en la economía nacional (PIB, comercio 
exterior, empleo) como en el sustento de la mayoría de la población. Este hecho no es 
intrascendente puesto que significa que el debate sobre la agricultura debe ponerse en 
perspectiva con una discusión más amplia sobre las alternativas económicas existentes en 
términos de crecimiento y empleo. 
En la etapa actual de la transformación estructural de muchos países en desarrollo – 
especialmente los países de bajos ingresos y un número significativo de países de 
ingresos medios – la evolución de la agricultura en las próximas décadas seguirá siendo 
decisiva para el desarrollo. Esta situación específica se explica por las dificultades de la 
diversificación económica en un ámbito internacional competitivo que no se puede 
comparar con otros períodos de la historia mundial. En este contexto único, el proceso de 
desarrollo económico debe enfrentarse de manera simultánea a los desafíos de la 
mundialización al igual que a menudo a transiciones demográficas inconclusas. 
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El desafío de las transiciones demográficas inconclusas 
El programa RuralStruc estudia situaciones muy diferentes en cuanto a transiciones 
demográficas. Mientras que México, Marruecos, y Nicaragua, han avanzado en sus 
cambios demográficos, con una reducción de las tasas de crecimiento demográfico, los 
países de África subsahariana se enfrentan a un auge poblacional - el más rápido en el 
mundo actual (siendo Asia del Sur la otra región de rápido crecimiento): la población 
subcontinental que podría duplicar entre el 2010 y el 2050 (llegando a 1.7 billones de 
personas a mediados del siglo veintiuno). 
Este crecimiento poblacional debería traducirse en un aumento masivo de la fuerza de 
trabajo. La cohorte anual de nuevos activos, la cual es alrededor de diez millones de 
personas hoy en día, debería alcanzar un máximo de cerca veinte millones en los años 
2030. Para un país mediano de África subsahariana – sea con una población de 15 
millones de personas - la cohorte anual es actualmente de 250 000 personas y debería 
alcanzar los 400 000 en el 2030. 
El "dividendo demográfico" por venir ocurre tras varias décadas con cocientes de 
actividad extremamente bajos que han constituido una pesada carga para el crecimiento 
(con sólo un activo por inactivo) cuando las economías africanas manejaban al mismo 
tiempo la liberalización y los procesos de ajuste estructural. Este dividendo demográfico 
puede ser una gran oportunidad, siempre que los motores de crecimiento sean 
suficientemente fuertes para absorber la expansión de la oferta en trabajo. Este refuerza 
los retos de la diversificación cuando la estructura económica del subcontinente ha 
evolucionado poco durante los últimos cuarenta años. El auge de la urbanización en 
África subsahariana se ha caracterizado por una muy baja industrialización, desempleo y 
subempleo recurrentes. La creación de empleos sigue concentrándose principalmente en 
el sector informal, tanto en zonas rurales como urbanas, el cual se caracteriza por bajos 
salarios y productividad que no hacen fácil acumulación de activos y aumento del 
consumo. 
Al contrario, en los casos de México, Marruecos y Nicaragua, la migración internacional 
parece haber sido la principal respuesta a la lentitud del ritmo de creación de empleos. No 
obstante el rol de la industrialización importante en un país como México, las 
migraciones desempeñaron y siguen desempeñando un papel importante en el proceso de 
transición: con alrededor del diez por ciento de su población que vive en países de 
mejores ingresos (lo que no es el caso en las migraciones intra-africanas), estos países 
han accedido a una poderosa alternativa adicional que ha facilitado su transición 
económica, así como las migraciones europeas hacia los “nuevos mundos” lo hicieron de 
cierta manera para las transiciones europeas. En el contexto actual, esta tendencia parece 
difícil de reproducir a un mismo nivel en los países de África subsahariana. 
El desafío de la agricultura frente a la mundialización 
La creciente fuerza de trabajo pone una presión adicional sobre la agricultura en los 
países donde el sector ocupa la mayor parte de la estructura del empleo. Asimismo, la 
evolución de la agricultura y su capacidad de absorción serán determinantes en la gestión 
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de la transición económica, a sabiendas de que el trabajo familiar y el trabajo por cuenta 
propia siempre han sido una de las principales características de la agricultura. Se trata 
evidentemente de un tema central para África subsahariana, pero también en países como 
Nicaragua o Marruecos, donde una parte significativa de la población se sustenta gracias 
a este sector. 
En los países en desarrollo, la agricultura se enfrenta hoy a dos cambios mayores 
relacionados con la mundialización. El primero es una consecuencia directa de una 
economía global más abierta, impulsada por el aumento de los intercambios de larga 
distancia, donde sistemas agrícolas con distintos niveles de productividad y de apoyo 
público compiten por los mismos mercados internacionales. Los agricultores tienen que 
manejar diferencias de productividad que van de 1 a 1000, lo que corresponde en el caso 
de los cereales, a diferencias entre sistemas manuales sin "paquete técnico” de la 
Revolución Verde y sistemas intensificados, motorizados y, a veces, subvencionados. 
Estas diferencias constituyen un problema crucial, porque la competitividad no sólo se 
refiere a ventajas en términos de costos y calidad de los productos, sino también en 
términos de capacidades de oferta que determinan las cuotas de mercado y también la 
facultad de abastecer tanto los mercados locales como internacionales. En paralelo, los 
apoyos públicos directos (al ingreso o bajo forma de crédito) e indirectos (gestión de los 
riesgos) ayudan a los productores de la OCDE a sobrellevar diferentemente las 
limitaciones económicas o naturales. 
El segundo proceso se refiere a la reestructuración global de los sistemas 
agroalimentarios. Esta se caracteriza a la vez por la integración vertical de las cadenas de 
valor y por el desarrollo de nuevas redes de distribución impulsadas por la demanda 
("revolución de los supermercados"). Estas reconfiguraciones ofrecen nuevas 
oportunidades a los productores, pero también modifican las reglas del mercado. El 
fortalecimiento de las normas sanitarias y de los estándares de calidad de los productos 
con alto valor agregado o de los sistemas de abastecimiento de los supermercados, exigen 
una capacidad de adaptación elevada por parte de los productores. Esta tendencia 
refuerza la diferenciación entre los agricultores en función de sus propios activos (capital 
y conocimientos) y del acceso al mercado (para los cuales el desarrollo de bienes 
públicos - típicamente infraestructuras e informaciones - es decisivo). 
El desarrollo de estos procesos es obviamente muy variado entre países, regiones y 
cadenas. La expansión de la contratación relacionada con el nuevo funcionamiento y con 
los requisitos más importantes de los mercados sigue siendo limitado y contrastado en 
África subsahariana donde se refiere principalmente al sector hortícola en su definición 
más amplia. En México y Nicaragua, los sistemas de adquisición están más desarrollados 
e incluyen igualmente productos lácteos y otros productos de origen animal. En África 
subsahariana, solo un máximo de decenas de miles de agricultores están involucrados en 
estos procesos en cada país, mientras que cientos de miles y hasta millones de personas 
producen alimentos básicos y productos tradicionales para la exportación. 
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Las alternativas a la agricultura y la reconfiguración de las economías rurales 
En este contexto que ofrece oportunidades desiguales, una cuestión central para los 
productores es su capacidad de adaptación a un entorno económico competitivo, así como 
a crecientes limitaciones: el aumento de los precios de los insumos, las dificultades de 
acceso a los factores de producción o las consecuencias de la degradación de los recursos 
naturales (estos dos últimos agravados a veces por la presión demográfica). 
Aunque el actual incremento de los precios alimenticios pueda mejorar fuertemente la 
situación de los productores excedentarios, la cuestión central sigue siendo la capacidad 
de los diferentes grupos de agricultores de enfrentarse a un contexto en el cual la 
evolución de la gestión de los riesgos depende principalmente de sus propios recursos: 
algunos productores son capaces de manejar las nuevas oportunidades y limitaciones; 
otros tienen que diversificar sus actividades y fuentes de ingresos para sostenerse; otros 
más no son capaces de adaptarse, y son expulsados del sector agrícola, y a veces de las 
zonas rurales. 
Por supuesto, la pauta de estos procesos de adaptación se basa principalmente en las 
alternativas económicas existentes, a nivel local, regional y nacional, y a veces en el 
extranjero, mediante migraciones internas e internacionales. Aunque su conocimiento sea 
incompleto, nuevos sistemas de actividades e ingresos más complejos y diversificados 
remodelan progresivamente las economías rurales. Sin embargo, la cuestión fundamental 
sigue siendo hasta que punto las adaptaciones puedan ocurrir y contribuir al proceso 
mundial de transición económica. 
Primera lección para la formulación de políticas públicas 
Debido al papel central de la agricultura en el proceso de transición económica de 
muchos países en desarrollo, el contenido de las políticas agrícolas debe ser 
cuidadosamente diseñado, coordinado y articulado con las demás políticas sectoriales. Se 
debe prestar especial atención a adecuarlas con políticas de diversificación económica y 
de creación de empleos tanto en las economías urbanas como rurales (mejoramiento del 
clima de inversión, dotación en bienes públicos, capacitación). Este enfoque global debe 
integrarse en una visión voluntarista y renovada de las estrategias de desarrollo. 
La falta de información adecuada sobre estos procesos de recomposición inconclusa 
constituye una gran desventaja para la definición de políticas. El reforzamiento de las 
inversiones en los diseños y la gestión de los sistemas de información capaces de captar 
las nuevas realidades debe ser una prioridad, porque son una piedra angular para la 
definición de políticas públicas adecuadas. En paralelo, la apropiación de los procesos de 
elaboración de las políticas por actores locales es esencial; puede ser facilitada por el 
involucramiento directo de expertos nacionales en este desafío de la información y del 
conocimiento. 
Debido al peso determinante de los temas de las actividades y del empleo, las políticas 
agrícolas deben centrarse en la mayoría, dirigirse y apoyar en prioridad las cadenas de 
valor que ofrecen las mejores oportunidades en términos de actividades y de generación 
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de ingresos. Desde esta perspectiva, y debido al aumento de los requisitos de la demanda 
impulsada por los mercados, los mercados de alimentos nacionales y regionales ofrecen 
un alto potencial de desarrollo con menores limitaciones. Tal elección favorece la 
promoción de un modelo inclusivo de desarrollo que toma en cuenta el desafío del 
empleo. De la misma forma, conviene evitar escoger soluciones únicamente técnicas 
dirigidas hacia un solo objetivo. Esto es típicamente el caso del aumento de la 
productividad - que es obviamente un objetivo indiscutible en la perspectiva de 
crecimiento del sector, de la distribución del ingreso, y del alivio de la pobreza – pero que 
debe al mismo tiempo considerar las dimensiones del empleo de las elecciones técnicas. 
Por último, aparece que la calidad del debate político será determinante para abordar la 
complejidad y la singularidad de la situación económica de los países con base agrícola. 
La adopción de una perspectiva amplia, que posiciona el futuro de la agricultura en el 
panorama mundial, es indispensable para renovar los debates a nivel nacional, regional y 
continental. Es además esencial para responder al desafío de las transiciones económicas 
y demográficas con la mundialización. 
 xvi 
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1 General introduction 
The RuralStruc (RS) Program on the “Structural Dimensions of Liberalization on 
Agriculture and Rural Development” is a three-year (2006-2008) cross-regional 
Economic and Sector Work (ESW) placed under the Sustainable Development 
Department of the World Bank and managed by the Agriculture and Rural Development 
Unit of the Africa Vice-Presidency (AFTAR). The program officially started in October 
2005 and was launched formally in April 2006 with a workshop in M’Bour, Senegal, 
after a preparation phase dedicated to the identification and selection of the contributing 
partners in the selected countries. 
This document’s objective is to provide the background and rationale of the program and 
the main results of its first phase (2006-07). These results aim to elaborate upon an 
overview of structural change processes in the agricultural and rural economy of every 
participating country. It is based on national reports prepared by the contributing partners 
through desktop studies relying on what is known about these issues.1 Updated 
information and analyses, based on fieldwork and data collection, will be provided by the 
on-going second phase (2007-08). As a consequence, this document does not pretend to 
present a state of the art on program’s core issues. 
1.1 Overview of the RuralStruc Program 
The RuralStruc Program is supported by a free-standing multi-donor trust fund sponsored 
by the World Bank and the French Cooperation (Ministry of Foreign and European 
Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Agence Française de Développement 
(AFD) and Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le 
Développement (CIRAD)). The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 
joined the program for its second phase, which is locally supported by additional donors 
in three countries of the program (the Swiss Development Agency (DDC) and the Finnish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
There are three purposes of the RuralStruc Program: (i) contribute to the analytical 
knowledge base about the structural implications of liberalization and economic 
integration for agriculture and rural development in developing countries, (ii) feed and 
improve the international and national debates by promoting these issues, and (iii) 
                                                 
1
 The national reports are referenced in the document using the following: (RS Country, 
p.x). Their executive summaries are provided in annex 2.  
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provide guidelines for policy making. Consequently, one of its original characteristics is 
the core methodological choice of developing activities through local partnerships – 
using local teams – whose purpose is to foster both local ownership and the public policy 
debate. 
The program adopts a broad approach, which is not limited to trade liberalization, and 
also includes domestic reform, state withdrawal, privatization, and decentralization in 
historical perspective in order to explore the trajectories of structural change and to 
identify factors of convergence and divergence between countries through comparative 
analyses. 
Box 1: “RuralStruc” – what’s in a name? 
The selection of the acronym used to name this program on the structural dimensions of liberalization on 
agriculture and rural development clearly relates to the choice of bringing structural issues into a debate 
mainly focused on trade issues. Using the iceberg image, structural transformation refers to what is under 
the waterline, while trade liberalization is only the tip. The program’s logo draws on this image. 
RuralStruc refers both to rural structures and to the implications of global structural change on agriculture 
and rural economies. The main objective of the program is to reconnect the on-going processes within 
agriculture to more global restructuring processes related to globalization, and to address some recurring 
blind spots of the international debate like the growing productivity asymmetries between countries, the 
demographic challenges of several developing regions, and their consequences on each country’s unique 
process of structural transformation. 
Seven countries are involved in the program, each of which corresponds with a different 
stage in the process of liberalization and economic integration: 
- Mexico, on one side, serves as an example of a deep integration and liberalization 
process and provides a background picture with the experience of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
- Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), on the other side, with Senegal, Mali, Kenya and 
Madagascar, provides an illustration of partial integration and liberalization 
processes, initiated through state reform, privatizations and lowering of tariffs, 
that are all still in progress (e.g. negotiations with the European Union of the 
Economic Partnership Programs - EPAs). 
- Morocco and Nicaragua represent two additional case studies of rapid integration 
processes through the implementation of free trade agreements (with the 
European Union and the United States in the case of Morocco, and with the USA 
in the case of Nicaragua and the implementation of the Central America Free 
Trade Agreement - CAFTA). 
RuralStruc’s main themes are (i) vertical and horizontal integration and their impacts on 
differentiation in production and marketing structures; (ii) the demographic and economic 
transitions (particularly the shift of the economically active population (EAP) between 
economic sectors) and the risks of transition impasses (leading to international 
migration); and (iii) the reshaping of rural economies as a response to these global 
processes of change, related to the development of non-farm activities and the 
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development of private and public transfers (remittances and social safety nets when they 
exist). This reshaping of rural economies concurs with the diagnosis formed in the World 
Bank’s last World Development Report (WDR08), which identifies diversification of 
activities and income as main pathways out of rural poverty (World Bank 2007). 
1.2 Background: agriculture is back on the agenda 
Forgotten over the last two decades by donors and many governments, agricultural 
development-related issues are back on the international agenda. Indeed, since the 
RuralStruc Program initiated, several events and new related debates have highlighted the 
recurring importance of agriculture for development. This comeback is critical and 
decisive for the orientation of public policies. 
At the time of RuralStruc’s preparation in 2005, two main frameworks structured the 
international debate about development: the United Nations’ Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs), and the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) “Development cycle” or 
Doha Development Agenda (DDA), set at the Doha ministerial conference (2001). 
Agriculture was clearly part of these two main agendas, sometimes occupying a key 
position (case of the DDA), but was never the core issue. 
The MDGs provided a global framework based on poverty alleviation. The first goal –“to 
halve poverty and hunger before 2015” – is clearly agriculture-related: 70% of the 
world’s poor (45% of the world’s population) live in rural areas and rural people rely 
mainly on agriculture as a livelihood; and improved food supply and availability is 
central for hunger alleviation. The decisive role of agriculture in “pro-poor growth” was 
also reaffirmed by broad cross-country analyses performed by the World Bank (2005a). 
However, poverty remained the central issue and agricultural development was only one 
of the means cited to fight poverty among many other thematic and non-sectoral issues. 
The WTO negotiations logically focused on trade liberalization, where agriculture is one 
sector, among others, to be liberalized. However, agriculture has progressively become 
the main stumbling block in the negotiation process, used by developing countries (DCs) 
as a core argument to engage with developed countries on the broader issue of the 
liberalization of industrial products and services. It led to the failure of the Cancún 
ministerial (2003), initiating a large debate on the costs and benefits of trade 
liberalization of agriculture. This overwhelming focus on agriculture and trade and its 
domination over the international debate was one of the main justifications of the 
RuralStruc initiative. 
Since 2005, the debate has been renewed and the global picture has been marked by 
several events and evolutions. On the trade side, the WTO debate has faded due to 
continuous impasses, particularly regarding agriculture, as seen at the Hong-Kong 
ministerial (2005) and the following Geneva meetings. Increasing attention was dedicated 
to bilateral or regional Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and major stakeholders decided to 
carry on bilaterally what was impossible to achieve at the global level.  
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Among other reasons explaining the declining interest in trade liberalization in 
international debates are additional estimations which downgraded its expected gains and 
pointed out the specific situation of many developing countries, particularly in Africa, 
which could probably incur net losses rather than gains (Box 2). In this context, 
negotiations have become more acute on OECD countries’ subsidies and market access. 
Box 2: Estimated gains of the further agricultural trade liberalization 
Additional work on trade liberalization and its impacts has provided a more detailed picture, thus 
downgrading the projected gains of liberalization.  
Initial gains were expected to be substantial. For instance, Anderson and Martin (2005) estimated that the 
elimination of agricultural subsidies and the liberalization of merchandise trade would lead to an increase in 
global income by $300 billion per year by 2015. But various authors such as Polaski (2006) or Bureau et al. 
(2006) have found that the actual gains from trade liberalization are less impressive. Polaski projects gains 
at the aggregate global level on the order of only $40 to $60 billion (an increase of less than 0.2% of 
current global gross domestic product (GDP). 
Moreover, these modest overall gains would have varied economic effects on different countries and 
regions: there are both net winners and net losers and the poorest countries are among the net losers under 
all likely Doha scenarios. China is the country that stands to gain the most from global trade liberalization 
with overall projected gains ranging from 0.8 to 1.2% of GDP, whilst some Sub-Saharan African countries 
are expected to be the biggest losers with an overall reduction in income of just less than 1%.  
However, particular assessments of agricultural trade liberalization itself show a global picture where the 
benefits are expected for the developed countries, while developing countries – on the whole – will 
experience slight losses. But, again, aggregated figures are the enemy in the debate and differences in 
impact among countries and regions are meaningful: while a few countries such as Brazil, Argentina and 
Thailand gain, more countries suffer small losses such as the Sub-Saharan Africa countries, Bangladesh, 
Middle Eastern and North African countries, as well as Vietnam, Mexico, and China (which should lose in 
agriculture when winning globally). 
As part of the recent analysis, authors pointed out that the initially large gains for developing countries 
predicted by some models were largely driven by particular assumptions about market equilibrium (notably 
labor) and inaccurate tariff data (Polaski 2006), underestimation of the impacts of price instability 
(Boussard et al. 2005), and excessive country aggregation (explained by the limitations of the existing 
databases) that hide the varied outcomes experienced by different developing country groups (Bouët et al. 
2005). This is particularly the case of the Sub-Saharan Africa countries, which are all aggregated in the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) database – the data reference of most of the projections.  
The current trend in this debate is that trade liberalization can help foster growth but needs careful design in 
the strategizing process of its implementation with specific accompanying domestic policies. 
Trade issues are also relativized by the renewed and growing concern over global climate 
change, which was stressed by the Stern Review on the economics of climate change (HM 
Treasury 2006) and later by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
report (Bates et al. 2008), because this phenomenon poses a threat to agricultural 
development and, hence, development as a whole. These broad analyses emphasize the 
impact of climate change on natural resources and agriculture by showing that climate 
change is expected to have various adverse effects such as increased rainfall variability, 
long-term drying trends, a reduction in cultivable land and a reduction in the length of the 
growing season. Out of all the regions, Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to suffer the most: 
the IPCC projects annual agricultural losses of between 2 and 7% of GDP in the region 
by 2100, Cline (2007) projects a reduction of 28% in agricultural output by 2080, and the 
World Bank (2006) predicts an average decline of 30% of net revenues/ha across all 
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African countries. These reports stress the need for special mitigating measures to 
prevent 120 million additional people from suffering from hunger. They also stress the 
role of agriculture in resource management and resource degradation.  
In this context, the choice made by the World Bank to select agriculture for its flagship 
report on development (WDR08) provided the necessary momentum for a new focus and 
a new perspective on agriculture. Its broad dissemination process has facilitated the 
comeback of agriculture in the international debate on development. Named “Agriculture 
for Development”, the WDR08 strongly reinforces the roles of agriculture as a main 
sector of economic activity in most developing countries (as a source of labor, growth 
and of comparative advantage), an important social sector due to the large share of the 
population involved, and an important user of natural resources.  
Box 3: The WDR08 and its “three worlds”  
The WDR08 proposes a regionalized approach of agriculture for development and identifies three distinct 
worlds of agriculture depending on its contribution to growth and on the rural share of global poverty: an 
agriculture-based, a transforming, and an urbanized world. In each world, the agriculture-for-development 
agenda differs in pursuit of sustainable growth and poverty reduction.  
In the agriculture-based countries, which include most of Sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture and its associated 
industries are essential to growth and to reducing mass poverty and food insecurity. They provide jobs, 
activities, incomes, and food self-sufficiency. In transforming countries, which include most of South and 
East Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, rapidly rising rural-urban income disparities and persistent 
extreme rural poverty are major sources of social and political tensions; rural diversification and 
agricultural income growth are answers to these challenges. In urbanized countries, including most of Latin 
America, much of Europe and Central Asia, agriculture can help reduce the remaining rural poverty if 
smallholders become direct suppliers in modern food markets, good jobs are created in agriculture and 
agro-industry, and if markets for environmental services are introduced. 
 
Sources: World Bank 2007, p. 31-32  
Note: The poverty line is $1.08 a day in 1993 purchasing power parity dollars. 
The WDR08 suggests three pathways out of rural poverty in order to explain how agricultural growth can 
reduce rural poverty: (i) agricultural entrepreneurship, (ii) the rural labor market, and (iii) the rural non-
farm economy and migration to towns, cities or other countries. Several pathways often operate 
simultaneously and the complementary effects of farm and non-farm activities can be strong. Although 
rural households engage in farming, labor and migration, one of these activities usually dominates as a 
source of income. 
 6 
The WDR08 also provides an insightful review of what is known about the mechanisms 
of agricultural development and how agriculture can leverage the development process. 
The latter is based on a regionalized vision of the world’s agriculture, which depicts the 
specific roles and challenges of agriculture in the development process depending on its 
weight in the regional economy (Box 3). This targeted approach has strongly contributed 
to the success of the report and fostered its discussion at regional level. 
New events characterizing the international food markets over the last two years have 
modified the global picture – particularly since the beginning of 2008 with a substantial 
and rapid increase of food prices (Box 4). These events, predictably, contribute to 
renewed interest in food and agriculture issues; however, they also tend to focus attention 
on short-term issues and mitigation. 
Box 4: Food price increase: the facts 
While the FAO food price index rose on average 8% in 2006 compared with the previous year, in 2007 it 
increased by 24% from 2006. For the first three months of 2008 when compared to the same three months 
in 2007 the increase reaches 53%. The sharp rise in prices has been led by vegetable oils with nearly a 97% 
increase, followed by grains (87%), dairy products (58%) and rice (46%) (FAO 2008). 
The current trend in food prices is expected to persist in the medium-term: food crop prices are projected to 
stay high in 2008 and 2009 and then follow a downward trend but to remain above 2004 levels through 
2015 for most food crops. The OECD-FAO “Agricultural outlook for 2008-2017” anticipates the same kind 
of evolution: prices are expected to decrease but to stay quite high in the medium-term. In the nominal-
term, projections for 2008-2017 express that prices of meat, sugar, wheat and maize, and vegetable oil will 
increase by respectively 20, 30, 40 to 60 and 80% when compared to the 1998-2007 period (OECD-FAO 
2008). 
Different demand-side and supply-side factors led to these high food prices and there is a 
fervent debate on the role played by each of them (Box 5). Nevertheless, and whatever 
the contribution of each factor, one main conclusion is that there is no global food 
shortage in the medium-term: the core issue is the cost of food and not the lack of food, 
and the main concern is the access to food for low-income consumers. The challenge 
today is to simultaneously help farmers to reap the benefits of the current price increase, 
mitigate its impact on the poorest consumers, increase food production to counter-act 
increasing prices, and also improve producers’ income through higher yields. 
Box 5: Food price increase: the main reasons 
On the supply-side, weather-related production shortfalls, stock levels and increasing fuel costs have all 
contributed to booming prices. With regard to production shortfalls, the most important occurrence is a 
drop in output – by 4-7% in 2005 and 2006 respectively – in eight major exporting countries, which 
constitute nearly half of global production. High food prices are also influenced by a gradual reduction in 
the level of stocks, mainly of cereals, since the mid-1990s; since the previous high-price event in 1995, 
global stock levels have, on average, declined by 3.4% per year. The boost in fuel prices increases the costs 
of producing agricultural commodities as well as the costs of transportation. Energy prices have augmented 
sharply, as seen with more than a doubling of the Reuters-CRB energy price index over a period of three 
years, since the middle of 2004. 
On the demand-side, the changing structure of demand, the emergence of bio-fuels, and operations on 
financial markets are cited as contributory factors towards raising food prices. With regard to the changing 
structure of demand, it is widely accepted that economic development and income growth in important 
emerging countries are gradually changing the structure of demand for food commodities (especially in 
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China and India). Diets are moving towards more meat and dairy products, away from starchy foods. For 
instance, in China, per capita meat consumption increased from 20 kg/year in 1980 to 50 kg at present; at 
the same time, the Chinese population rose from less than 1 billion to more than 1.3 billion people. 
Although cited as a factor, it must be noted that these changes are progressive. The emerging bio-fuels 
market is a new and significant source of demand for some agricultural commodities such as sugar, maize, 
cassava, oilseeds and palm oil, because crude oil price increase allow them to become viable substitutes in 
countries that have the capacity to produce (not to mention subsidize) them. The development of maize-
based ethanol production in particular impacts by contagion effect the other cereal markets. On the subject 
of financial markets, derivatives markets offer an expanding range of financial instruments to increase 
portfolio diversification and reduce risk exposures. These derivatives markets can attract speculators and 
the resultant influx of liquidity is likely to influence the underlying spot markets. More likely, however, 
speculators contribute to raising spot price volatility rather than to long-term price trends. 
Agriculture is now back on the agenda of development and its contribution to growth, 
trade, and poverty alleviation is no longer in question: donors and governments are 
reengaging. This context provides an opportunity to broaden the debate and to propose a 
global perspective where agriculture is not only a supplier of food products but also a 
core activity of rural livelihoods. Agriculture is part of the process of structural 
transformation and is also deeply reshaped by the new trends in the agrifood markets and 
the general consequences of globalization. Understanding these processes is critical for 
the identification of the adequate development policies. 
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2 Rationale, hypotheses and design of the program 
The main objective of the RuralStruc Program when it was initially discussed in 2005 
(World Bank 2005b) was to provide an additional perspective to an international debate 
on agriculture that was clearly focused on trade liberalization and its price effects (both at 
the macro level and the micro level, notably its distributional impacts). In particular, its 
purpose was to feed this debate with other effects, facts and analyses related to more 
structural dimensions of liberalization and to discuss their consequences regarding the 
broad processes of structural transformation. This perspective has strongly founded the 
rationale of the program and shaped its main hypotheses, while the objective of 
contribution to the national and international debates determined its design. 
2.1 Agriculture in the process of structural transformation and the 
challenges of globalization 
The structural transformation of economies and societies is a core issue in development 
studies. Historical records and statistical evidence (Timmer & Akkus 2008) show a 
progressive switch from agriculture (the original “primary” activity of every sedentary 
population), to industry (the “secondary” activities) and then to services (the “tertiary” 
activities). The well-known underlying dynamics of this structural change – or “economic 
transition” from one configuration to the next – is productivity gains in agriculture, based 
on innovation that fosters technical change and allows labor and capital transfers towards 
other economic activities. This process is accompanied by progressive spatial 
restructuring from scattered activities (typically agriculture) to more concentrated ones 
(typically industry), with migration of labor and people from country to cities. Rural 
depopulation fosters cities’ growth, which initially developed for defense and trade 
purposes. 
Alongside the process of growing urbanization, this global economic transformation has 
induced increasing incomes and wealth, which translates into improved living conditions. 
This, in turn, initiated the process of demographic transition (progressive reduction of 
mortality and birth rates, the differences of which explain different population growth 
dynamics – see infra). 
Evidence of this global structural process of change can be found in various regions 
across the world, albeit with different paths and paces, starting with the closely related 
agricultural and industrial revolutions of Western Europe at the end of the 18th century, 
followed by the USA, other regions of Europe, the main part of Latin America and 
various regions of Asia. 
One of the main challenges of the present period is the simultaneous acceleration of 
change and the growing asymmetries between regions of the world characterized by 
different stages in this process of economic transition. This situation is unique in world 
history. The current globalization process is too often trivialized as a “second 
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globalization” with reference to a first period between the 1860s and the First World 
War, when increasing flows of goods, labor and capital connected Europe with its 
immediate periphery (Russia, Ottoman Empire) and most of all with the “New Worlds” – 
mainly the USA (Berger 2002). However, this globalization of the early 20th century was, 
first of all, a process of convergence in the North Atlantic economy, driven by migration 
flows (O’Rourke & Williamson 1999), with a significantly different geopolitical order 
(mainly European colonial empires and the American influence zone in Latin America).  
In comparison, the globalization of today involves an increasing “global world” 
integration – facilitated by continuous technical progresses in transportation of goods, 
capital and, particularly, information – with new financial instruments, a greater 
concentration of assets among global firms and institutional investors, and the 
development of intra-industry trade. The emerging result of this integration is a deeper 
interconnection of both markets and human societies, which impacts their structure. The 
consequence is a global confrontation between different stages of social and economic 
development resulting from specific development trajectories and from different 
modalities and sequences of integration in the world economy. 
Box 6: Liberalization or globalization? 
In the early definition of the RuralStruc Program, liberalization was understood in a broad sense as the 
global process of change engaged in the early 1980s, that included trade and domestic reform, state 
withdrawal from economic activities, privatization, and, in many developing countries, the reform of the 
state through decentralization and the development of democracy. 
The aim of the RS program was to focus on all of the structural implications of this new context, which 
explains the choice for the denomination of the program. However, although we adopted a broad definition 
of liberalization, this “official positioning” of the program’s name quickly appeared inadequate: 
- Firstly, because the understanding of the objectives was often restricted to the policy package 
dimension of the reform process associated with liberalization and, consequently, was perceived as a 
critical approach of the reforms – which was obviously not the purpose; and 
- Secondly, this misinterpretation implicitly limited the scope of the processes at stake. 
After engaging in debates with both the donor community and the national partners, it appears that 
“globalization” would have been more relevant than “liberalization” in the denomination of the program. 
Such a positioning could appear to be an excessive scope. Nevertheless, what the program clearly addresses 
is the new international regime engaged in the early 1980s and its consequence for agriculture and rural 
economies. This new regime is characterized by new roles for the state and private actors, as well as by a 
broad and deep movement towards integration of the world economy. 
Among the main structural dimensions of this new international regime, two key themes 
are targeted by the RuralStruc Program: (i) the consequences of the “confrontation” effect 
between different levels of productivity and competitiveness in an increasingly open 
economy, and (ii) the global agrifood system restructuring and its impacts at national 
levels. Simultaneously, a demographic perspective is adopted to confront these processes 
of economic structural change with the trends of evolution of the economically active 
population (EAP) to subsequently discuss the challenges of present structural 
transformation. 
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2.1.1 The “confrontation effect” 
Presently, a large portion of the world’s labor force (45% or approximately 1.3 billion 
people) is still engaged in agriculture.2 Out of this agricultural EAP (AgEAP), 97% are in 
developing countries (14% in SSA, 78% in Asia, less than 4% in Latin America). 
Consequently, the agricultural population, i.e. all the persons depending on agriculture 
for their living, totals 2.6 billion people (41% of the world population). Differences 
among regions are remarkable, particularly if we refer to the “three worlds” of agriculture 
presented by the WRD08. Whereas agriculture still plays a major role in SSA, which is 
the core of the “agriculture-based countries” (where on average 64% of the EAP is 
engaged in agriculture), AgEAP counts for less than 20% in the “urbanized countries” of 
Latin America. The “transforming world” of Asia presents more contrasts with 
significant differences between China and India (with respective AgEAP of 64% and 
57%) and other countries in the region (Indonesia 45%, and Malaysia with a mere 15%). 
Behind these aggregates, critical differences in productivity exist. For instance, if we 
confront the cereal production of developing countries – characterized by manual labor, a 
lack of Green Revolution packages (industrial inputs) and a single agricultural cycle per 
year – with the most heavily mechanized, high input level (not to mention subsidized) 
farms of developed countries (and some specific regions of DCs), the commonly 
accepted world productivity gap is a minimum of 1 to 1000. This gap (Table 1) is a 
durable obstacle to competitiveness in the context of increasing competition in a 
globalized open economy. This is a major issue because one must bear in mind that the 
three pillars of competitiveness are, of course, production costs, but also the response to 
the quality requirements, and the volume of supply. In the current context of increasing 
food demand and high prices, the most productive farming systems are the ones able to 
take advantage of the new market opportunities, as they will be able to provide additional 
supply quickly. For less productive and competitive agriculture the risk of progressive 
marginalization due to decreasing market shares seems a possible trend. 
This progressive marginalization is a legitimate concern because it refers to the existing 
employment alternatives for the AgEAP, which continues to increase in relation to the 
demographic growth (see below). 
Despite the issues raised by the different agricultural productivity and competitiveness 
levels between developed and developing countries, the confrontation effects remain a 
blind spot in the international debate that must be taken into account when analyzing the 
past and future role of agriculture in DCs. 
                                                 
2
 Figures on agriculture EAP come from FAOSTAT. See the discussion in 3.1.2. 
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Table 1: Existing world’s gross productivity gaps in cereal production 
Number of workers Green 
Revolution 
Mechanization Area per 
worker 
(ha) 
Land 
productivity 
(tons/ha) 
Labor 
productivity 
(tons/worker) 
Millions %      
30 2 Yes Tractors 100 10 1000 
410 32 Yes Animal traction 5 or 
2.5 (x 2 
harvests) 
10 
 
50 
410 32 Yes Manual tools 1 or 
0.5 (x 2 
harvests) 
10 
 
10 
450 35 No Manual tools 1  
0.5 
1 (rainfed) 
2 (irrigated) 
1 
1300 100      
Source: adapted from Mazoyer (2001) 
2.1.2 Restructuring the global agrifood system  
The other driver of change (since the early 1980s) is the progressive restructuring of the 
global agrifood system, which has overtaken the slow and difficult progress made 
towards the liberalization of agricultural trade. The “agricultural exception”, allowed 
since 1947 under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regime, only 
began to be addressed in the launch of the Uruguay Round in 1986. This exception 
formally ended with the Marrakech Agreement of 1994, but since then negotiations for 
further trade liberalization have stalled within the WTO framework. 
At the same time, but at a different pace, the global characteristics and functioning of the 
agrifood markets have been deeply affected by the emergence of globalization. The 
concurrence of market deregulation and privatization, on one side, and the emergence of 
demand-driven markets boosted by global income increase, on the other, has radically 
reconfigured the global pattern with new structural trends. 
Firstly, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have increased rapidly in reaction to new 
capital mobility fostered by deregulation, new financial instruments, firms’ needs to find 
external sources of growth – through new markets and more efficient production costs – 
and by taking advantage of the opportunities created by privatization. This situation leads 
to market globalization and to concentration processes related to competition for market 
shares. 
Secondly, an increasing demand for high-value food products, a consequence of new 
diets resulting from growing incomes (with a bigger share of fresh products – fruits and 
vegetables, meat and dairy), has introduced new quality requirements particularly those 
linked to sanitary issues and the specific needs of fresh product marketing (appearance, 
packaging, speed of distribution, etc.). Simultaneously, new high-value market segments 
have emerged related to the development of organic food, fair trade and other ethical 
concerns. These demand-driven trends, significantly different from the historical basic 
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food supply, have translated into new norms and standards for dealing with these more 
complex quality issues; the consequence of these new norms and standards is increasing 
transaction costs linked to the compliance with these new requirements. 
Thirdly, improvements in communication and transportation facilitate long-distance 
transactions and the globalization of the food supply chains, for both the food industry 
and food distribution.3 On both sides, the trend toward concentration – related to global 
competition fostered by increasing FDI –translates into vertical integration of the value 
chains and the development of new distribution systems with the rise of the supermarket 
model, which is a way to guarantee the supply in due time of the requested quality 
products.  
This deep restructuring has radically changed the landscape of the agrifood system 
(Reardon & Timmer 2007). On the one hand, this evolution comes with a growing 
disconnect of local farmers from their national markets, which can now be supplied from 
abroad. On the other hand, it allows for the integration of some local producers into 
global chains and provides new opportunities for growth. However, the new rules 
resulting from this new context require adaptation by producers who must now observe 
the new quality requirements, which often imply capital and technical skills. Therefore, 
understanding the consequences of this new trend in terms of inclusion and/or exclusion 
of producers in these global value chains is a critical issue. Again, similar to the 
consequences of the confrontation effect, the risks of marginalization must be evaluated 
in the light of alternative activities for the people working in agriculture. 
2.1.3 The new demographic pattern and its challenges 
The progressive restructuring of the global agrifood markets and the consequences of the 
confrontation between different types of farming systems and productivity levels have to 
be put into perspective with a rapidly evolving demographic context. Over the past few 
decades, the challenge of “nourishing the planet” has been of critical international 
concern, and is often exacerbated by circumstances such as natural disasters. This 
challenge has been reactivated by the interaction of the potential impacts of climate 
change on production and the rising new demands linked to evolving diets and bio-fuels; 
all these factors translate into the current price increase and greater volatility (see 
introduction). However, at the same time, one must consider that the global population 
continues to grow. 
According to the last United Nations projections, the world population will reach 9.1 
billion people in 2050 – nearly 2.5 billion more people than today (see Table 2). 
                                                 
3
 The sustainability of this trend will of course depend on the evolution of transport costs (see the recent oil 
price increase). 
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Although these statistics are widely acknowledged, a matter that receives less attention is 
the distribution of this population increase across regions and the consequences of this 
distribution on the respective regional economic structures. This unequal distribution is a 
direct consequence of different stages in the process of demographic transition 
experienced regionally. Whilst Europe shows characteristics of the final stage of 
transition, with an ageing and declining population, Sub Saharan Africa or South-Central 
Asia are still booming, demonstrating different phases within the transition. However, 
SSA and South-Central Asia are booming at different rates: SSA’s population should 
duplicate by 2050, reaching 1.7 billion people, while South-Central Asia should “only” 
grow by 40%. Thus, Sub-Saharan Africa should become the second most populated 
region of the world (after South Asia). Simultaneously, East Asia’s population growth 
(mainly China) should come to a halt as a consequence of the radical birth policies in 
place since the 1970s, and East Asia should progressively face the same problems 
presently seen in Europe (i.e. the burden of an ageing population). 
The main result of this differentiated evolution will be a new mapping of the world, 
which will inevitably influence the current balance of power. As Guengant (2007) 
reminds us, SSA should regain its former share of the world population – around 20% – 
and should overtake China in 2050 (interestingly, the two had a very close population 
around the 16th century). Europe and North America combined should represent fewer 
than 15% of the world’s total population (Table 2). 
The main economic concern with the demographic transition relates to the evolution of 
the activity structure of the population, which reflects its age structure (Bloom et al. 
2001). It translates into different dependency or activity ratios4 summarizing the 
respective portions of active and inactive people in the economy. In the first phase of 
demographic transition, the population is young with a high share of young, inactive 
people; during the second stage, these cohorts become active and could offer a bonus to 
the economy named the “demographic dividend”. Finally, the third stage corresponds to 
the ageing of these cohorts, thus increasing the dependency ratio (or decreasing the 
activity ratio). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 The ratio commonly used is the dependency ratio, i.e. the inactive population : the active population.; 
however, because we examine activity and employment, we use the activity ratio (active : inactive) which 
is more illustrative for our purposes. 
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Table 2: World population increase in selected regions: 1960-2050 (millions) 
Region 1960 1990 2010 2050 2010-2050 
 MM % MM % MM % MM % Increase % 
            
Eastern Asia 792 26.1 1,344 25.4 1,563 22.6 1,591 17.3 29 2 
South-Central Asia 622 20.5 1,243 23.5 1,777 25.7 2,536 27.6 759 43 
            
Sub-Saharan Africa 226 7.5 519 9.8 867 12.6 1,761 19.2 894 103 
            
North America 204 6.7 284 5.4 349 5.0 445 4.8 97 28 
Latin America and Caribbean 220 7.3 444 8.4 594 8.6 769 8.4 176 30 
            
Europe 605 20.0 721 13.6 730 10.6 664 7.2 -66 -9 
            
WORLD 3,032 100 5,295 100 6,907 100 9,191 100 2, 285 33 
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects, 2006 Revision.  
Note: for the definition of regions see: http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=5 
Figure 1 illustrates the consequences of staggered and differentiated demographic 
transitions. Due to its high population growth rate since the 1960s (higher than 2.5% per 
year over 40 years, with a peak at 3% in the 1980s), Sub-Saharan Africa had to deal in 
the 1980s and 1990s with the weakest activity ratio ever recorded, with approximately 
only one active person per inactive person (and less than one active in some Sub-Saharan 
Africa countries). This heavy burden must be put into perspective with these two decades 
of economic crisis and structural adjustment, thus shedding new light on the SSA context. 
During the same period, East Asia benefited from an outstanding demographic dividend 
with 2.5 active persons for one inactive person, which certainly fuelled the economic 
growth of the region (Bloom et al. 2001). South Asia, which has a 30-year delayed 
transition, should only get this demographic windfall around 2035; SSA will have to wait 
after 2050 to potentially reap the benefits of a more favorable demographic structure. 
When we translate these different demographic trends not only into global population 
increase but into yearly cohorts of people, and particularly into yearly cohorts of labor 
force, we have a clear indicator of what the labor supply and demand for jobs should be 
in the coming decades. Figure 2 shows the same delayed trends between the main 
growing regions and provides an estimate of the needs for absorption by the various 
economies. In Sub-Saharan Africa today, the yearly cohort of new EAP is around 10 
million people and should reach a peak near 20 million in the 2030s. For a median SSA 
country – e.g. 15 million people – the yearly cohort is 250,000 in the 2000s and is 
expected to be 400,000 in 2025. 
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Figure 1: Activity ratio by region: 1950-2050 
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Source: World Population Prospects, 2006 revision. 
Figure 2: Yearly increase in the labor force by region: 1955-2050 
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2.1.4 Structural transformation in an open global economy 
As was previously discussed, the existing productivity and competitiveness gaps are 
consequences of the confrontation between staggered and delayed processes of economic 
transition in an open world economy. Delayed demographic transitions add another 
challenge when large cohorts entering the EAP increase pressure on employment. On one 
side, this push is a considerable market opportunity, as rising domestic markets will fuel 
economic growth. On the other side, national economies will have to absorb this 
population increase and provide labor opportunities – or sectors of activities for self-
employment – to these new cohorts.  
The degree of challenge presented by these trends depends heavily upon the stage in the 
structural transformation of every economy (i.e. share of the different economic sectors in 
GDP, intersectoral linkages, human capital, infrastructure and provision of public goods). 
Economic diversification opens up the range of alternatives for people who are no longer 
able to sustain their livelihood from agriculture and who must find an “exit option”.  
Annex 1 presents a statistical overview of the RS program countries’ economic 
characteristics comparing them with those of four emerging economies – Brazil, Chile, 
Thailand, and Indonesia. This comparison, based on the 1960-2005 period, exemplifies 
what economic transition is and the various charts strongly show the rapid decrease 
among the comparative countries of the share of agriculture in the various economic 
aggregates (GDP, EAP, and trade) and the very slow pace of change among the RS 
countries. Mexico, chosen as a background reference for its 20-year liberalization and 
integration process, clearly appears as an exception with characteristics close to the ones 
of the emerging economies. While Brazil, Chile and Mexico started their structural 
transformation in the 1940s and 1950s, prior to the period under review, Thailand and 
Indonesia amazingly illustrate the rapid change over 40 years. 
One of the main questions is to explore the reproducibility of the historical sequence of 
structural change. Will developing countries follow the same pathway as demonstrated 
through history or will they be confronted with difficulties related to the simultaneous 
challenges of globalization and demographic transition? The common approach today is 
to consider that this pathway is an obvious fact, confirmed by history, and that there is no 
justification to dispute this approach. Timmer and Akkus (2008) show that if countries 
are lagging in the process of structural change it is mainly related to economic growth 
difficulties and not to the pattern of change alone.5 However, it seems important to 
highlight the need for a historical perspective, which must be kept in mind to discuss the 
                                                 
5
 Timmer and Akkus have tested the evolution of the structural pattern in 86 countries. The results confirm 
the robustness of this historical process. The authors included the seven RS program countries in the 
sample, which do not exhibit strong divergence from the general pattern. 
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on-going process of structural change: the “moment” in world history when the transition 
occurs – or becomes possible – matters, because opportunities, constraints and balance of 
power evolve and provide different room to maneuver within economies and societies 
engaged in the process of change (Gore 2003). 
The case of the past economic transitions strongly illustrates this issue. The 
characteristics of the Western European and North American transitions over the 19th and 
the better part of the 20th centuries cannot be disconnected from European and American 
political hegemony which expressed openly through colonization, unequal treaties or, 
indirectly, through influence zones. This hegemony reduced or eliminated competition 
but also allowed very attractive situations of both supply and demand, with captive 
markets, which facilitated specialization and industrialization, and also increased 
accumulation through profitability of businesses. The European transition and “new 
worlds” development, which are totally intertwined, were also boosted by a unique flow 
of international migration (Hatton & Williamson 2005) made possible by Europe’s 
hegemonic position. Between 1850 and 1930, nearly 60 million Europeans migrated to 
the Americas (35 million to the USA alone), Australia, New Zealand, and Africa. These 
migrations facilitated the adjustment of European economies and the management of the 
surpluses of labor resulting from rural depopulation and the insufficient pace of job 
creation in other sectors, despite a strong process of industrialization. 
The cases of the emerging economies of Latin America and Asia, which are frequently 
called into the debate to confirm the ineluctability of structural change, must also be 
discussed in the historical context of when their structural change happened. For all these 
countries, the transition occurred during a very specific period of national self-centered 
development, which characterized the world international regime between the 1929 crisis 
and the current new globalization era, starting at the end of the 1970s (see Giraud 1996). 
Everywhere in the world, nation-states implemented their own “development projects” 
(McMichael 1996) characterized by import-substitution, protection and strong state 
intervention. The role of public policies was determinant for both industrialization (Evans 
1995) and agriculture modernization (Djurfeldt et al. 2005) and initiated the so-called 
“developmental state”. The independent Latin American countries engaged in this 
process between the two World Wars; they were followed by many Asian countries that 
were decolonized in the early 1950s; and, in both cases, the Cold War period funding 
played a significant role. The results of this state-led development were uneven but they 
always deeply shaped the economic and institutional environments and prepared further 
changes.  
Today, the situation of the developing countries that stay at the early stages of the 
economic transition, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, is more constrained by the 
characteristics of globalization. Indeed, if we refer to the three pathways out of rural 
poverty proposed by the WDR08, the third pathway – migration to cities or abroad – is 
critical for many developing countries. 
Firstly, although international migration is a growing issue in development studies with 
reference to the impact of remittances, the main migration flows stay concentrated in the 
‘contact’ regions peripheral to the EU and the USA. The options will likely depend on the 
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demographic evolution of the industrialized countries and their reliance on foreign labor, 
as the current geopolitical order does not allow the same process of mass-migration that 
occurred at the end of the 19th century. 
Secondly, a major characteristic of developing world cities’ growth is a process of 
urbanization without industrialization, illustrated by the dramatic expansion of slums 
(UN-Habitat 2003, Davis 2006). This “low regime urbanization” is particularly prevailing 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and is a main difference when compared with Europe and the USA 
during the 19th and 20th centuries, and with some regions of the developing world 
previously engaged in structural change (typically but partially China, India) where 
industrialization fueled rural depopulation based on labor demand. Today, migration to 
cities is not systematically related to job access, higher income and better life because the 
process of industrialization is constrained by international competition and does not 
initiate the same labor demand. 
This observation serves as a reminder that productivity gaps are not limited to agriculture 
and concern other sectors of activity. For many DCs, although low labor costs are a clear 
comparative advantage, the differences in other factor costs (particularly capital), in labor 
skills, and in economic and institutional environments reinforce the asymmetry in 
competitiveness patterns. For countries that are less endowed, these differences are a real 
obstacle in the process of structural transformation when their infant sectors have to 
confront world champions on the global markets. This is the case for SSA and many 
other low-income and lower-middle-income countries versus developed or emerging 
economies. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, where agriculture still plays a large role, with on average 60% of 
the total EAP engaged in agriculture and a modest structural evolution over the last 40 
years, the situation is extremely challenging and there are significant risks of transition 
impasses, reflecting the difficulty of alternative options. 
2.2 Hypotheses of the program 
This discussion on the consequences of global changes on economic and social structures 
and on the agricultural and rural dynamics of developing countries directly shaped the 
rationale of the RuralStruc Program and its hypotheses. While the trade liberalization 
debate focused on the expected gains of the liberalization process and its consequences 
on poverty (see Box 1) and also engaged in its potential employment dimensions 
(Winters et al. 2004, Hoekman & Winters 2005), the program objective was to 
investigate more particularly the characteristics of economic transition within 
globalization and to elaborate on possible structural difficulties and not only on 
transitional problems (which is the common view of the international debate). 
Three embedded hypotheses were advanced. First, the global restructuring of the agrifood 
markets and the increasing asymmetry within the international competition lead to both 
the development of differentiation processes among farm structures, and also marketing, 
transformation and distribution structures. This hypothesis raises several questions: What 
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is the balance between the potential integration of farmers in the new value chains and 
their possible exclusion? What are the amplitude, rapidity, and characteristics of these 
processes? Do they induce a segmentation dynamic with concentration, marginalization 
and, sometimes, exclusion, within and from the farm sector leading to the emergence or 
consolidation of multiple-track agriculture? 
The second hypothesis refers to the existing processes of adaptation among rural 
households as a response to the many changing factors in agriculture and their impact on 
farms’ viability. Rural households engage in new configurations of activities and income 
characterized by a changing role of agriculture and a growing importance of off-farm 
activities and transfers (private transfers related to migration and, possibly, public 
transfers linked to specific support systems). Questions relevant to this hypothesis 
include: What are the characteristics of these new configurations? How do they differ 
between countries? Are they new dynamics or do they follow the historical paths of 
structural transformation? Are they effective answers for rural livelihoods sustainability? 
Consequently, the differentiation dynamics within agriculture and the possible difficulties 
of rural households’ adaptation constitute risks of transition impasses within the process 
of structural transformation. This is the third hypothesis, which refers to the 
characteristics of the “agriculture based” countries, where the weight of agriculture in the 
employment and activity structures, the low regime urbanization, the limited economic 
diversification in a context of growing international competition, and heavy demographic 
pressure, all create a unique challenge for development. Will some countries face 
impasses in escaping poverty due to a lack of alternatives (Kydd 2002), and what are the 
potential social, economic, and political consequences of such dead-ends in the economic 
transition? 
2.3 Design of the program 
To assess the relevance of the hypotheses and to answer their related questions, a 
comparative approach seemed most appropriate. This approach included a set of 
developing countries with the objective of identifying the main similarities and 
differences in their processes of adaptation to the new context within their own 
trajectories of structural change. Simultaneously, it was necessary to implement the 
program with a collaborative framework engaging local teams in an “inside process” of 
analysis with the dual objective of a “better understanding for a better policy making” 
(this statement is the sub-title of the program). 
To support the implementation of the program, two bodies are dedicated to its 
governance: (i) a Steering Committee, including all the trust fund contributing donors, is 
responsible for the follow-up of the activities and budget execution; and (ii) an Advisory 
Committee, consisting of academics and researchers from six countries, provides 
guidance on the orientation and development of the program and its members will act as 
peer-reviewers upon completion. 
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2.3.1 A comparative approach  
2.3.1.1 Country selection 
To engage in the comparative approach, it was decided to select a sample of countries 
corresponding to a spectrum of situations within the process of liberalization and 
economic integration, including, on the one side, countries that are far ahead in this 
process and, on the other side, countries where the pace of liberalization and integration 
to the world economy has been slow and/or unequal.  
The country selection resulted from discussions between the contributing donors and 
subsequently with the local partners.6 It was decided that a specific focus on Sub-Saharan 
Africa was justified by the critical structural situation of the continent and the many 
commitments of both the international community and the African governments to 
revitalize the agricultural sector.7 
Further to the criteria above, the selection was based on two specific macro-economic 
criteria: the GDP per capita and the AgEAP, which are indicators of the country’s stage 
within the economic transition. As a consequence (with the exception of Mexico) the 
selected countries are low-income or lower-middle-income countries, and have a 
significant level of their economically active population involved in agriculture (see 
annex 1 and § 3.2). The demographic size was also part of the selection process in order 
to avoid extremes8 – particularly the most populated countries, which offer broader 
options regarding the process of structural transformation.9 Again, the selected countries 
have a small to middle demographic size between 5 and 35 million inhabitants (except, 
                                                 
6
 In each country, the program, its objectives and expected outputs were officially introduced by the World 
Bank and discussed with its counterparts. 
7
 For example, on the donors side, the UN Millennium Project’s Task Force on Hunger, the Commission 
for Africa Report, the Africa–EU Partnership, the World Bank Africa Action Plan (AAP) and, on the 
governments side, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) defined by the 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development’s (NEPAD) and endorsed by the African Union Maputo 
declaration (2003) stating a commitment of 10% of African government expenditures dedicated to 
agriculture and rural development within five years. 
8
 One must keep in mind that among the 192 members of the United Nations, only 25 countries count more 
than 50 million people, 50 count more than 20 million, but 80 have less than 5 million inhabitants. 
9
 Predictably, this view is disputable. There is no direct correlation between economic transition and 
demographic size and there exists significant counter-examples on both sides. However, in the context of 
increasing competition linked to globalization, economies of scale related to large domestic markets offer 
additional room for maneuver (this is particularly the case for industrialization, as well as for research 
and/or capacity building). Regional economic integration is, of course, the main option for “small” 
countries. 
 22 
again, for Mexico). These criteria precluded the selection of any Asian countries, as many 
countries of the continent deal with bigger dimensions.10  
The choice among the SSA countries reflects the diversity of situations among low- 
income countries (Madagascar, Mali, and Senegal being in the Least Developed 
Countries group - LDCs) with reference to their geographical situation (Southern, East 
and West Africa, including a land-locked country, Mali), their colonial history, their 
activity structure including the role of migrations, and the state of the national debate 
around privatization. 
The specific cases of Nicaragua11 and Morocco, two lower-middle-income countries, are 
direct and powerful examples of countries facing the challenges of managing rapid 
transformation processes in a context of free trade agreements (with the European Union 
and/or the United States) and where the weight of international migration plays a big role. 
Despite being an exception to several selection criteria, including Mexico (an upper-
middle-income country, OECD member and emerging economy) was justified by its 
anteriority in the integration process through the implementation of the NAFTA in 1993. 
Indeed, Mexico provides a useful background picture of the impacts of deep 
liberalization and integration processes with strong impacts on agriculture and the rural 
economy on the whole. It is also a reference case for international migration, which plays 
a decisive role in the processes of adaptation to deeper integration. 
With reference to the WDR08, the selected countries represent the three worlds of 
agriculture: “agriculture-based” (Kenya, Madagascar, Mali), “transforming” (Senegal, 
Nicaragua and Morocco), “urbanized” (Mexico).12 
2.3.1.2 Operationalizing the comparative work  
The RuralStruc Program was conceived with two main phases and involves several 
knowledge sharing workshops. The main objective of the first phase was to generate 
                                                 
10
 If we exclude the former USSR Republics and the conflict and post-conflict countries, the alternatives 
are limited. Malaysia could have been an interesting case, even if already deeply engaged in its structural 
transformation. 
11
 To illustrate the CAFTA countries and identify the possible country cases, support was provided to the 
coordination team by RUTA (Unidad regional de asistencia técnica), platform for sustainable development 
in Central America. Guatemala and Honduras were alternative options. However, Nicaragua was selected 
for operational reasons. 
12
 Having Senegal, a country with 73% of its EAP in agriculture (2003), in the “transforming world” 
illustrates the ambiguity of using “rural” (and rural poverty) as a category for the analysis. The definition of 
rural varies between countries and has a restrictive definition in Senegal. Nicaragua is not referred to in the 
“three worlds” analysis, which excludes countries below the 5 million inhabitants limit (even though 
Nicaragua passed this limit in 2000). However, using the same criteria, Nicaragua would be part of the 
“transforming countries” group.        
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broad country overviews based on desktop studies and gathering all the available 
information on the role of agriculture in the economy, on market structures and their 
evolution, on development and differentiation of farm structures, and on risks of impasses 
and possibilities for adaptation. Simultaneously, this first phase was an opportunity to 
identify the missing information related to the processes of structural change within 
agriculture and to share views on the general approach of the program with the national 
partners. 
The second phase was designed to produce specific information through more detailed 
case studies both at the regional and sectoral levels. This phase involves fieldwork 
including household surveys and interviews targeting the relevant issues brought up in 
the first phase.  
The comparative perspective is not to make comparisons between countries (for instance 
Mexico and Madagascar), as this would make little sense and could lead to classical 
selection bias.13 Simultaneously, facing the classical challenge of ex-post analysis, the 
goal is not to evaluate “impacts” – the term was carefully avoided in the title of the 
program and “dimensions” was preferred – because it would lead to information 
difficulties (particularly the lack of years of reference for evaluation) and to a risky 
discussion on causalities of change. On the contrary, the objective is to illustrate 
processes of change in agriculture and the rural economy related to liberalization and 
globalization so as to identify regularities and differences, the understanding of which 
can be useful for policy making. The approach is to adopt a global multi-disciplinary and 
historical perspective of the dynamics of change, by giving attention to the national 
trajectories and their “critical junctures”,14 which can modify the nature of relationships 
between agriculture, the rural sector and the overall economy. 
2.3.2 A local partnership framework 
In order to foster ownership of the knowledge process (data gathering and data creation, 
analysis, results sharing, and dissemination), the implementation of the program is based 
on a local partnership, the final goal of which is to facilitate the policy debate. To this 
end, two types of partnership were identified, one at the institutional level and a second at 
the operational level. 
                                                 
13
 Due to the selection process and the self-selection of the country cases, any conclusion from direct 
comparison to explain variables would suffer from systematic error (cf. Collier & Mahoney 1996). 
14
 The critical juncture refers to the concept of path dependence and designs a “key choice point” when a 
particular option is selected by governments, coalitions, or social forces among other alternatives and leads 
to the creation of recurring institutional patterns (see Mahoney 2001, Pierson 2000). 
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The institutional counterparts are public bodies or policy dialogue platforms engaged in 
the policy debate, that are interested by the objectives of the RuralStruc Program and the 
dissemination of its results with the goal of feeding discussions about the future of 
agriculture and rural development. They are:  
- ministries in charge of agriculture in Kenya, Mali, Mexico, and Nicaragua; 
- the Conseil Général du Développement Agricole (CGDA) in Morocco; 
- the Programme d’Action pour de Développement Rural (PADR), hosted by the 
Prime minister cabinet, in Madagascar and;  
- the Initiative Prospective Agricole et Rurale (I-PAR) in Senegal, a platform 
joining the agriculture research institute, rural producers’ organizations, NGOs, 
and the ministry of agriculture. 
The contributing partners in charge of the implementation of the research work are 
locally based private consulting bodies, research institutions or universities, and 
sometimes, ad hoc teams specifically set up for the work program. The first phase 
partners are: 
- in Kenya, the Tegemeo Institute (University of Egerton); 
- in Madagascar, APB Consulting; 
- in Mali, the Centre d’Expertises Politiques et Institutionnelles en Afrique 
(CEPIA) with the Institut d’Économie Rurale (IER); 
- in Mexico, the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO); 
- in Morocco, the Institut Agronomique et Vétérinaire Hassan II; 
- in Nicaragua, the Instituto Nitlapán (Universidad Centroamericana); 
- in Senegal, the Association Sénégalaise pour la Promotion du Développement à 
la Base (ASPRODEB).  
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3 Results of the first phase of the program 
The activities implemented during the first phase of the program in every participating 
country, during the sharing workshops, and through additional literature review, have 
provided an overview on the processes of change, which are central to the program’s 
hypotheses. As expected, the local teams engaged in desktop studies and generated 
information presented in their first phase reports. This information was disseminated at 
the country level and helped in the design of the on-going second phase. 
The following section presents the main results of the first phase of the program, its 
implementation (§ 3.1) and discussions of its core hypotheses. It proposes an assessment 
of what is known about the employment challenge in countries that remain submitted to a 
strong demographic growth, highlights the role of agriculture, and discusses the other 
economic alternatives (§ 3.2). Then a review of the processes underway related to the 
agrifood restructuring allows a first insight into their development and consequences for 
farm structures and a preliminary discussion on the differentiation and segmentation issue 
(§ 3.3). The section finishes with a quick reference and introduction to the reshaping of 
the rural economies on which information is limited and justifies ad hoc data collection (§ 
3.4). 
3.1 Implementation of the program 
3.1.1 A knowledge sharing process  
3.1.1.1 Main steps of the first phase 
The first phase, originally designed for a period of six months, started with a launching 
workshop in M’bour, Senegal, on 11-13 April 2006, bringing together representatives of 
every national team. The main objectives of the workshop were a broad discussion on the 
rationale of the program and its design, a presentation by the national teams of the main 
characteristics of agriculture and of rural and agricultural policies in their country, and a 
detailed discussion about the content of the first phase. It was agreed to structure the first 
phase report on the following (i) the role of agriculture in the economy, (ii) the market 
structures and their evolution, (iii) the evolution and differentiation of farm structures, 
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and (iv) the risks of impasses and possibilities for adaptation.15 The workshop was also 
an opportunity to start a collaborative dynamic between the seven national teams. 
The operational design, objectives and launching of the first phase were presented to the 
first Steering Committee of the donors on 8 June 2006. Subsequently, preliminary reports 
were sent by the national teams in October and early November 2006 and initiated a first 
round of discussions with the coordination team. It helped with the preparation of a 
second sharing workshop, which was held in Marrakech, Morocco, on 20-25 November 
2006, to present and discuss the results of the first phase, and to draw preliminary 
conclusions. 
Based on the discussions in Marrakech and after a revision process, final reports were 
submitted to the coordination team between the end of January and early March 2007.16 
Preliminary results of the first phase, based on its implementation and an initial cross-
analysis of the national reports, were presented to the first Advisory Committee of the 
program held in Washington, at the World Bank Headquarters on 23 March 2007. The 
meeting was also an opportunity to discuss the overall rationale, objectives, and 
challenges of the program with academics and experts. The Advisory Committee strongly 
supported the positioning and objectives of the program, drawing attention to the means 
needed to conduct this ambitious work (particularly timeframe, budget and human 
resources), and recommended an assessment of the feasibility of specific field surveys for 
the collection of genuine and updated data. It also suggested postponing the start of the 
second phase until September 2007 to provide the coordination team more time for the 
careful preparation of this core part of the program. 
The Advisory Committee was followed by the second Steering Committee of the donors 
on 28 March 2007, which discussed the development of the program and the 
recommendations of the Advisory Committee. The Donors Committee validated the 
postponement of the launching of phase two until September 2007.  
3.1.1.2  First dissemination 
As decided when the program was designed, and due to its objective of contributing to 
the local policy debate, the national teams organized different events throughout and after 
completing the first phase. These presentation meetings or one-day workshops targeted 
                                                 
15
 In May 2006, the coordination team sent a detailed and commented table of contents, based on the 
discussion during the workshop. In parallel, an internal website for the program was created to share and 
group information – bibliography, background documents, workshops presentations, statistical data. A 
database was created by the coordination team to help national teams with international data resources on 
agriculture (July 2006). 
16
 The only exception is the Malian report. The final version was only submitted in July 2007 because of 
staff difficulties within the team, which delayed the revision suggested by the World Bank and an earlier 
approval of the report. 
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different audiences depending on the local configuration and the situation of the local 
debate. The box below provides a summary of the dissemination process. 
Kenya and Mexico’s teams did not formally present their results. This situation is 
explained by different contexts. In Kenya this is, of course, related to the political 
situation (the period before the presidential election and the subsequent political events). 
In Mexico, this was a choice of both the national team and the World Bank. In this 
country, due to the number and standard of research institutions, universities, and NGOs, 
the local debate on agriculture and rural issues is fed by an abundant flow of surveys, 
studies, and research supported by year-round publications. As a consequence, and 
because the first phase was mainly an overview on the existing information, it appeared 
preferable to keep the dissemination for the presentation and discussion of the final 
results of the program, which will provide new perspective based on specific field work. 
Box 7: Dissemination process of the first phase results in the RS countries 
Madagascar  
20 September 2006 - roundtable on the first results with ministries, donors, university and researchers  
16 May 2007 - presentation of the first phase report to ministries, donors, university and researchers  
Mali  
08 November 2006 - roundtable on the first results with ministries, chamber of agriculture (APCAM), rural 
producers’ organizations (AOPP), and consumers’ association 
07 December 2007 - Ministry in charge of agriculture, General Secretary – presentation of the first phase 
report and of the objectives of the second phase 
Morocco 
13 March 2007 - Conseil Général du développement Agricole (CGDA) – presentation of the first phase 
report 
Nicaragua 
20 September 2007 – workshop organized by the Ministry in charge of agriculture (MAGFOR) with the 
Finnish Cooperation and the World Bank 
Senegal 
23 March 2007 - Initiative Prospective Agricole et Rurale (I-PAR) – presentation of the first phase report 
25 June 2007 - the seven rural producers’ organizations platforms of Senegal 
07 July 2007 - Mouvement social pour le Développement (MSD) Platform  
27 July 2007 - debate at the University Cheikh Anta Diop of Dakar, co-organized with Editions 
Clairafrique  
04 January 2008 - Ministry in charge agriculture, DAPS – presentation of the first phase results, of the 
dissemination process, and of the objectives of the second phase 
In addition to the presentation meetings, debates and roundtables, some national teams 
also took specific initiatives. In Senegal, the first phase report was posted on the I-PAR 
website to share information and also to open its results to discussion, see:  
http://www.prospectiveagricole.org/actualite.html. 
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In Morocco, the team chose to publish the first phase report to facilitate its 
dissemination.17 In Madagascar and Kenya, the teams contributed to an academic article 
and a book chapter, in collaboration with other researchers.18 
In parallel, a webpage presenting the program, its objectives, sequences, and governance 
structure, was posted on the World Bank extranet, see: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/0,,menuP
K:311690~pagePK:146732~piPK:64087638~theSitePK:258644,00.html 
3.1.2 The knowledge challenge 
3.1.2.1 Gaps and conceptualization 
Highlighting the importance of the “knowledge challenge” is probably one of main 
results of the first phase of the RuralStruc Program. The weakness of the knowledge-base 
and the importance of information gaps regarding agriculture and rural development, and 
more precisely the processes of structural transformation of rural economies, are a 
common concern shared by national stakeholders and the international community, 
particularly the donor community. 
In every country national teams faced specific difficulties regarding data availability, data 
age, and a lack of available information to inform the issues raised by the RuralStruc 
Program: employment, household activities and incomes (on-farm, off-farm, agricultural 
and non-agricultural), migration and remittances, connection to markets, integration and 
contractualization with global value chains, etc. On all these themes, information mainly 
relies on case studies, from which it is difficult to draw general conclusions or 
perspectives. The review of the main results of the first phase will highlight these 
information gaps, particularly about the reshaping of the rural economies (see §3.4). 
The following section provides some insight on the current situation and difficulties 
posed by the existing information systems, both at the international and national level. 
However, one must keep in mind that the challenge of providing evidence on the 
processes underway in agriculture and rural economies cannot be reduced to updating: as 
we are reminded by Laurent (2007), the fundamental issue lies in the conceptualization of 
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 Akesbi N., D. Benatya and N. El Aoufi (dir.), 2008. L'agriculture marocaine à l'épreuve de la 
libéralisation, Economie Critique Editions, Rabat, 175p. 
18
 Dabat M.H., B. Gastineau, O. Jenn-Treyer, J.-P. Roland, C. Martignac and A. Pierre-Bernard, 2008. 
“L’agriculture malgache peut-elle sortir de l’impasse démo-économique ?”, Autrepart, No. 46, p. 189-202 ; 
and Anseeuw W., S. Fréguin-Gresh and P. Gamba, 2008. “Une nouvelle politique agricole au Kenya: 
nécessaire mais suffisante?”, in Devèze J.-C. (Dir.), Défis agricoles africains, Karthala-AFD, Paris, p. 209-
229. 
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the new roles of the agricultural activity within the activity nexus (types of income 
generation, combination of systems of income and activities, multi-purpose strategies, 
etc.). 
3.1.2.2 Existing data 
- International databases 
The main hurdle encountered when trying to compare the rural situations among 
developing countries is the availability and precision of data. Most of the time, 
international comparisons rely on databases created by international institutions; 
unfortunately, these databases often lack consistency and accuracy. 
Consistency and accuracy problems can be seen easily when comparing figures extracted 
from different databases that are supposed to reflect the same indicator. Several reasons 
can easily be advanced to explain this situation (e.g. institutions do not use the same 
sources; they do not implement the same methodology to aggregate data; they do not 
refer to the same definition for what seems to be the same indicator, etc.). As a result, the 
use of different databases can lead to very different conclusions about the situation within 
each country and among countries. Researchers should strongly stress this issue when 
drawing conclusions for policy makers based on international databases, regardless of the 
consistency and the reliability of their methodologies; however, this is rarely the case. 
When dealing with agricultural issues with a comparative approach, the main source of 
data is FAOSTAT, produced by the FAO. FAOSTAT is based on national data provided 
by countries and that are mainly derived from national censuses (particularly agricultural 
censuses) and are completed with yearly surveys on agricultural production. Even though 
this international database is often criticized about the reliability of its statistics, it 
remains the main reference of many analyses. 
Specific databases have been developed either to improve information or to meet specific 
needs depending on the kind of data required. On the issue of rural activities and 
diversification, this is the case of the Rural Income Generating Activities database 
(RIGA) project developed by the FAO and the World Bank (see § 3.4 and Box 19 for 
more information). 
Similarly, for employment issues, Bezemer and Hazell (2006) use the Groningen Growth 
and Development Centre (GGDC) database to carry out prospects on the number of 
people that would exit agriculture in the near future around the world – a theme of direct 
interest for the RS program. They “chose this data set over the more usual World 
Development Indicator data because serious anomalies and gaps were found in the latter 
data. In particular, the number of observations on agricultural employment is smaller [… 
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which] precludes estimation work by decade and increases the dependence of the results 
on a few observations” (Bezemer & Hazell 2006, p. 4-5). However, GGDC labor force 
series for African countries are largely obtained from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI), which relativizes the initial methodological precautions.19 
- National data 
National statistical systems are uneven and often provide irregular information based on 
ad hoc surveys, like the Living Standards Measurement Studies (LSMS). National 
(population) and agricultural censuses remain decisive tools because they allow for 
applications that range from very general to very specific. From a strictly statistical 
standpoint, census data represents one of the most important components of the 
information system in a country and can serve as the basis for many research activities 
related to the agricultural sector. One can argue about the availability, the quality, and the 
reliability of censuses in developing countries; however, national and agricultural 
censuses are an invaluable source of data because of their large scale (notably for basic 
population statistics) and their methodology, which permits a breakdown to small 
geographical units (UN 2007). 
Nevertheless, in specific research such as the RS program, the use of agricultural 
censuses can highlight several fundamental limitations and constraints of this approach, 
perhaps most notably the difficulty of capturing the reality of the rapidly evolving rural 
and agricultural situations of the developing countries. A fundamental limitation of 
utilizing agricultural census data for the RuralStruc Program’s purposes is that the census 
approach centers on farm structures, which creates two obstacles. First, the data do not 
provide a broader view on the family or household levels, particularly on household 
members indirectly linked to, but not necessary involved in, farming activities. They do 
not allow an understanding of the progressive reshaping of the rural households, nor of 
the emergence of new systems of activity and incomes, and they are not helpful for the 
estimation of the new roles of agriculture. From farm perspective, they are also logically 
inappropriate to provide information about off-farm employment and landless farmers. 
Second, the focus on production (crops, acreage, and rotation) does not allow one to 
capture the various types of farm connections to markets, which are decisive for 
analyzing the sustainability of farming activities. 
Another fundamental disadvantage of census data is the infrequency of agricultural 
censuses. Between 1950 and 2007, most of the RS program countries did not undergo 
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 These problems of data availability and data harmonization, particularly in the case of employment, have 
been raised several times at the international level. A Regional Employment Forum of technical experts and 
policy facilitators will soon be established under the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), in 
collaboration with ILO and African regional institutions (ILO 2007).  
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more than two or three censuses, hence limiting the capacity to feature and understand 
the evolution of their agricultural situation (Table 3). 
A final issue with agricultural censuses is that they do not incorporate detailed 
agricultural labor force data. These data are necessary to address broader economic and 
social issues concerning agricultural employment and the absorption capacity of the 
overall economy. As far as labor force data are concerned, one must rely on international 
sources. On this issue, the main source of information is, again, the FAO database. 
Table 3: Agricultural censuses in the RS program countries since 1950 
Countries Years of agricultural censuses Elapsed years since 
the last agricultural census 
Kenya 1977 21 
Madagascar 1961,1984, 2004 4 
Mali 1984, 2004 4 
Morocco 1974, 1996 12 
Mexico 1950, 1970, 1981, 1991, 2007 1 
Nicaragua 1963, 1971, 2001 7 
Senegal 1961, 1998 10 
Sources: RS country reports, FAO Agricultural World Census. 
Table 4: Population censuses in the RS program countries since 1950 
Countries Years of population censuses Elapsed years since 
the last population census 
Kenya 1962, 1969, 1979, 1989, 1999 9 
Madagascar 1975, 1993 15 
Mali 1976, 1987, 1998 10 
Morocco 1960,1971, 1982, 1994, 2004 4 
Mexico 1950,1960,1970,1980,1990, 2000 8 
Nicaragua 1950,1963,1971, 1995, 2005 3 
Senegal 1955, 1976, 1988 20 
Sources: RS country reports, FAO Agricultural World Census. 
Another constraint when discussing national data concerns the definitions countries use 
for “rurality”, which tend not to be comparable among countries. There are two main 
definitions of rurality: one based on the delimitation of administrative areas such as 
municipalities, and another based on variables such as “population level” and “population 
density” that does not specifically correspond to administrative boundaries. Countries 
may combine these two different approaches in their own definition of rurality. 
Moreover, when rurality is defined on a settlement basis (home of the household), 
censuses do not consider that a rural household may have diversified activities, which can 
be located in both rural and urban areas, as in the case of temporary migration for 
instance. For our purpose, these limitations generate difficulties because of our cross-
country comparative approach.  
These drawbacks of international and national databases emphasize the need to develop 
methodologies and additional information to fully capture the complexity and the 
diversity of rurality among developing countries. 
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3.2 First overview of the employment challenge: agriculture and its 
alternatives 
In the “agriculture-based countries” and in the “transforming countries” agriculture 
remains the sector absorbing most of the new EAP. Among these countries, the on-going 
demographic transition that characterizes Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia puts 
additional pressure on employment. This section describes the demographic challenge 
and its implications on the labor market; in addition, it explores the substantive role 
played by agriculture and its ability as a sector to carry on absorbing a large share of the 
additional working population. It also puts forward the limited exit options available for 
the youth entering the labor market. 
3.2.1 Prospects: a massive increase of labor supply over the next decades 
3.2.1.1 An awaited demographic transition 
The RS countries are following considerably different patterns of demographic transition. 
Mexico and Morocco have recorded a sharp decline in their population growth since the 
1970s, with a present growth rate very close to 1% (Figure 3). In stark contrast, the 
Malian population growth rate continues to increase and should reach a maximum of 
around 3% in 2015. In between are Senegal and Madagascar, which have been 
experiencing declining growth rate trends since the end of the 1980s and 1990s 
respectively; however, these decreases are much less abrupt than those in Mexico and 
Morocco: Senegalese and Malagasy growth rates remain very high – among the highest 
in the world – between 2.4 and 2.8%.  
Kenya has followed a different demographic evolution than the other SSA countries. 
With the exception of the Southern African countries deeply affected by the devastating 
impact of HIV/AIDS, the Kenyan curve is unusual in the African context and reflects the 
specific demographic dynamic of a country which shows a clear and early decrease (since 
1980s) of its population growth rate. Following the main explanations provided in the 
literature on the Kenyan case, several elements combined to contribute to this decrease 
(Collomb 1999). First was the early political will of the Kenyan government to better 
understand the demographic dynamics (national surveys on contraception, demography 
of health, and fecundity), which translated into targeted public policies with strong family 
planning programs (wide development of contraception), the implementation of a well-
structured health system, and an increase in the education; second was the role played by 
non-governmental organizations (the country has one of the highest concentration of 
NGOs in all of Africa); and finally the consequences of a health crisis that includes 
HIV/AIDS and the resilience of other diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis (RS 
Kenya, p.131). However, this decreasing trend came to a halt in the first decade of the 
new millennium, which clearly demonstrates the worsening national context and fading 
public intervention. 
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Figure 3: Population growth rate of the RS countries, 1950-2005 
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Source: World population prospects, 2006 revision. 
The main consequence of these population growth rates is the continuously increasing 
population (Table 5): in the four SSA countries, the demographic growth rate should be 
over 2% until 2025-2030 and the population could increase two to threefold by 2050 
compared to 2010, i.e. a population increase supposedly ranging from a lower 12 million 
in Senegal to a higher 44 million in Kenya. In the other RS countries, the population 
could only raise from 20 to 30%. 
Table 5: Evolution of the population of the RS countries, 1950-2050 (in millions) 
 1960 1990 2010 2050 Variation 
2010-2050 
Variation 
2010-2050 
Kenya 8.1 23.4 40.6 84.8 44.1 109% 
Madagascar 5.4 12.0 21.3 44.5 23.2 109% 
Mali 4.0 7.7 13.5 34.2 20.7 153% 
Mexico 37.9 84.0 110.3 132.3 22.0 20% 
Morocco 11.6 24.8 32.4 42.6 10.2 32% 
Nicaragua 1.8 4.2 5.9 7.0 1.1 18% 
Senegal 3.3 7.9 13.3 25.3 11.9 90% 
Source: World population prospects, 2006 revision. 
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All of these trends and figures are based on projections; as such, many commentators 
point to the fact that these previsions for the SSA population are unviable and are, 
consequently, impossible. However, it must be recalled that, contrary to economic 
forecasts, demographic forecasts are calculated using actual existing populations (which 
means that we know with certainty today the level of the labor force in 20 years), and that 
approximations simply reflect different hypotheses regarding birth and death trends, 
which are relatively stable. Significant variations are due to natural catastrophes, health 
hazards or are the consequences of political events (which could be the implicit issue for 
those who claim the unviable nature of the current trends). Nevertheless, birth rates can 
reflect and adapt more rapidly to the political and economic tensions. This is one of the 
explanations for the drop of the Nicaraguan trend in the 1990s. Similarly, the recurring 
stagnation of the rural economies and the lack of exit options at the national level are 
demonstrated by the remaining population trends in Senegal, Mali or in Madagascar. 
3.2.1.2 The surge of the labor supply in SSA  
Over the past decades, massive population growth has been responsible for a huge 
increase in the labor force, a trend that will become even more acute. Thus, the increasing 
labor supply is neither a new phenomenon nor one that will stop soon (Figure 4); it 
follows a long-term trend that will endure at least the next two decades in the four SSA 
countries, where the annual additional labor supply will probably increase until 2025 and 
even until 2045 in Mali (Table 6). In SSA, this increase could represent between two to 
three times the present annual increases in labor demands in each country. Conversely, in 
Mexico and Morocco, the youth entering the labor market annually should progressively 
decrease, as the peak of labor supply has passed. Nevertheless, this decline remains rather 
slow and must be compared with the limited capacity of each domestic economy to create 
jobs and, hence, to cope with these important flows (see below). 
 35 
Figure 4: Annual additional labor supply in the RS countries, 1955-2050 
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Source: World population prospects, 2006 revision. 
Table 6: Maximum annual labor supply in the RS countries, 1950-2050 
Country Additional labor 
supply in 2005 
Peak of annual additional 
labor supply 
Peak time 
Kenya 558,800 930,600 2030 
Madagascar 286,200 473,400 2035 
Mali 171,800 447,800 2045 
Mexico 922,600 1,368,600 2000 
Morocco 377,800 413,600 2000 
Nicaragua 69,000 81,000 2010 
Senegal 179,800 268,200 2025 
Source: World population prospects, 2006 revision. 
Consequently, all of the RS countries are facing a huge socio-economic challenge in the 
expansion of their labor supply. What is at stake is the capacity of the domestic economy 
to absorb this growing labor force, i.e. its ability to achieve a sustainable growth that 
creates jobs. 
3.2.1.3 Implications of labor supply increase over time 
Depending on the stage of the structural transformation an economy is experiencing (see 
§ 2.1), the demographic transition and EAP increase can be a boost or a burden for 
economic growth. Figure 5 shows that the evolution of the ‘activity’ ratio has been on a 
downward slope since, at least, the 1950s, implying that there have been fewer and fewer 
economically active people to sustain the livelihood of the economically dependent 
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population. Mexico and Morocco recorded a reversal in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
This reversal took place much later in the SSA countries, in the 1980s in Senegal and 
Kenya, and only in 2000 in Madagascar and Mali. 
Since the 1950s, Sub-Saharan Africa countries have been bearing the burden of this 
economically dependent population and will continue to do so over the next two decades. 
The demographic dividend, which will progressively rise over the next three decades, 
could become a real opportunity if, in the meantime, the economic and institutional 
environment is reshaped to ensure that this momentum benefits the economy and fosters 
growth. However, the challenge is daunting: the very slow decrease of fertility compared 
to any other regions in the world – much slower than the drop of the mortality rate – 
raises questions about the SSA economies’ ability to create the needed jobs in order to 
absorb what will feasibly be a significant surge of their EAP. 
Figure 5: Activity ratio in the RS countries, 1950-2050 
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Source: World population prospects, 2006 revision. 
3.2.2 What do we know about labor markets and their current trends? 
Understanding the on-going structural transformation processes in the RS program 
countries requires knowledge on how labor markets work, what their dynamics are, what 
the level of job creation in industry and services has been and could be, and whether it 
actually expresses the classical shift of the workforce away from agriculture. The major 
issue here is the scarcity or the actual lack of reliable historical data at country levels that 
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prevents the formation of definitive conclusions. We can only advance partial 
assumptions and these would require further investigation to be confirmed. 
3.2.2.1 Agriculture as a major employment sector 
As previously mentioned (§ 2.1), in the historical process, economies have progressively 
switched from agriculture to industry, then tertiary activities (services). However, slightly 
more than half of world’s workforce, of whom 30% are women, is still engaged in 
agriculture, especially in DCs. Currently, there are nearly one billion self-employed 
and/or unpaid family workers in the world, most of them farmers in developing 
countries,20 yet, knowledge about agricultural labor markets remains limited and poorly 
informed. Thus, questions concerned with the current state of the agricultural labor 
market and its evolution over the past decades are those we must address first. The main 
source of data for international comparison of employment in agriculture is FAOSTAT. 
Unfortunately, as previously seen (§ 3.1.2), these statistics often lack consistency, 
without which only a broad view on agricultural labor markets can be provided. 
In all of the RS countries, since the beginning of the 1960s, the absolute number of both 
the AgEAP and the agricultural population has risen (Table 7). The magnitude of this 
EAP increase has been very important in Sub-Saharan RuralStruc countries, with an 
increase ranging from 114% in Mali to more than 232% in Kenya. In the meantime, the 
agricultural population has risen either at approximately the same pace (Kenya, 
Madagascar) or more rapidly (Mali, Senegal). The latter situation corresponds to an 
increase in the number of people supported by every agricultural economically active 
person. 
In Mexico, Morocco and Nicaragua, the AgEAP has slightly increased (23 to 38%), and 
the agricultural population has stagnated or only slightly increased. Consequently, the 
number of people supported by an agricultural economically active person has declined. 
Hence, the four Sub-Saharan Africa RS countries have followed a rather different path 
than the three others. Looking at the annual growth rate of the AgEAP allows us to 
understand the fundamental differences (Table 5). This growth rate has been positive and 
relatively stable around 2 % in Senegal, Mali and Madagascar. Conversely, in Mexico, 
Morocco and Nicaragua, this rate has followed a steady decline since the 1970s, falling 
below 1% during the 1980s. As previously discussed (§3.2.1.a), the Kenyan curve 
demonstrates a specific context: while the agricultural population initially increased at a 
higher rate than the AgEAP, growth rates for both currently show declining trends. The 
drop of the Nicaraguan rate shows the impact of the civil war during the 1980s (Figure 
6). 
                                                 
20
 Report of the International Commission on Peace and Food,   
http://icpd.org/UncommonOpp/CHAP04.htm  
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Table 7: AgEAP and agricultural population in the RS countries, 1962 and 2004 (in thousands) 
 AgEAP Agricultural population 
 1962 2004 Difference Variation 
Annual 
Growth 
rate 
1962 2004 Difference Variation 
Annual 
Growth 
rate 
KEN 3,785 12,570 8,785 232% 3.0% 7,698 23,873 16,175 210% 2.8% 
MAD 2,422 6,220 3,798 157% 2.3% 4,864 12,974 8,110 167% 2.4% 
MALI 2,296 4,920 2,624 114% 1.9% 4,337 10,549 6,212 143% 2.2% 
MEX 6,156 8,453 2,297 37% 0.8% 21,954 22,164 210 1% 0.0% 
MOR 3,124 4,296 1,172 38% 0.8% 8,816 10,408 1,592 18% 0.4% 
NIC 318 392 74 23% 0.5% 1,016 1,003 -13 -1% 0.0% 
SEN 1,328 3,369 2,041 154% 2.3% 2,804 7,488 4,684 167% 2.4% 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
Figure 6: Growth rate of AgEAP in the RS countries, 1963-2002, 5 year moving average 
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Consequently, the share of the AgEAP in the total EAP has been declining in the three 
non-SSA countries to attain rather low levels: 30% in Morocco and even 20% in Mexico 
and Nicaragua. Once again, we have to be very cautious with these FAO figures. For 
instance, in Nicaragua, FAO data give a share of AgEAP below 20% in 2003 (Table 7) 
while the 2005 national census estimates this share at 40% (RS Nicaragua, p. 87). In Sub-
Saharan Africa the share of the AgEAP has also declined, but more gradually, and, by 
consequence, has remained very high over the last four decades (Figure 7); this reflects 
the importance of agriculture as an employment provider for more than 70% of the EAP 
in the four SSA countries. While it would have been very useful to compare the evolution 
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of the share of the AgEAP in the total EAP and the evolution of the share of the 
agricultural population in the total population, quite surprisingly, the FAO data give 
exactly the same results for the two ratios over time for the seven RS countries. 
Figure 7: Share of AgEAP in total EAP in the RS countries, 1961-2004 
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3.2.2.2 A weak formal employment dynamic in other economic sectors 
Economic transition should translate into the gradual shift of the workforce from 
agriculture towards industries and services, but in the RuralStruc countries this shift 
seems to be very slow. Indeed, opportunities to access formal employment, as in many of 
the least developed countries (ILO 2006), are very low: in Sub-Saharan Africa RS 
countries, only 7% to 20% of the annual additional labor force is able to find a formal job 
(Box 8 and Table 9); however, we must be very cautious with such figures. On the one 
hand, they could be underestimated, as only major sources of job creation have been 
taken into account due to a lack of national statistics. On the other hand, these figures 
mainly reflect the gross – and not the net – job creation statistics (i.e. these figures could 
be over estimated as long as in many RS countries, more jobs are suppressed than 
created). In any case, these levels are so low that, even with a large margin of error, the 
employment situation appears very unfavorable to job seekers.  
In Morocco and Mexico, the formal sector provides job to 43-57% of the annual new 
EAP. Nevertheless, employment remains a significant challenge – until present, only 
annual job deficits seem to have been recorded. 
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Box 8: Formal job creation in the RS countries 
Kenya: Following the elections in 2002, the new government promised the creation of 500,000 jobs 
annually. Between 2003 and 2004 an estimated 437,900 jobs were created with a mere 36,400 in the formal 
sector. 
Madagascar: In 2004, salaried jobs were an exception rather than a rule in Madagascar, as only 13% of the 
Malagasy workers were salaried. This is due to the weak formal labor market in the country. While no data 
are available on the repartition of workers per economic sector, the number of jobs created by economic 
sectors known to be the most dynamic (tourism and the textile-garment industries), is very low: tourism is 
projected to create 12,000 jobs, and the textile garment industries, 30,000 jobs annually by 2013 (RS 
Madagascar, p. 154). However, using household surveys, Stifel (2007) provides a contrasted picture. They 
estimate that in Madagascar in 2004, the primary sector employed 80% of the working population, 97% of 
these workers engaged in agriculture, an increase of more than 6% compared to 2001. Agriculture 
generated more than 275,000 jobs every year between 2001 and 2004 (Table 8) when the industrial sector 
lost 70,000 jobs, mainly in textile and energy. 
Mali: The capacity for formal job creation in Mali is very weak. Informal private enterprises provide the 
majority of employment opportunities with 80.3% of the created jobs. Employment in formal, private 
enterprises only accounts for 8.7% at the national level (13% for men and 2.7% for women). The public 
sector – public administration and enterprises combined – provides 4.6% of the jobs at the national level 
(RS Mali, p. 108). 
Mexico: The construction industry followed by agrifood and garment industries have been the most 
dynamic sectors in the provision of formal jobs over the last years in rural Mexican areas. Construction and 
personal services require low skill levels and are low-paid. Thus, the majority remains employed in the 
informal sector, a trend that has amplified since 1995. Only 8% of the males and 12% of the females 
worked in the formal sector in 2003. In contrast, informal jobs accounted for about 65% of the working 
population in rural areas in 2003, compared to approximately 55% in 1995 (RS Mexico, p. 65). 
Nicaragua: In Nicaragua, 63% of the employed population is part of the informal sector (RS Nicaragua, p. 
75). Between 2000 and 2005, trade and other services (the sectors experiencing the most growth) generated 
115,500 and 78,800 jobs respectively, i.e. an average of 32,000 jobs each year, while the number of young 
people seeking work totals 74,400 annually. 
Senegal: Formal sector employment annual growth between 1995 and 2004 was 1.1%, only because of the 
expansion of the education and health sectors. Such a result is not due to the lack of growth of the formal 
sector itself (an annual growth rate of 4% between 1995 and 2004 equivalent to the informal sector), but to 
the structure of this growth, which is mainly based on capital investment rather than net job creation. 
Consequently, the formal sector contributed to 2.7% of the total job creation against 97.3% for the informal 
sector (World Bank 2007, p. 30-32). 
Table 8: Annual net job creation and additional active population in Madagascar, 2001-2004. 
  Annual Average 
Job creation (2001-2005) Primary 275,700 
 Industry -70,700 
 Service 2,600 
 Total 207,600 
Additional EAP (2000-2005)  286,300 
Gap   -78,700 
Source: Stifel (2007) and United Nations, World Population Prospect: The 2006 revision. 
Another issue refers to the cumulative employment gap over time. For as long as stocks – 
and not only flows – of people are considered, the employment pattern is worsening in all 
RS countries. A simple five-year projection based on the additional labor supply and the 
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level of formal job creation gives an estimate of the cumulated employment deficit (i.e. 
the stock of EAP that would not manage to find a formal job). Despite very different rates 
of formal job creation, Senegal, Mali and Morocco could have to cope with the same 
stock of people, around 800,000. In Madagascar, the gap could be huge – 1 million – 
while Kenya could face an even more critical situation. Even if these figures are very 
rough estimates, they express a quite disturbing lack of formal job creation. 
Table 9: Projection of formal job creation and employment gap over a 5-year period in the RS 
countries 
 
Date or 
Time 
period 
Formal job 
creation 
(annual 
average) 
Additional 
labor supply 
(annual 
average) 
Formal job 
creation / 
additional labor 
demand (%) 
Projected 
formal job 
deficit after 5 
years (stock) 
Kenya 2004 36,400 558,800 7% 2,612,000 
Madagascar 2007 42,000 251,600 17% 1,048,000 
Mali 1999 39,500 201,600 20% 810,500 
Mexico 1994-2003 217,000 377,800 57% 804,000 
Morocco 2000-2005 32,000 74,400 43% 212,000 
Nicaragua 2000-2006 20,000 179,800 11% 799,000 
Source: RS country reports, World population prospects, 2006 revision, and authors’ calculations. 
As a consequence of the weak formal job creation, workers in developing countries tend 
to rely on self-employment or wage employment in the informal sector, in which there 
are three main options: agriculture, informal rural and informal urban. “Excluding 
agriculture, there are about 104 million self-employed and unpaid family workers in 
developing countries, representing 37% of the non-agricultural workforce. Self-employed 
persons and the small firms that they establish have enormous potential for rapidly 
generating large numbers of new jobs and raising productivity to increase incomes, 
provided the right policy measures are in place to support them. […] Indeed, appropriate 
policies focusing on access to technology, training, credit, marketing and distribution 
channels can substantially accelerate self-employment, particularly in the informal sector 
and rural areas” (ICPF 2005, p. 79). 
Despite having this high potential for job creation, the informal sector offers unequal 
opportunities to “pick up the slack” in terms of absorbing increases in EAP. As suggested 
by Ranis (2008), the informal sector can be divided in two sub-sectors. The first is a 
dynamic modernizing sub-sector, which frequently subcontracts to the formal sector, and 
appears to be very competitive and to offer great income opportunities; the second – a 
traditional ‘sponge-like’ sub-sector – emphasizes self-financed, under-capitalized, small-
scale, unskilled-labor intensive production leading to low revenue, poor working 
conditions and low productivity (DIAL 2007, Pratap & Quintin 2006). What is at stake, 
then, is the relative size of these two informal sectors. Because the modernizing informal 
sub-sector is closely related to the dynamic of the formal sector, and since the formal 
sector is, as demonstrated here, weak and provides insufficient job opportunities, the 
informal ‘sponge-like’ sub-sector is much more likely to dominate. 
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Box 9: The informal sector in some RS countries 
Kenya: Kenya’s informal sector has developed since 1992 and has employed an estimated 6.12 million 
people directly and indirectly. This accounts for nearly a third of country’s labor force. Most of the sector is 
rural-based, with trade, service provision and manufacturing as significant sub-sectors. The strong 
emergence of the informal sector is largely attributed to the liberalization of the communications sector and 
the cotton industry. The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), although attributed for the cotton 
industry losses, is also recognized as having created many jobs through sale of imported second hand 
clothes (RS Kenya, p. vi). 
Morocco: Widely developed in trade and services but also in small-marketed production, the informal 
sector in Morocco is difficult to evaluate and, when attempts are made, the results vary considerably 
depending on the approaches and definitions. In any case, the last official investigation on the issue 
estimated that the informal sector in Morocco employed nearly 39% of non-agricultural workers in 1999-
2000. Out of nearly 1.9 million people surveyed, 73% were located in urban areas and 27% in rural areas 
(RS Morocco, p. 7). 
Nicaragua: The informal sector represents around 63% of total employed population. In 2005, only 51.2% 
of the employed population had a job year round, 13.2% had a partial job, 30% was under-employed (had a 
job for a week or two) and 5.6% was unemployed (RS Nicaragua, p. 88). 
Senegal: The informal sector dominates the Senegalese economy in both rural and urban areas. Thus, 92% 
of jobs and self-employment have been generated by the informal sector (64% in the rural informal sector, 
and 28% in the urban informal sector). For example, the formal public and private sectors represent only 
4% of jobs. In 2003, 277,200 Informal Production Units (IPU) were accounted for in the census in Dakar, 
the distribution was as follows: 31.1% in industry, 47.3% in commerce and 21.6% in services. The 
proportion of active women in the IPU is high (42.9%) such is the proportion of young people: 33.5% of 
the informal workers are younger than 26 years old. The level of education is also very low, averaging 2.8 
years of education. Moreover, the average incomes are, of course, much lower than in the formal sector. As 
a consequence, people from disadvantaged backgrounds dominate the informal sector (RS Senegal, p. 34). 
3.2.3 International migration 
Beyond formal and informal in-country employment, international migration is an option 
for people seeking ways to sustain their livelihoods. As presented previously (§2.1.4), 
international migration was, in the past, a clear exit option for many European countries 
where, despite a strong process of industrialization, the job creation pace was far too low 
to cope with the rural depopulation. Today, international migration receives a growing 
attention on the international scene for another reason: their related remittances are 
rapidly growing and appear higher than all donors’ contributions (Maimbo & Ratha 2005, 
World Bank 2006, Ratha & Shaw 2007). But the necessity to grasp migration as an exit 
option for part of the population of the developing world is not on the political agenda of 
the international community or, more particularly, of the developed countries, which are 
directly concerned.  
In many RS countries, depending on their geography and national trajectories, 
international migration is also a core issue. Mexico, Morocco and Nicaragua have taken 
advantage of their geographic position, with (on average) 10% of their total population 
living abroad. This option is less possible in Sub-Saharan Africa countries except in Mali 
where about 11% of the Malian population live abroad, with migration flows oriented 
toward other West African countries (Table 10). 
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Table 10: Migrants and remittances in RS countries 
 KEN MAD Mali MEX MOR NIC SEN 
Stocks of emigrants in 2005 
(Millions) 0.4 0.2 1.2 11.5 2.7 0.7 0.5 
Population in 2005 
(Millions) 33.4 17.0 11.4 104.3 29.9 5.6 11.7 
Emigrants / Population  1.3% 0.9% 10.6% 11.0% 9.1% 12.2% 4.0% 
Remittances in 2005 
(Millions $US) 494 16 175 21,802 4,724 600 511 
Remittances (% GDP) 3.4% 0.4% 3.9% 3.5% 9.4% 13.3% 6.7% 
Remittances ($US / 
migrants) 1,156 106 144 1,895 1,738 878 1,103 
Source: Ratha and Shaw 2007, WDI. 
When OECD countries are the destination of migration, factors such as neighboring 
boarders (Mexico and the US, Morocco and Southern Europe) or a former colonial 
relationship (France with Morocco, Senegal and Madagascar; the UK with Kenya) play a 
major role in migration patterns; conversely, when another developing country is the 
destination of migration, geographic proximity seems to be a major influence (Kenya and 
Tanzania; Mali and Côte d’Ivoire; Nicaragua and Costa Rica; Senegal to Gambia – a very 
unique case of migration). These patterns highlight the difficulty and costs of long 
distance migration. 
One may suppose that a higher proportion of emigrants going to developed countries 
should equal higher remittances per migrant. This assumption, however, does not hold, as 
Madagascar records very low levels of remittances per migrant despite the majority of its 
migrants going to France. Nor does this assumption prove to be linear, as Kenya 
demonstrates with a larger proportion of migrants going to developed countries than 
Senegal but has a somewhat equal level of remittances per migrant. These gaps show that 
a deeper knowledge of the migration patterns is necessary to understand remittances’ 
flows to developing countries. Furthering the argument against this assumption is Mali, a 
country that records the lowest flow of remittances by migrants while more than 10% of 
its population lives abroad. This could be explained by the fact that many Malian 
migrants are seasonal workers and, therefore, they return with the earnings, rather than 
sending them home (Shaw 2007). In Nicaragua, nearly half of the emigrants go to Costa 
Rica, a neighboring developing country, because the wage gap between Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua is high enough to generate migration and allow remittances to flow back to 
Nicaragua. 
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Table 11: Main destinations of emigrants from the RS countries (2005) 
 
 Migrant’s country of origin 
 
 
KEN MAD MALI MEX MOR NIC SEN 
Canada 5% 1% 1%  1% 1%  
France  54% 4%  29%  20% 
Israel     8%   
Italy  1%   11% 1% 15% 
Netherlands     6%   
Réunion  17%      
Spain   1%  25% 1% 5% 
United Kingdom 34% 1%   1%   
United Sates 11% 1%  90% 2% 36% 3% 
Others 7% 3% 1% 2% 9% 1% 3% 
To
 
de
v
el
o
pe
d 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
Sub total 57% 78% 7% 92% 91% 40% 46% 
Burkina Faso   25%     
Comoros  14%      
Costa Rica      49%  
Gambie   1%    27% 
Côte d’Ivoire   41%     
Mauritania   1%    9% 
Nigeria   9%    1% 
Tanzania 26%       
Uganda 8%       
Others 9% 8% 16% 8% 9% 11% 18% 
To
 
de
v
el
o
pi
n
g 
co
u
n
tr
ie
s 
Sub total 43% 22% 93% 8% 9% 60% 54% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Ratha and Shaw 2007, authors’ calculations. 
Therefore, it seems that only countries with both a large share of their migrants living in 
developed countries and a large segment of migrants relative to the size of their overall 
population record a significant contribution of remittances when compared to their GDP 
(Morocco, Nicaragua). One must stress that these data do not take into account the 
geographic distribution of emigrants within a country, leading to high emigrant 
concentration in some regions (e.g. Kayes region in Western Mali), hence influencing the 
potential impact of both emigration and remittances in these regions. 
Bloom et al. (2001) indicate that as long as fertility remains high, SSA countries are 
unlikely to see rising incomes or healthier, better-educated workers and that in this 
context, international migration is a clear option. These authors even propose that migrant 
flows should be directed towards Europe, as the two regions are complementary 
opposites in their population structure. Simultaneously, Hatton and Williamson (2001) 
remind us that, while the two main driving forces of migration in the 19th century were 
real wage gaps between sending and receiving countries and demographic boom in low-
wage sending countries, these two features are even more important in Africa today, and 
that the migration pressure will continue to increase. Thus, migration is likely an 
inevitable step towards developing countries of origin (De Haas 2006). This option could 
obviously decrease the pressure on labor market (Pritchett 2007) but the clear challenge 
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will be its scaling-up: to what extend could developed countries take in workers coming 
from developing countries with regards to their economic, political, social and cultural 
context? 
Such a conclusion should encourage developed countries to rethink their migration 
policies; however no developed countries are currently looking at the migration issue 
through this lens. On contrary they prefer to develop new migration policies based on 
their own short-term needs (i.e. preference for skilled workers), rather than to grapple 
with the complex modifications of societies and economies that seem to be at the heart of 
the migration dynamics. Consequently, current migration policies could more likely harm 
Sub-Saharan Africa countries than bolster their economic growth (Landau & 
Vigneswaran 2007). 
3.2.4 What prospects for the absorption capacity of agriculture? 
Throughout history, and into the present, agriculture has been the major source of 
livelihood for the majority of people, particularly in Africa. As such, the crucial question 
about agriculture is its ability to remain a major source of activity and income in the 
context of a growing economically active population. We have seen in the previous 
sections that in Sub-Saharan Africa the huge increase of the EAP faces a weak formal 
employment dynamic, related to the difficulties of economic diversification, and that, if 
international migration is an option, it is also constrained by political issues. 
Notwithstanding possible opportunities for new activities, agriculture and informal 
sectors will continue to play their important role and, in this context, the question of the 
absorption capacity of agriculture appears to be particularly relevant. 
However this question is notably sensitive and contains many traps because in DCs 
information on endowment and availability of production factors is often scarce, partial, 
and based on estimation at the national level. Also the possible answers to this sensitive 
question are clearly context-related and cannot be generalized. Indeed, global figures do 
not inform about the accessibility, the quality and/or the possible combination of each 
factor, which depend on their intrinsic local characteristics and also of the global 
economic and institutional environment. Global figures also mask the distribution effects 
among stakeholders and regions and their evolution.  
The case of land is particularly illustrative of these difficulties for the analysis. The 
evolution of the quantity of agricultural land21 and its size by AgEAP is insufficient to 
                                                 
21
 Agricultural land refers to: (a) arable land - land used for temporary crops (double-cropped areas are 
counted only once), temporary meadows for mowing or pasture, land under market and kitchen gardens and 
land temporarily fallow (less than five years). Abandoned land resulting from shifting cultivation is not 
included in this category. Data for arable land are not meant to indicate the amount of land that is 
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understand the existing challenges. Further information is needed on: the soil’s quality 
and fertility; land access and concentration of land, which refer to property rights, 
structure of ownership, all of these elements being part of the characterization of the 
agrarian system. Asymmetric agrarian structures, where smallholdings coexist with 
latifundia and large estates, do not provide the same room for maneuver as a more 
homogeneous structure of “small” farms (“small” is, of course, relative to the context). 
Each situation has its own constraints and opportunities, which directly affects the 
options for development. Similarly, if there is an absolute stock of agricultural land – 
defined by national borders or landscape – the available land is relative to the level of 
technology, the existing infrastructure, and the provision of public goods (water access 
and irrigation, roads, eradication of endemic diseases, etc.). 
Discussion about the absorption capacity of agriculture, with reference to the 
employment challenge under constraint of limited alternatives, leads to an introduction of 
the ways to increase the agricultural activity and its outputs – the volume and value of 
agricultural products22 – which will sustain farmers’ livelihood and allow income per 
capita improvements. Historically, two main strategies exist to increase production: 
adding new agricultural land, or intensifying production; often a combination of the two 
strategies is employed. 
The conditions for intensification are a core issue among agricultural and development 
specialists. Since the pioneer work of Boserup (1965), intensification has generally been 
associated with the end of the “agricultural frontier” and the possibility of expanding the 
agricultural area, because in a pre-industrial economy (or in regions badly connected to 
markets) without modern inputs (industrial fertilizers, improved seeds, and motorization), 
extensive growth on new land gives access to new fertility stocks and provide a better 
output per working day. Further works have highlighted other powerful engines for 
intensification, mainly linked to the structural transformation process itself: 
industrialization (and the availability of industrial inputs), urbanization and growing and 
new demand for food. Authors such as Djurfeldt et al. (2005) also point out that the 
diffusion of technical innovations (typically the “Green Revolution package”) relies on 
market forces and on specific public policies, which appear to be strong drivers of 
agricultural development, particularly when they rally private economic agents (which 
was the case of the Asian agriculture modernization).  
                                                                                                                                                 
potentially cultivable; (b) permanent crops - land cultivated with crops that occupy the land for long 
periods and do not need to be replanted after each harvest, such as cocoa, coffee and rubber; this category 
includes land under flowering shrubs, fruit trees, nut trees and vines, but excludes land under trees grown 
for wood or timber; and (c) permanent pastures - land used permanently (five years or more) for herbaceous 
forage crops, either cultivated or growing wild (wild prairie or grazing land). Source: FAOSTAT. 
22
 We could also add here the other services or amenities provided by agriculture like landscape and natural 
resources management; however these productions do not rely, so far, on markets in DCs and barely 
provide income. Carbon markets could be a development on this front. 
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The RuralStruc Program’s first phase national reports provided insights on this difficult 
question of the absorption capacity of agriculture, mainly focusing on expansion 
dynamics. As a background, we can recall the aggregated figures by using the FAO 
database which show a very slight extension of the agricultural land among the RS 
program countries over the last 40 years, the exceptions being Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Morocco, and Mali, where specific public interventions occurred (Table 12). 
Table 12: Evolution of the agricultural land in the RS countries, 1963-2003 
 KEN MAD MALI MEX MOR NIC SEN 
Agricultural land, 1963 (Millions ha) 25.2 26.2 31.7 98.1 23.9 5.2 8.1 
Agricultural land, 2003 (Millions ha) 26.5 27.6 34.7 107.3 30.4 7.0 8.2 
Difference (Millions ha) 1.3 1.4 3.0 9.2 6.5 1.8 0.1 
Variation 5% 5% 10% 9% 27% 34% 1% 
Average annual growth rate 0.13% 0.13% 0.23% 0.22% 0.61% 0.74% 0.03% 
Source: FAOSTAT 
Although some RS country reports (especially Kenya and Madagascar) indicate possible 
room for maneuver to continue extending agricultural land while considering the many 
related challenges of such an option (access, existing property rights, development 
prerequisites), a common concern is the overexploitation of the resource that has 
occurred and that continues with the closure of the last frontiers. In many cases, marginal 
lands are being cultivated due to growing pressure on land, which becomes the scarce 
resource (Box 10). 
Box 10: Extension of agricultural land and pace of land colonization in some RS countries 
Madagascar: Land expansion occurs at the expense of forests with a decrease of approximately a third of 
primary forest in the last ten years (Zeller et al. 2001). This is mainly due to slash and burn practices for 
maize, cassava or potatoes on “tanety” areas. The expansion of agricultural land will now become more 
difficult because the Malagasy government decided to triple the protected areas in the next five years with 
the objective of strengthening the conservation of biodiversity: two thirds of the remaining natural forests 
of the country should be placed under formal protection (RS Madagascar, p. 130). The surfaces classified 
as “protected” currently represent 11.5% of the national territory.  
Mali: In large part, production increase has been the result of extending agricultural land, which relies on 
farmers’ dynamics. This is particularly the case for cotton where incentive “controlled” prices are the main 
driver. This is also the case for cereals (mostly millet and sorghum), the development of which is driven by 
the strong demographic growth (RS Mali p. 82). Only rice followed a different path due to the development 
of a large irrigation scheme - the Office du Niger in the Niger River inland delta - initiated during the 
colonization era (RS Mali, p. 75). 
Mexico: The expansion of agricultural land has been a long-stated target of public policy and heavily relied 
on two key interventions: land distribution (particularly through the opening of new agricultural frontiers), 
as part of the agrarian reform; and the irrigation policy, which incorporated major production areas in the 
North of the country that were strongly limited by insufficient rainfalls. However, the momentum driving 
the expansion of the agricultural frontier began to weaken, especially during the period 1983-1994 when 
the sector was in crisis. The expansion model is now approaching its limits; new rain-fed land is 
characterized by lower soil quality, hydraulic works necessary to increase the irrigated area are more and 
more difficult and costly while water resources are depleting (RS Mexico, p. 12). 
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Morocco: An ambitious irrigation policy was implemented in the country starting in the mid-1960s. This 
strong public intervention, named the “Policy of Dams”, allowed an increase of the irrigated area by 130% 
between 1967 and 1974, and 72% between 1974 and 1996. In 1996, 1.25 million ha were irrigated (RS 
Morocco, p. 33, 108). 
Nicaragua: During the period between 1950 and 1975, the introduction of cotton production as well as the 
creation of a vegetable oil processing industry and industrial slaughterhouses in the Pacific region (where 
the land is the most fertile) provided a strong incentive for land concentration and infrastructure 
investments (paved roads, electricity, telephone, transport), which simultaneously fostered urban growth. 
At the same time, public policies encouraging the colonization of the country’s south-central area opened 
up an agricultural frontier to landless population, particularly those who had been pushed out from the 
Pacific region (RS Nicaragua, p. 16). The agricultural frontier was relatively stable in the 1980s because the 
civil war was concentrated in this region; subsequently, a new frontier was opened in the 1990s in the 
Caribbean region (RS Nicaragua, p. 45). Nicaragua developed a model based on land expansion because 
the resource was still available in the eastern region. It led, however, to the development of large – often 
under-used – farms, primarily based on livestock. The consequence is that the “last frontier” is now 
reaching the Caribbean coast and its swamp area, thus land pressure is definitely increasing (RS Nicaragua, 
p. 80). 
In the context of growing pressure on resources, the increases in the demographic in rural 
areas and in the number of families relying on agriculture for their livelihood have 
directly impacted on the size of farms and the farm structure. Impacts of these trends 
include the simultaneous processes of segmentation due to the integration of the new 
generations and, sometimes, concentration when the head of household decides to exit 
agriculture (other activity options or aspirations, or a farm’s lack of viability). 
Surprisingly, data on farm structures, which are central to the understanding of the 
processes underway and for public decisions, remain scarce and are constantly 
changing.23 With the exception of Mexico and Morocco, where the structural 
transformation engaged (at different pace and with different levels of alternatives), the 
number of farms raised over the last decades in the other RS program countries. In the 
meanwhile, the average size of farms has decreased in general, except in Senegal24 and in 
Morocco, Madagascar and Nicaragua showing the most dramatic evolution of this 
indicator (Table 13).  
                                                 
23
 This is notably true in Kenya and Mali. In Kenya, there is little information about farm numbers and 
average size. The main source available is the Welfare Monitoring Survey conducted in 1992, 1994 and 
1997 with large variations in design and implementation. The 1994 survey is the only one with national 
coverage (Society for International Development 2006, and also Gautam 2000). Researches on land tenure 
indicate that farms sizes have sharply and prematurely declined since the 1960s (Haugerud 1989). 
Similarly, little is know in Mali about farm structures at the national level. However, case studies (Mariko 
et al. 1999; Kébé et al. 2003, 2005) show a general trend towards fragmentation of farm holdings with 
diminution of their average size in the Centre and in the South of the country (RS Mali, p. 76). 
24
 In Senegal, one of the adjustments has been a progressive increase of the farm household size, both 
through an increase of the dependent household members (active and inactive) and an increase of the 
number of households within the same farm unit and sharing the main production factors. This process, 
related to the rural social structure in the Sahelian zone, also occurred in Mali where it was partly 
compensated by the access to new land resources (in the Niger delta and the cotton zone). 
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Table 13: Evolution of the number and the average size of farms in the RS countries 
Country Date Number of farms 
 
Variation Average size of farms (ha) 
 
Variation 
Kenya (*) 1994 3,440,000 + 2.5 - 
Madagascar  1985 1,459,435  1.2  
 2005 2,428,492 +66% 0.86 -28% 
Mali (*) 2004 805,200 + 4.5 - 
Mexico 1970 2,557,000  8.7  
 1990/91 3,823,000 +50%   
 2000 3,400,000 -11% 2.8 (ejidatarios) 13.8 (private producers) 
 
Morocco 1974 1,921,958  4.9  
 1996 1,496,349 -22% 6.1 +24% 
Nicaragua 1963 102,201  -  
 1971 86,870 -15% 47.8 ? 
 2001 199,549 +130% 31.47 -34% 
Senegal 1960 295,000  3.7  
 1998 437,037 +48% 4.3 +16% 
Sources: RS country reports  
(*) See footnote 23 
Beyond these average figures, RS country reports insist on the fact that, especially in 
Latin America, but also in Morocco or Kenya, and due to the duality of the agrarian 
systems or preexisting inequality in land distribution, the demographic pressure has led to 
increase in the number of very small farms unable to provide livelihood for farmers and 
their families (Box 11). 
Box 11: Farm structures in some RS countries 
Mexico: The number of farmers increased from 2.6 to 3.8 million between 1970 and 1990/91, and then 
declined to 3.4 million in 2000. In the meantime, the average size of the farms (which was about 8.7 ha in 
1970) had declined for the majority of the farmers (the ejidatarios), who were granted an average of 2.8 ha 
through land reform in 2000. Indeed, the persistent dualism of the Mexican agrarian structure has not 
changed much over the last decades. In 1990, farms less than 5 ha still represented 59% of the total number 
of farms and they covered less than 5.4% of the cultivated land; 84,853 farms – 2.1% of the total number of 
farms – had an average size exceeding 100 hectares and controlled more than 68% of the total cultivated 
land (RS Mexico, p. 108). 
Morocco: The increase of agricultural area, coupled with the decline in the number of farms, led to a 24% 
increase in the average size of productive units from 4.9 ha to 6.1 ha from the mid-70s to the mid-90s. This 
trend did not include farms of more than 100 ha, whose average area declined by 15%. However, there are 
still great disparities in the distribution of land: farms of less than 3 ha account for 55% of the number of 
farms and cover 12% of the farm area, while those of more than 50 ha account for less than 1% of the total 
number of farms and cover more than 15% of the total area. Furthermore, agricultural land has been 
extended into forests, pastures and other marginal lands, thereby increasing the risks of soil exhaustion and 
overexploitation of resources (RS Morocco, p. xx, xxiv). 
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Nicaragua: Between 1971 and 2001, the number of farms increased by 130%, from 86,870 to 199,549 
largely because of demographic pressure. In the meantime, because agricultural land expanded less rapidly, 
the average farm size has declined from 48 to 31 ha, a drop of 34%. From 1963 to 1971, 70% of the 
population accessed only to 10% of agricultural land. There were slow but significant changes in land 
distribution during the last four decades and land concentration was reduced: the 10% of farms which 
controlled 71% of the agricultural land in 1963, then 73% in 1971, owned 60% in 2001. However, despite 
the land reform efforts of the 1980s and early 1990s (which came to a halt), Nicaragua still has an unequal 
land distribution reducing small and medium farmers’ access to land (RS Nicaragua, p. 86, 96). 
Consequently, one of the main issues regarding the absorption of a growing AgEAP, 
particularly high in Sub-Saharan Africa, is the viability of farms, or their ability to sustain 
the livelihood of their members, which leads us back to the potential increase of 
agricultural outputs and to the core question of productivity of land and labor. 
Productivity indicators (output per unit of land or per unit of labor, mainly the day of 
work) are another difficult issue. As a consequence of lack of information, ratios are 
often based on agricultural GDP per unit of land and labor, which is, of course, a very 
rough estimate because market prices variations, which are not directly related to 
technical innovations about farming practices (except those related to the quality of 
products), significantly impact the final result. 
The common agreement about productivity is that there is a clear divide between 
countries where farmers are able to access and to adopt the Green Revolution package 
and mechanization, and countries where they are not. As clearly illustrated by Table 1 (in 
2.1.1), the gaps between productive systems are huge and lead to very distinct worlds of 
production. The Green Revolution package was disseminated during the last four decades 
among the South, South-East, and East Asian countries, and also in many regions of 
Latin America (particularly Mexico which was a pioneer place for the experimentation 
and development of “modern intensification techniques”). Sub-Saharan Africa is clearly 
lagging due to a lack of infrastructure and subsequently higher prices of inputs, very 
diverse agroecology (the consequence of which is a wide range of crop varieties making 
their improvement more difficult), soil degradation, weakness of the research systems, 
and a lack of economic incentives, partly due to inappropriate public policies (World 
Bank 2007, p. 55). It is commonly accepted that the region made some progress in the 
1960s but then suffered a regression in productivity during the 1970s and 1980s to only 
slightly recover and achieve a dull improvement at the end of the century, estimated at 
0.8% per year, a number that cannot support the region’s demographic growth (Lilyan et 
al. 2004). 
The other agreement about productivity is that its progresses have been unevenly 
distributed. This situation is due to imperfect markets with difficulty of access (lack of 
infrastructure or lack of economic agents) and to differences of assets (financial, human, 
and social capital) between households; the consequence is an increasing asymmetry 
among farms leading to a clear differentiation process, which has been observed in 
various RuralStruc Program countries, notably in Mexico where the regional gaps are 
increasing between the irrigated regions and the large producers of the North-West and 
the Central and Southern regions, where smallholdings and indigenous producers 
dominate (RS Mexico, p. xv-xix). The case of maize production is particularly illustrative 
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of these gaps and shows a 30% yield increase in the North-West of Mexico when the rest 
of the country was stagnating (Léonard et al. 2006). Increasing disparities among 
producers linked to differences of assets and uneven access to markets or public support 
can contribute to progressive marginalization of the most vulnerable farmers (i.e. those 
coping with and recovering from the climatic or economic shocks and stresses with 
difficulty (Chambers 1989)) and to an increasing number of landless peasants (Rahman 
2004). 
These very mixed economic results, which constrain the ability of agriculture to answer 
the challenges related to demographic growth, are expressed by the stagnation – and 
sometimes the increase – of the rural poverty rate, which can be used as indicator of rural 
income, since no other data on rural and/or agricultural income at the country level are 
available. The RS country reports show deterioration (the worst situation is noted in 
Kenya) or a near stagnation of poverty (Table 14). Conversely, the slight decrease in 
Nicaragua and in Mexico is not only a result of improvement of the agricultural results 
but also the consequence of an accelerated diversification of activities and incomes, with 
remittances playing a major role.  
Table 14: Evolution of rural poverty rate in the RS countries 
 KEN MAD MALI MEX (*) MOR NIC SEN 
Year 1 1992 1993 1994 1992 1985 1993 1994 
Rural poverty rate 46% 75% 76% 35% 27% 76% 62% 
Year 2 2000 2005 2001 2002 2001 2001 2001 
Rural poverty rate 60% 74% 81% 34% 28% 67% 65% 
Average annual growth rate of poverty 3.4% -0.1% 1.0% -0.3% 0.3% -1.6% 0.7% 
Source: RS Country Reports, 2007.  
*For Mexico, the extreme rural poverty rate is used. 
Finally, the ability of agriculture to cope with, and contribute to, the employment 
challenge will unequivocally depend on the progresses achieved by the different types of 
farmers. The evolution of their incomes relies on their own assets, as well as on their 
access to technical innovations and inputs through markets and possible support systems 
(technical advice, extension services) and provision of public goods. It also relies on the 
nature of the connection to markets the restructuring of which over the last decades leads 
to new opportunities, but also to new constraints. 
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3.3 Market restructuring and differentiation processes 
What are the implications of agrifood market restructuring for the developing countries’ 
farmers? No answer can be put forward without a clear understanding and evaluation of 
(i) the opportunities and challenges that this restructuring offers and the ability of the 
farmers to seize them (inclusion) or not (exclusion); and (ii) the actual proportion of 
farmers able to join these new markets and sustain their participation. This section 
describes these restructuring processes based on RuralStruc country examples, and then 
focuses on the limited knowledge available to allow an initial discussion of the on-going 
inclusion/exclusion processes in the RS program countries. 
3.3.1 General background 
There is an abundance of literature on the liberalization of agrifood markets. The main 
objective of this introduction is not to provide a deep review of this literature but to set 
the scene for the processes of change that started in the 1980s.  
3.3.1.1 Context prior to liberalization 
In all the RuralStruc countries, prior to liberalization, the agricultural markets were 
similarly characterized by an asymmetric dual system with strong state intervention. On 
the one hand, most staple domestic markets and commodity exports were controlled and 
highly regulated by states via marketing boards, state-run industries, administrative 
commodity pricing, and, often, fixed wholesale and retail prices for many basic food 
products. Most of the time, these public bodies were monopsonies, especially for major 
export products and sometimes for staples (with some cases of associated monopolies). 
These structures were initially created to i) promote sector growth, with agriculture being 
perceived as the first sector of accumulation; ii) stabilize producer prices (and incomes) 
within a single season and reduce variability between seasons, with the objective of 
reducing risks; iii) increase prices and improve incentives by reducing the number of 
intermediaries along the commodity chains; and iv) facilitate the insertion of exports into 
international markets through management of the national supply. On the other hand, few 
traditional non-staple markets (fresh products such as fruit and vegetables, dairy, etc.) 
were almost free, with little or no state intervention or price regulation. Spot transactions 
with many small, non-specialized and unorganized buyers and sellers characterized those 
markets, where few if any grades or standards existed, poor market information systems 
prevail and mostly informal contracts, largely enforced through social networks, were the 
norm (Fafchamps 2004). 
Due to the weakness of the private sector, states also intervened in processing, mainly 
through parastatals (see Box 12), with key industries in the traditional export sector such 
as groundnut, palm oil, tea, coffee, cocoa, sugar, etc. Many of the industrial crops were 
produced by public vertically integrated firms aiming at economies of scale (processing, 
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transportation), and/or justified by the need for quick processing, in particular because of 
perishability and quality requirements of the products (palm nuts, tea, etc.). 
Box 12: State intervention in some RS countries food markets prior to liberalization 
Kenya: The Kenya Tea Development Agency (KTDA) was set up in 1964 by the Government of Kenya, the 
CDC, OPEC and the EEC. In two decades KTDA organized the planting of more than 57,000 ha of tea by 
151,000 smallholders. Since its creation, KTDA has effectively controlled all levels of tea production from 
the quality of planting material through control over nurseries to the quality of production through selective 
registration, including the effectiveness of extension, the supervision of leaf quality, and, critically, through 
the exercise of a buying monopoly. The whole chain has been vertically integrated, as the crop must be 
produced relatively near the processing plant: even if the transportation costs are not as serious a problem 
for tea as for instance for sugarcane, the perishability of the crop requires geographically concentrated and 
coordinated delivery (Bauman 2000, Kinyili 2003). 
Mali: The Malian agricultural economy was based on an administered system that lasted 25 years after 
Independence and was transformed very gradually. The state controlled main staples and export markets 
(cereals, cotton, etc.) through parastatals or semi-public companies, which intervened in marketing and, in 
some cases, in production, storage and distribution also. Through the Office des Produits Agricoles du Mali 
(OPAM), created in 1964, the Malian state controlled marketing structure of agricultural products – 
particularly for grains. OPAM had the monopoly of the collection of grains from producers at fixed prices 
and was then in charge of the distribution of cereals in the country (RS Mali, p. 51). 
Mexico: Direct state intervention in agricultural markets was a major component of Mexico’s development 
policy until the beginning of the 1990s. The state supported the commercialization and the storage of major 
products, creating state-run structures responsible for the supply of the domestic market in staples (dealing 
with local production and imports), and also for the supervision of exports such as coffee and tobacco. For 
instance, in 1958, the INMECAFE (Instituto Mexicano del Café) in charge of the promotion and the 
modernization of the coffee production (among other things) was created. The CEIMSA (Compania 
Exportadora e Importadora Mexicana SA) was created in the 1950s, replaced in the mid-1960 by the 
CONASUPO (Compania Nacional de Subsitencias Populares). These public institutions played a key role 
by supporting prices of staples for the producers, by processing, storing, and distributing the crops and by 
regulating trade through direct imports (RS Mexico, p. 24, Losch et al. 1997, Yunes Naude 2003).  
3.3.1.2 Withdrawal of the state and fading regulation 
In the 1980s and 1990s, market-oriented agricultural policy reforms were a centerpiece of 
liberalization in developing countries, within the context of structural adjustment 
programs designed to restore fiscal and current account balance, to reduce or eliminate 
price distortions, and to facilitate efficient price transmission, so as to stimulate 
investment and production (Barrett & Mutambatsere 2005). These reforms were justified 
by the fact that the original objectives of the state-run structures, such as marketing 
boards, development agencies and public enterprises, were most widely diverted, 
especially during the second half of 1970s agricultural price boom. These public 
structures, which had controlled marketing and regulated prices of agricultural products 
in most DCs, became the target of the liberalization process and the symbols of the state 
inefficiency. Thus, the first steps in reforming agricultural markets were the dismantling 
and the privatization of the state-run structures, and the reduction of tariffs and export 
taxes, consumer subsidies, and producer price controls. The following table (Table 15) 
presents some examples of the dismantling of former public bodies in the RS countries. 
These processes of restructuring all occurred over an extended period of time (from the 
end of the 1970s to the end of the 1990s). As discussed previously, depending on 
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countries’ historical trajectories, the starting point, the scope, and the pace of 
liberalization were all country specific and explain large variations among countries. 
Table 15: Scope of market reforms in RS countries 
 Marketing at producer level BEFORE 
liberalization 
AFTER liberalization 
Mali 
OPAM 
Office des Produits 
Agricoles du Mali 
 
State marketing board which had the monopoly 
of the commercialization of grains 
 
1986: removal of the 
monopoly 
1989: liberalization of imports 
and commercialization of 
grains 
Office du Niger Parastatal which managed water, land and 
irrigation infrastructure, production, marketing, 
and processing of rice 
1994: objectives restricted to 
land management, 
infrastructures maintenance, 
and extension  
CMDT 
Compagnie Malienne 
de Développement des 
Textiles 
Semi public company (40% of the capital 
belong to the French DAGRIS) in charge of 
inputs supply, extension, marketing, and 
processing of cotton seed, supply of cotton 
fiber to the Malian public textile industry 
COMATEX and exports 
On-going liberalization since 
2004 
 
Senegal 
ONCAD 
Office national de 
commercialisation et 
d’assistance au 
développement 
 
State marketing board which had the monopoly 
of the commercialization of domestic 
agricultural products (groundnut, grains) and 
imports, and supervised the cooperatives of 
producers 
 
1979: liquidation  
1991: liberalization of local 
market and imports of rice 
SONACOS 
Société nationale de 
commercialisation des 
oléagineux du Sénégal 
State-run processor for groundnut oil 2006: privatization 
Madagascar 
BCSR 
Bureau de 
Commercialisation et 
de Stabilisation du Riz 
 
 
State marketing board which had the monopoly 
of collect and commercialization of rice 
 
1986: total removal of the 
monopoly of the 
commercialization of rice in 
domestic market 
1990: privatization of imports 
1991: removal of the buffer 
stock 
2005: removal of import taxes 
HASYMA 
Hasy Malagasy 
Semi public company (36% of the capital 
belong to the French DAGRIS) which ensured 
collection and commercialization of cotton 
seed, and trade of cotton fiber to local textile 
industry and exports 
2004: privatization (90% of the 
capital bought by DAGRIS) 
Kenya 
NCPB 
National Cereals and 
Produce Board 
 
State marketing board that was charged with 
grain marketing controls in both internal and 
external level 
 
1991-95: privatization and 
liberalization of trade in both 
internal and external markets  
Kenya Cooperative 
Creameries 
 
Dairy Board which had the monopoly 
/monopsony power over the dairy industry 
 
1992: liberalization of 
processing and 
commercialization of dairies 
   
 55 
The Coffee board of 
Kenya 
State marketing board in charge of collection, 
process and trade of coffee 
2002: end of the coffee 
marketing board activities 
The Tea Board of 
Kenya 
State marketing board mandated to regulate the 
tea industry: growing, research, manufacture, 
trade and promotion on local and international 
markets 
no change  
KTDA 
Kenya Tea 
Development Agency 
Public development agency responsible for the 
management of production through provision 
of inputs, extension, collection, processing and 
marketing of tea 
2000: privatization 
Morocco 
ONICL 
Office National 
Interprofessionnel des 
Céréales et 
Légumineuses 
 
 
State marketing board which fully controlled 
marketing of grains through fixed prices 
(especially wheat), and strictly controlled 
imports 
 
1996: liberalization of the 
grain market25 
 
OCE 
Office de 
Commercialisation et 
d’Exportation 
State marketing board which had the monopoly 
of exports such as citrus, horticultural products, 
canned foods etc. 
1985: removal of the 
monopoly and liberalization of 
exports 
Nicaragua 
ENABAS 
Empresa Nacional de 
Alimentos Basicos 
 
State marketing agency which had the 
monopoly for the commercialization of staples 
and export crops such as peanuts, sesame and 
soy 
 
1984: elimination of price 
differential for basic grains 
1990: full liberalization of 
staples commercialization 
Mexico 
CONASUPO 
Compania Nacional de 
Subsitencias Populares 
 
 
State-run enterprise that had the monopoly for 
the supply of the domestic market in staples 
(marketing of national production and imports 
management), and supervision of exports  
 
 
1989: removal of the 
marketing monopoly of 
national products and imports 
and limitation of its 
intervention to maize and 
beans 
INMECAFE 
Instituto Mexicano del 
café 
State marketing board which supported farm 
production and handled processing and 
marketing of coffee 
1993: dismantling of the board 
and liberalization 
Source: RS country reports 
3.3.2 The restructuring of agrifood markets 
State withdrawal from agricultural markets and the dismantling of parastatals and 
regulation systems have generated a new economic and institutional environment at the 
national level. However, this change has to be put in perspective with other major 
processes of restructuring within the international agrifood markets, briefly presented in 
                                                 
25
 In fact, this has been virtually the case for durum, barley and maize since 1988. However, there is still a 
quota of 1 million ton of subsidized flour. 
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§ 2.1.2. These processes are the result of new patterns in food demand and have been 
boosted by the increasing mobility of factors resulting from globalization (see Figure 8). 
The main consequence of this evolution, which started in the 1980s, is a trend towards an 
increasing integration process whose main attributes are development of standards, closer 
relations between producers and buyers, and the development of contractualization. This 
process is, of course, developing at very different paces among countries. The aim of the 
following section is to provide a framework of reference for understanding what is 
underway in the different countries under review. 
Figure 8: New patterns and trends in the agrifood system resulting from liberalization and 
globalization 
NEW PATTERNS IN MODERN 
AGRIFOOD MARKET REGULATION
NEW PATTERNS
IN AGRIFOOD DEMAND
NEW PATTERNS OF FACTORS AND 
PRODUCTS MOBILITY
Centralized
administrated
system
Price control
Many
producers vs 
State 
monopolies
Free market system 
Supply/ demand
Market-driven price
Many producers vs 
Private oligoloplies
Less price distorsion
More incertainity or 
transaction  costs
Urbanization (+)
Incomes (+)
New diets
⇒fresh products: 
FFV, dairy, meat
New market segments 
such as niche markets
⇒organic, fair, ethical
Quality requirements
Development of 
norms and standards
Transport revolution
Tariffs decrease
⇒Far trade & supply
⇒Deconnected
production & 
consumption places
Market deragulation
and privatization
⇒FDI investments (+)
⇒Integration and 
concentration (+)
Competition among
big players
Need of increasing
market share
NEED FOR CONTRACTS 
and INCREASING 
INTEGRATION
 
Source: authors, diverse inspiration 
3.3.2.1 New patterns in agrifood markets regulation 
The dismantling of the public regulation structures and of the centralized supply 
management systems had several consequences that can be summarized by two main 
features. First, value chains rapidly became market-driven and dependent on supply and 
demand variations. Many new private actors emerged but were often eliminated later 
because of intense competition. In many situations, one of the conditions for survival was 
increasing alliances with foreign capital. This phenomenon exacerbated an asymmetrical 
situation: whereas markets still incorporated many fragmented producers, larger but 
fewer marketing agents have progressively controlled the value chains. Second, due to 
the removal of administrated regulation and price management, uncertainty and 
transaction costs increased for those emerging private actors engaged in the new 
competitive environment. Faced with this context, the main trend among trade and 
processing companies was to implement strategies to secure their supplies through the 
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implementation of contract arrangements with producers. Some of them engaged in 
closer integration by buying local subsidiaries, organizing supply networks with specific 
support to producers, etc. At the same time, increasing competition over the international 
and national markets fostered processes of concentration, the result of which was the 
emergence of many “big players” that deeply transformed market dynamics. 
Box 13: Newly emerging private actors and the implementation of contractualization in some RS 
countries 
Kenya: Since liberalization of the dairy industry, the number of milk processors and mini dairies has 
rapidly declined in Kenya. Only four firms remain, all of which are private limited companies (Brookside, 
Premier, Spin Knit and Meru Central dairies). They are supplied by some vertically integrated cooperatives 
that have acquired processing equipment and cold storage (RS Kenya, p. 74-76). 
Mexico: The liberalization of the fruits and vegetables chain in Mexico translated into growing production 
and productivity, and i) an increased concentration of large economic agents both in production and 
distribution; ii) a greater dependence of producers on credit allocated by large export firms; and iii) 
increasing control of the retailing sector over production with: large wholesalers controlling the main 
supply markets, and large supermarket chains controlling distribution. In staple chains, a concentration 
process has also been observed. With the dismantling of CONASUPO, markets for basic grains such as 
corn, wheat, rice, and soy have been progressively controlled by a few transnational enterprises – 
subsidiaries of U.S. companies – working on both sides of the border. For instance, CONASUPO's closure 
left Mexican maize producers in the hands of a very small number of large companies (the only buyers of 
their crops): Maseca, Minsa, and Arancia, in which Cargill and Archer Daniels Midland – the United 
States’ main importers and exporters of maize – are directly engaged (Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland, 
and Zen Noh control 81% of corn exports in the United States) (RS Mexico, p. 112-113). 
Morocco: The restructuring of the citrus export market, after the 1986 removal of the OCE monopoly, has 
left producers with choices to market their production through different channels. This led to the emergence 
of several private groups. Today, exports are the result of 12 groups of exporters who account for about 
80% of exports. These groups are either private firms that produce and export, or cooperatives; 
nevertheless, they often complement their citrus production by buying “on the tree” from small producers. 
Meanwhile, in an effort to improve logistics, private exporters have grouped into the Atlas Fruit Board 
(AFB) (RS Morocco, p. 63, El Hadad 1995). 
3.3.2.2 New patterns of the food system 
In the meantime, the food system is evolving quickly, although the pace of change varies 
considerably from region to region. There are several major trends behind these changes: 
i) the world’s population is becoming increasingly urban; ii) growing incomes result in 
quickly evolving diets with more proteins and high-valued foods (meat and dairy, fruits 
and vegetables) instead of staples; iii) until the current period of growing food prices, 
structurally decreasing prices have stimulated the agrifood market dynamics; and iv) an 
increasingly integrated world trade environment and improved transportation systems 
have spurred the convergence of dietary patterns and food preferences (FAO 2004). 
As a consequence of these combining factors, consumer-driven value chains such as 
fruits, vegetables, meat, dairy products, fish and seafood products, have rapidly grown. 
Telecommunications allow long-range commerce, and changes in shipping and storage 
technologies in the mid-late 1980s allowed fresh produce (apples, strawberries and 
asparagus, for example), to be shipped from the southern hemisphere producers to 
northern hemisphere markets. This expanding demand and trade of perishable products 
and high-value foods brought about a need for more standards for food safety and animal 
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and plant health; this need is demonstrated by the growing attention on the risks 
associated with microbial pathogens, residues from pesticides, veterinary medicines or 
other agricultural inputs, for example. New international rules were introduced such as 
the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures that 
built on the Standards Code, and permitted measures that were “necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life and health” (Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures 1994). The implementation of stricter food safety and quality 
standards has had strong impacts on the evolution of supply chains; in particular, 
exporters and retailers employ new forms of production and marketing contracts, while 
technical and/or financial assistance is often provided to strengthen these new networks. 
In parallel, the shift of the market drivers from supply to demand, in a context of 
increasing incomes (at the aggregate level) has also transformed the focus and 
relationships among the commodity chain stakeholders. Today, more careful 
consumption has grown among consumers who are increasingly looking for safety and 
for information on the way products are grown and traded, to ensure socially fair and 
sustainable conditions. This growth in consumer awareness has progressively supported a 
range of new alternative initiatives in international, national, and local agrifood systems, 
and has fueled changes in retail patterns as fair trade, organic, and other “alternative 
foods”, which have entered the mainstream venues. With the emergence of these niche 
markets, new types of standards and specific controls have been extended, parallel to the 
implementation of certification structures. For instance, efforts are made to protect the 
integrity of organic standards to further differentiate organic foods by accurate labels and 
to promote different forms of short supply chains for local community development. 
Beyond these standards, the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements 
(IFOAM) has been created, basing certification on several issues such as the principles of 
health, ecology, fairness and the principle of precaution. As for fresh products, 
contractualization is growing between producers and exporters/retailers as the best means 
to guarantee standards and requirements. 
Contracts, in their various forms and with varying degrees of obligations, usually reduce 
risks for the buyer and seller and have appeared in response to the removal of the 
formerly controlled marketing systems as a possible way to guarantee standards and 
requirements for the purchaser. For the producer, selling under contract arrangements is 
less risky when the requirements for the product are high and its characteristics are 
complex. Also, it is often the only way to access specific markets. For this reason, 
contracts have progressively spread to both emerging fresh product chains and niche 
markets, where product attributes are clearly defined in terms of norms and standards, 
and where the final value of production allows for the coverage of specific costs of 
contracts (selection, negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement). Contractual 
arrangements exist in all the RS program countries; however, contractualization mainly 
develops with high-value crops and tends to be more “informal” in other sectors. 
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Box 14: The development of value chains, standards, and contractualization in RS countries 
Kenya: Horticultural products account for significant share in Kenyan agricultural exports and have 
recently surpassed coffee to become the second largest export of the country, after tea. The horticultural 
export market is served by a few large-scale company-owned farms, an increasing number of contracted 
commercial horticultural farms, and a declining – but still significant – number of contracted smallholder 
farms (RS Kenya, p. 84). Around 15-20,000 producers in total are involved in the Kenyan horticultural 
production under contract arrangements (Swinnen & Maertens 2006).  
Madagascar: The development of the green beans chain in Madagascar is closely linked to one firm – 
LECOFRUIT (Légumes, Condiments et Fruits de Madagascar) – which operates through regular contracts 
with European supermarkets (Leclerc, Intermarché, Auchan, Casino). Malagasy green beans for export are 
mainly extra-fine, canned with the annotation "picked and placed by hand”. Small-scale producers grow 
green beans under delivery contract with the company (approximately 10,000 farmers under contract 
adding up 500 ha in 2004/05). LECOFRUIT limits the area at 500 m2 per farmer, provides seeds, fertilizers 
and pesticides, is committed in intensive monitoring and extension advice, and, finally, is in charge of the 
processing and packaging. A share of the production of green beans is outside the scope of the contracts 
and then sold by farmers on local markets via traditional marketing channels (RS Madagascar, p. 74-75). 
Mexico: Fresh horticultural markets are important, dynamic components of the Mexican agricultural sector, 
and more than 2 million producers are involved in this production. The NAFTA, signed in the early 1990s, 
is often cited as the primary contributor to the recent growth in US imports of fresh vegetables (Malaga et 
al. 2001). Mexican horticultural exports to US increased from 61 to about 86% of the total agricultural 
exports earnings between 1991 and 2004, reinforcing Mexico as the first supplier of those products to the 
North American market (RS Mexico p. 54-55). Contract farming dominates the horticultural production 
and agro-industrial companies – such as BirdsEye, Green Giant, Campbell’s or Del Monte – are the key 
actors for the integration of local farmers into national and world markets (Echanove & Steffen 2005). 
Nicaragua: After hurricane Mitch devastated northern Nicaragua in 1998, the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) funded the Cooperative League of the United States of America 
(CLUSA) to implement a series of economic reactivation programs. One of those focused on developing 
certified organic coffee production. Nine cooperatives (CECOCAFEN, PRODECOOP, PROCOSER, 
SOPPEXCA, La Gorrion, CORCOSAN, Solidaridad, and La Providencia) are involved in the program, 
with about 6,000 smallholders who developed certified organic coffee production under delivery contracts 
with the marketing cooperative prior to harvest time. At the same time, OXFAM started to promote 
alternative model of Fair Trade coffee production with about 2,000 producers under contract with 
CECOCAFEN. By 2005 Nicaragua’s government started a new alternative way to trade coffee through 
Internet, with international tasters who guarantee high quality of gourmet coffee. This initiative, called “cup 
of coffee”, brought high prices and recognition to Nicaraguan coffee and attracted important companies 
such as Starbucks, which currently not only buys coffee but also finances gourmet coffee producers. Since 
then, gourmet and alternative coffees represent about 20% of total exports of Nicaraguan coffee (RS 
Nicaragua, p. 110-114). 
Senegal: The horticultural sector plays a major role in Senegal’s recent strategy of export diversification 
towards high-value crops. The growing demand for these products increases the need for tighter 
coordination and leads to important structural changes within the horticultural export chain, with major 
implications for farmers including: increased consolidation at the agro-exporting industry level, as well as 
at the primary producers’ level, and increased vertical coordination with downstream buyers in the EU as 
well as with upstream suppliers (Maertens et al. 2006; Maertens & Swinnen 2006). The need for regular 
supplies in quality and quantity generates the introduction of institutional arrangements based on contracts 
(inputs supply), certification (EUREPGAP, HACCP norms, matching the limit of pesticide residues), and a 
labeling system (“Origine Sénégal”). The implementation of these contracts facilitates the development of 
national exports (RS Senegal, p. 84-86). 
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3.3.2.3 New patterns of factor mobility and trade, and rising new actors 
Since the 1980s, growing long-distance trade and increasing FDI have broadly modified 
the scope of agricultural production and marketing. They are the consequence of both a 
more open international economy resulting from economic liberalization and also of 
progress in technology (the Internet for finance and information on the software side; 
shipping, storage, processing on the hardware side). These factors all greatly increase the 
efficiency of international trade and domestic marketing, and have paved the way for 
major investments by new players everywhere, particularly in processing, and retailing 
since the 1990s (Barrett & Mutambatsere 2005). Consequently, a handful of vertically 
integrated transnational corporations have gained growing control over global trade, 
processing and retailing of food products. The tremendous development of these 
processes in the case of the distribution of products has resulted in the so-called 
“supermarket revolution” (Box 15). 
Box 15: The world spread of the supermarket revolution 
The penetration of modern food retailing varies among developing countries. Reardon and Timmer (2007, 
p. 2840) write: “Experiencing supermarket-sector “takeoff” in developing countries in the early to mid 
1990s, the first-wave include much of South America, East Asia outside China, and South Africa – a set of 
areas where the average share of supermarkets in food retail went from roughly only 10-20% circa 1990 to 
50-60% on average by the early 2000s. The second-wave include parts of Southeast Asia, Central America 
and Mexico where the share went from circa 5-10% in 1990 to 30-50% by the early 2000s, with the take-off 
occurring in the mid to late 1990s. The third-wave include countries where the supermarket revolution 
take-off started only in the late 1990s or early 2000s, reaching about 10-20% of national food retail by 
circa 2003; they include some of Africa and some countries in Central and South America (such as 
Nicaragua, Peru and Bolivia), Southeast Asia, and China and India and Russia. Sub-Saharan Africa 
presents a very diverse picture, with only South Africa firmly in the first wave of supermarket penetration, 
but the rest either in the early phase of the “third wave” take-off of diffusion - or in what may be a pending 
– but not yet started – take-off of supermarket diffusion”. 
The differences between countries can be explained by socio-economic factors related to 
consumers’ demand for supermarket services, product diversity and quality. Among these 
factors one can cite as examples: income level and urbanization, correlated with the 
opportunity cost of time (in particular that of women), and reductions in transaction costs 
through improvements in roads and transport and ownership of refrigerators. These 
demand-side factors are necessary, but not sufficient, to explain the very rapid spread of 
supermarkets in the 1990s and 2000s in these countries, most of which had a very small 
supermarket sector before 1990. Supply-side factors were also of extreme importance, 
especially the influx of retail foreign investment as countries liberalized FDI, and 
improvements in procurement systems arose. 
Box 16: The contrasted development of modern food retailing in RS countries 
Kenya: Supermarkets in Kenya have grown from a tiny niche market only seven years ago to almost 20% 
of urban food retail today, and are rising quickly. In 2003, there were 225 large format stores in Kenya – 
209 supermarkets and 16 hypermarkets. Before 1993, the main chains stuck to headquarter cities, until 
Uchumi broke this pattern in 1993 by building its first store outside Nairobi (in Nakuru) starting a national 
level competition that has built-in crescendo. Most notably, the rivalry between leading chains Uchumi and 
Nakumatt became an important growth driver; a new strategy by one chain forces imitation and/or a 
counter strategy by its competitor (Neven & Reardon 2004). 
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Madagascar: The network of supermarkets in Madagascar is currently made of three groups with foreign 
capital. The South African chain Shoprite settled in Madagascar in 1992, buying out shops of the French 
chain Champion, and has seven stores: five in Antananarivo, one in Antsirabe and one in Toamasina; the 
French chain Leaderprice has three stores in Antananarivo; and Score supermarkets from Vindemia 
Company, a subsidiary of the Casino Group, have three hypermarkets in Antananarivo and two 
supermarkets in the other provinces (RS Madagascar, p. 63). 
Mexico: Important changes have occurred in food retailing in Mexico over the last five decades. The 
development of modern food retailing occurred in three stages. From 1946, date of the establishment of the 
first supermarket until 1980, the development of supermarkets focused on large cities in the north and the 
center of the country and were mainly based on domestic capital, although some chains were set up with 
US capital. In the 1980s, supermarkets began to move their initial basis into a few growing cities to create 
chains. This development was accompanied by intense competition, and several chains sought alliances 
with both domestic and foreign capital. From 1990, very rapid expansion occurred, impelled by the entry of 
giant chains from USA (Wal-Mart) and France (Carrefour) (Schwentesius & Gomez 2002). 
Morocco: The Moroccan retail food sector has developed significantly over the past ten years. In 1991, the 
first supermarket was created by Marjane, one of five Moroccan-owned chains. With the exception of the 
cash & carry sector, the first foreign investment in large-format retail was made in 2001 by Auchan 
(France), which took control of 49% of the hypermarket chain Marjane, by entering a joint venture with 
ONA (Omnium Nord Africain), Morocco’s largest consortium of private companies. In 2002, Auchan took 
control of Acima, a supermarket chain owned by ONA. The two other chains (Label’Vie and Aswak 
Assalam) are smaller and are owned by national investors (Codron et al. 2004). 
Nicaragua: By the end of 1990, supermarkets began developing. Initially only Nicaraguan enterprises were 
involved. Then, in a second level of integration, Costa Rican enterprises established a competitive 
supermarket chain. At the same time, regional enterprises like Hortifruti were playing middlemen between 
supermarkets and producers. Finally, a third level of integration was established in the 2000s when Wal-
Mart bought up regional supermarkets and intermediary companies such as Pali, La Union, Paiz and 
Hortifruti. Supermarkets in Nicaragua supply about 20% of the consumer demand for quality standards (RS 
Nicaragua, p. 58-60) 
3.3.3 Segmentation and differentiation processes 
The presentation of the restructuring of agrifood and agricultural markets, illustrated by 
examples arising from the RuralStruc Program countries, shows that several processes 
converge towards an increasing integration but at different paces depending on the 
regions.  
The WDR08 argues that contractualization and development of agricultural 
entrepreneurship is one of the ways for smallholders in developing countries to escape 
from poverty (World Bank 2007, p. 127). Contractualization is seen as a tool for fostering 
smallholder participation in restructured markets, increasing and stabilizing smallholder 
incomes. Smallholders are considered to be very efficient producers in terms of labor 
intensity and labor-related transaction costs, but are constrained by capital and liquidity 
difficulties, and by a lack of access and/or capacity to adopt technological innovations. 
Indeed, contract farming with supermarkets or processors could help them overcome 
those constraints. 
However, as previously shown (§3.3.2.b) and as reiterated by Reardon and Timmer 
(2007), contractualization implies increasing requirements in terms of norms and 
standards, sometimes including specifications on how the product should be grown, 
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harvested, transported, processed and stored. This trend presents an opportunity to reach 
lucrative new markets for the suppliers who are able to respond to the requirements, but it 
also presents a substantial risk of marginalization for those who are not. The consequence 
of this process is a progressive differentiation among producers, which tends to be 
exacerbated by the practices of major retailers or by the supermarkets’ procurement 
systems. Indeed, as they try to facilitate the adoption of their specifications and to reduce 
their transaction costs, supermarkets and major retailers often chose to work with a 
reduced number of suppliers able to provide high volumes and high quality in due course. 
This pattern has been highlighted by some RuralStruc national reports (Box 17). It is also 
one of the main results of the recent Regoverning Markets research program (Box 18), 
which, based on many case studies around the world, shows that a main trend is an initial 
growth in the participation of smallholders in new modern value chains frequently 
followed by their progressive marginalization as larger producers enter the market and 
are able to provide more supply (Reardon & Huang 2008). 
Box 17: High requirements and segmentation in some RS countries 
Kenya: In a context where cut flowers production for export is concentrated in about two-dozen large-scale 
farms, which account for 75% of the Kenyan industry, small-scale farmers face an uncertain future because 
of declining demand for lower-quality flowers and increasing production and marketing costs. Their lack of 
access to adequate credit and inputs, logistical constraints, and environmental concerns exacerbate the trend 
(RS Kenya, p. 69). Furthermore, there is evidence that the challenges of complying with high standards and 
requirements have acted to exclude small-scale producers from export supply chains for high-value 
agricultural products. For example, while an estimated 14,500 small-scale producers were involved in the 
Kenyan export supply chain for fresh vegetables in the mid-1980s, accounting for 45% of exports, by 1998 
the contribution of small-scale farming had declined to an estimated 18% (Jaffee 2003). 
Nicaragua: The segmentation in Nicaraguan cheese markets corresponds to different quality standards. 
Cheeses for US and Mexican markets must meet several requirements: cows must be certificated as free of 
diseases; cows must be milked in a clean infrastructure with roof, water, and metallic containers; and 
processing plants have to be certificated by sanitarian and environmental Mexican and US authorities. In 
comparison, cheese for El Salvador has two quality segments: a similar standard as that of the US, and a 
lower standard. This low standard chain does not require any type of certification, and, therefore, is a low 
cost sector. Local markets have three main segments: supermarkets with quality standards, national and 
local markets without quality standards, and retailers who are small businesses mainly dedicated to low-
income consumers. A single company does industrial cheese processing and three companies process dairy 
products, thus creating an oligopoly. Semi-industrial cheese processing is done by cooperatives and they 
are organized in a chamber of commerce and form another oligopoly. Commercial cheese channels are 
useful to show exclusion and integration of different social sectors and the vertical integration to an 
oligopoly, whose goal is to control Central American dairy markets (RS Nicaragua, p. 108-110). 
This evolution could be decisive for the development of many value chains with a clear 
impact on farm structures. The core issue here is to identify how developed these 
processes of differentiation are, so as to be able to anticipate their impacts, both positive 
and negative. Nevertheless, it appears that these evolutions are badly informed. We know 
more about the characteristics of value chains integration and contractualization 
development, particularly thanks to the Regoverning Markets program, but we know little 
about the number of farmers engaged in these new chains. 
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Box 18: The Regoverning Markets Program 
Regoverning Markets is a multi-partner collaborative research program (2005-2007) analyzing the growing 
concentration in the processing and retail sectors of national and regional agrifood systems and its impacts 
on rural livelihoods and communities in middle and low-income countries. The aim of the program was to 
provide strategic advice and guidance to the public sector, agrifood chain actors, civil society organizations 
and development agencies on approaches that can anticipate and manage the impacts of changes in local 
and regional markets. 
Regoverning Markets focused on agrifood market restructuring in order to assess its impact on farmers and 
to see if farmers are able to integrate into the new restructured chains. To respond to this purpose, the 
program compared country/product pairs, each at different stages of restructuring, using farm household 
surveys and commodity chain analyses. Household surveys were conducted with a focus on the selected 
products among high-value chains, mainly fresh products such as fresh fruit and vegetables and dairy 
(Reardon & Huang 2008). 
One of the main conclusions of the first phase of the RS program and its country 
overviews is that the integration and contractualization processes that result from the 
restructuring of agricultural markets remain limited and contrasted. They are mainly 
concentrated in these new high-value chains with specific development of horticulture in 
a broad sense (Senegal, Madagascar, Kenya, Mexico and Nicaragua), and with specific 
additional specialization in flowers (Kenya), dairy (Nicaragua) or fruits (Morocco). 
Opportunities in niche markets (organic, fair trade) exist, but they are limited, with only a 
small number of farms are involved in each country. Agribusiness can play a direct role 
in the organization of these new chains, as is the case for the dairy products in Nicaragua. 
Though this new integration pattern appears limited, it is significant to note that former 
modes of integration remain and primarily depend on the existence of monopsonies 
(cotton in Senegal, Mali, and Madagascar) or remaining price regulations (wheat in 
Morocco, peanut in Senegal, sugar in Morocco and Madagascar). 
It is very difficult to estimate the number of farms engaged in these processes, due to the 
orientation of the statistical systems that focus on farm structures and not on integration 
in value chains (see supra § 3.1.2). This issue is also demonstrated by how little attention 
is devoted to these types of issues. By crossing the scattered information provided by the 
first phase reports and other very limited sources of information, we harvested only a few 
figures, which provide a partial overview of the processes underway. However, they also 
confirmed that these processes remain limited to few specific chains. 
In Madagascar, about 10,000 green beans producers are under contract. In Kenya, only 
15 to 20,000 producers (the figures are highly disputed) are involved in contract 
arrangements out of about 500,000 producers of horticulture products in the country (less 
than 4% of the horticultural producers). In Nicaragua, the integration process seems to be 
more developed: about 8,000 coffee producers are involved in the production of organic 
and fair trade coffee out of 43,200 coffee producers (about 19% of the Nicaraguan coffee 
producers are under contract), and about 6,400 farmers produce organic certified 
horticultural products (about 28% of the horticultural producers) (Table 16). 
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Table 16: Relative size of integration processes with contract agreements in the RS countries (*) 
 KEN MAD MAL MEX MOR NIC SEN 
Total # Farms 3,440,000 2,428,500 805,200 3,400,000 1,496,000 199,500 437,000 
Organic 
coffee 
     6,000 
14% 
 
Fair-trade 
coffee 
     2,000 
5% 
 
Tea  154,800 
64% 
      
Horticulture 15-20,000 
<4% 
10,000 
21% 
 350,000  6,400 
28% 
 
Peanut 
«arachide de 
bouche» 
      32,000 
Dairy  330    4,450 
5% 
 
Sources: RS country reports, bibliography and national census.   
(*) Percentages give the size of the producers under contract on the total number of producers in the chain, 
when the data is available. 
In the other countries, the information is non-existent or fragmented and refers to case 
studies. For example, in Senegal, the firm NOVASEN worked with 32,000 contracting 
farmers who produced approximately 40,000 tons of edible peanuts (arachide de bouche) 
annually (Warning & Key 2002). In Mexico, about 350,000 smallholders (ejidatarios) 
grew fruits and vegetables under contract arrangements in 1995 (Marsh & Runsten 1996). 
However, the aggregation of data at the national level remains virtually impossible. 
While participation in the newly integrated value chains stays limited in all countries, the 
penetration of modern food retailing appears to be highly contrasted. Based on the up-
dated data from the Regoverning Markets Program (Reardon & Huang 2008) and its 
classification related to the share of modern food retail versus total food retail, the 
RuralStruc countries cover the three stages: 
- Advanced stage: Mexico (45%) 
- Intermediate stage: Nicaragua (20%), Kenya (18%), Morocco (5-6%) 
- Initial stage: Senegal, Madagascar, and Mali (<5%) 
The gradient of penetration of the supermarkets in the food-retailing sector is broadly 
related to the average level of income per capita, which generally corresponds to more 
diversified and urbanized economies. This is relevant with the situation among the RS 
countries, with the initial stage corresponding to the lower income countries, Kenya being 
an exception at the Sub-Saharan Africa level. 
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Table 17: Modern food retail, urbanization and average incomes in the RS countries 
 KEN MAD MAL MEX MOR NIC SEN 
GDP per capita 
2004 (US$) 
480 290 330 6, 930 1, 570 830 600 
Urbanization in 
2004 (%) 
41 27 33 75 55 55 49 
Modern food 
retail (%) 
18 - - 45 5-6 20 - 
Sources: FAO ESSGA November 2006, RS reports, Regoverning Markets program 
As the preceding sub-sections demonstrate, the restructuring processes of agrifood 
markets are still underway and their consequences on farmers are difficult to estimate. 
Only partial information coming from specific case studies gives clues about the 
opportunities it offers for developing country farmers. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
involvement of farmers in these new chains seems to remain rather limited: horizontal 
and vertical integration processes offer opportunities; however, although contract farming 
is reported in each RS country, only a limited share of the farmers are actually concerned. 
As a consequence, a vast majority of farmers does not participate in these restructuring 
processes and relies on the “old” productions (mainly staples and traditional export 
crops). What is the viability of such systems today with reference to the employment 
challenge and the increasing pressure on natural resources? At what pace will new 
distribution systems and the related contractualization develop? Moreover, in this 
evolving context, how many farmers could be entirely pushed out of agriculture, 
particularly in countries most engaged in the processes of integration? Better qualifying 
the magnitude of these inclusion and exclusion processes remains a main knowledge 
challenge. 
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3.4 Preliminary insights on the reshaping of rural economies 
The configuration of the rural economies has broadly changed everywhere during the last 
three decades. As a consequence of the broader mobility of people and ideas, directly 
linked to technical progresses in transport and communication, the old urban-rural divide 
is fading and we need to rethink our vision of the main characteristics of rural economies.  
One of the main expectations of the RuralStruc Program is to provide updated 
information on these processes reshaping rural economies, particularly on new and more 
complex systems of activities and incomes leading to livelihood diversification (Ellis 
1998, Barrett & Reardon 2000). These evolutions progressively tend to replace the “old” 
production system where, historically, the core activities and income of rural households 
were principally drawn from agriculture. 
Indeed, over the last decades, the concept of “household coping strategies” has been 
employed more widely.26 Because of the importance of market imperfections and market 
failures, liberalization policies and globalization resulted in a plethora of changes for the 
rural households that often increased, rather than reduced, uncertainty. In many regions, 
particularly those less connected to markets, vulnerability and fragility have increased 
due to difficulties in marketing and supply, price instability, the removal of subsidies 
(particularly for inputs), the withdrawal of technical support, etc. Meanwhile, cutbacks in 
public funding for hospitals, schools and other social services, as well as consumer price 
inflation, have led to an increased need for accessible cash. As a consequence, an 
increasing number of rural households has engaged in a diversification process, looking 
for additional and more remunerative activities outside agriculture (Bryceson 1999), 
which was a condition for the sustainability of their livelihood. Technical progress in 
transportation and communication (particularly cell phones and cash transfer systems) 
facilitates livelihood diversification.  
As such, for many households, farming is now one of several activities and income 
sources. This situation leads to two main trends in the literature characterized by the 
importance of case studies and the limited number of global approaches27. The first refers 
to the diversification of income through rural non-farm activities; whereas the second 
deals with diversification of income with regards to the migration of rural household 
members to cities, other regions, or outside the home country, and the related impact of 
remittances on rural household livelihood. This diversification relies on multiple 
locations and connects members of the household working in different places (the market 
                                                 
26
 See Ellis (1998) for discussion on the different meanings of “coping strategies”. 
27
 Among others we can cite: for general discussion Ellis (2000), Wiggins and Davis (2003), and 
Haggblade et al. (forthcoming); for regional approaches on Latin America Reardon et al. (2001), and 
Barrett et al. (2001, 2005) on Africa. 
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town, the regional city or the national capital, and sometimes, foreign locations). These 
new composite systems contribute to the emergence of archipelago models28 that clearly 
redefine the country-to-city linkages. 
Understanding this redefinition is hindered considerably by the significant data problems 
arising from the inadequate information systems referred to previously (§ 3.1); thus, 
unsurprisingly, while scoping the state of current knowledge on rural economies the first 
phase national reports have provided little information on this issue. The existing 
information is based mainly on case studies and all the national reports confirmed that 
“huge changes were occurring” pointing to diversification of activities as a main trend, 
with, for some countries, the growing impacts of remittances (mainly Mexico, Nicaragua, 
and Morocco). As a result, little systematic information was provided and what we 
propose here is to set the scene by presenting some insight on the existing debate. 
In recent years, there has been increasing emphasis in the rural development literature on 
livelihood diversification, i.e. the multiple income-generating activities undertaken by 
rural households. Barrett and Reardon say: “Diversification is the norm. Very few people 
collect all their income from any one source, hold all their wealth in the form of any 
single asset, or use their assets in just one activity”. They remind that: “There are 
several reasons for this: risk reduction, realization of economies of scope, diminishing 
returns to factor use in any given application, response to crisis, liquidity constraints, 
etc. At the more aggregate level of households or communities or regions, scarcity of 
productive resources and specialization according to comparative advantage accorded 
by superior technologies or skills or by greater endowments leads to considerable inter-
individual diversity in activities and incomes. So no matter the unit of analysis, 
diversification is ubiquitous. This is especially true in rural areas of low-income 
countries, where high transactions costs induce many residents to self-provision in 
several goods and services, where increasing population pressures often result in 
landholdings too small to absorb all of a household’s labor supply, and where limited 
risk-bearing capacity and weak financial institutions create strong incentives to select a 
portfolio of activities in order to stabilize income flows so as to stabilize consumption and 
minimize the risk of entitlements failure” (Barrett & Reardon 2000, p. 1-2). 
The discussion on diversification of income sources and activities is sometimes difficult 
because there are no static categories of income sources and activities in the literature; 
thus, it remains useful to clarify the picture. Following Davis et al. (2007), rural activities 
can be divided into six categories: (i) crop production, (ii) livestock production, (iii) 
agricultural wage employment, (iv) non-agricultural wage employment, (v) non-
agricultural self-employment, and (vi) transfers (private and public). The first three 
categories (crop, livestock and agricultural wage) make up “agricultural activities”, while 
                                                 
28
 On these new configurations, see for example, among others: Gastellu and Marchal (1997); Léonard et 
al. (2004). 
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the last three (non-agricultural wage, non-agriculture self employment, transfers) 
represent “non-agricultural activities”. The first two categories (crop and livestock) are 
“on-farm activities”, and categories four and five (non-agricultural wage and self 
employment) are “non-farm activities”. Agricultural wage employment and transfers are 
separate categories. The concept of “off farm activities”, includes all “non-agricultural 
activities” plus “agricultural wage labor” (Barrett & Reardon 2000; Winters et al. 2001; 
Davis et al. 2007).  
As with every classification, the latter proposal is disputable and it is possible to continue 
feeding the debate on definitions and concept shapes interminably. For instance one 
could argue that (i) transfers are not an activity but an income and can foster activities or 
increase consumption or savings; (ii) private transfers can also result from agricultural 
activities or agricultural wages; (iii) agricultural activities cannot be restricted to crops 
and livestock but must also include raw products transformation (added-value at the farm 
level); or (iv) occasional hunting, fishing and gathering are not agricultural activities but 
rural practices based on the utilization of natural resources, and so on. 
For the purposes of this research the following figure (Figure 9), adapted from Davis et 
al. (2007), is proposed. It puts forward the perspective of the household rather than that of 
the activity because the RS program’s purpose is to facilitate the identification of activity 
and income systems, which express the complex livelihood strategies adopted by rural 
households, which aligns with RuralStruc’s objectives. 
Figure 9: Diversification of activities and income sources of the rural households in developing 
countries 
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During the last years, the need to understand the processes of change and the 
development of rural diversification has led to an effort of systematization of the 
available information with the objective of providing a new vision of rural realities. 
This effort translated in initiatives such as the RIGA (Rural Income Generating 
Activities) project, a joint initiative of the World Bank and the FAO, which aimed at 
helping the development community to build rigorous and empirically based 
generalizations about the Rural Non-Farm (RNF) economy and to identify policy 
instruments that could be used to promote RNF activities alongside agriculture to 
facilitate rural poverty alleviation.  
Box 19: The Rural Income Generating Activities (RIGA) project 
The RIGA project analyzes sources of rural household income in 15 countries from 23 household surveys: 
Ghana 1992 & 1998; Madagascar 1993-94; Malawi 2004-05; Nigeria 2004; Bangladesh 2000; Indonesia 
1992 & 2000; Nepal 1995-96; Pakistan 1991 & 2001; Vietnam 1992-93 & 1997-98; Albania 2002 & 2005; 
Bulgaria 1995 & 2001; Ecuador 1995 & 1998; Guatemala 2000; Nicaragua 2001; Panama 1997 & 2003. 
RIGA uses a database constructed from a pool of Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) and other 
multi-purpose household surveys made available by the World Bank and the FAO. From this pool of 
existing data, a panel of countries is selected with the objective to ensure geographic coverage across four 
main developing regions – Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America –, as well as adequate quality 
and sufficient comparability in codification and nomenclatures. Furthermore, an effort is made to include a 
number of low-income countries as these represent the highest levels of poverty and are, therefore, of 
particular interest to illustrate and understand the ways rural households cope with poverty. The specific 
objective of this work is (i) to conduct a systematic analysis of income-generating activities in rural areas of 
the selected countries; (ii) to identify the relative importance of different activities; and (iii) to analyze the 
determinants of participation and intensity of involvement.  
To this end, basic analysis is conducted to (i) evaluate the participation in and income received from 
RIGAs, (ii) analyze the role of household assets in participation in each activity, (iii) analyze the role of 
household assets in the income received from each activity, and (iv) disaggregate rural non-farm activities 
by industry. 
Indeed, a major component of the RIGA project is to construct comparable income measures. The aim of 
the exercise is to provide annualized benchmark aggregates spanning four continents, which, despite 
pervasive differences in the quality and level of information available in each survey, is suitable for cross-
country analysis. Although consumption-based money metric measures are more commonly used in 
welfare analysis because they are considered to be more accurate and easier to measure in a typical 
household survey, the RIGA study uses income-based measures and their components, whose definitions 
closely follow those given by the International Labour Organization (ILO).  
Some of the results of the RIGA project are that schooling is an important determinant for participation in 
many activities, but that its magnitude and sign vary with respect to Rural Non-Farm wage employment, 
agricultural wage and RNF self-employment. As a consequence, this study puts forward that schooling 
leads to a shift to RNF wage employment and, thus, higher income. This work also underlines that services 
are the most important RNF wage employment activity followed by manufacturing, construction and 
commerce, the latter being the most important RNF self-employment activity. 
Source: Carletto et al. 2007 
Even though the RIGA results are based on largely heterogeneous data (particularly in 
years during which a national survey was conducted), the RIGA project remains quite 
unique. It was used broadly by the WDR08 and directly participated in the development 
of one of the core issues of the report: the role of the diversification of rural activities and 
sources of income as a way out of poverty: “Many rural households move out of poverty 
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through agricultural entrepreneurship; others through the rural labor market and the 
rural non-farm economy; and others by migrating to towns, cities, or other countries. The 
three pathways are complementary: non-farm incomes can enhance the potential of 
farming as a pathway out of poverty, and agriculture can facilitate the labor and 
migration pathways” (World Bank 2007, p.72). 
As explained above, diversification of rural activities and sources of income does not 
necessarily mean complete abandonment of on-farm crop and livestock activities, as most 
rural households in all countries maintain on-farm activities despite participation in other 
off-farm activities. Indeed, the evolution of the agricultural sector has led many rural 
households to develop new strategies based on different income generating activities, 
which allow adaptation and risk management in an uncertain and changing environment. 
As a consequence, available land, labor and capital can be reallocated to more certain and 
sustainable activities – when alternatives exist. Thus, the core issue remains that of 
existing diversification alternatives and the potential of each to provide a pathway out of 
rural poverty. Furthermore, the discussion remains rather elusive on the “quality” or the 
concrete content of these alternatives, i.e. do they allow rural households to actually 
increase their level of living and accumulate assets, or do they merely contribute to their 
survival? In other words, to what extent these diversification strategies could actually 
participate in the structural transformation process of developing countries? 
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4 Conclusion: Where do we stand so far?  
All developing world economies are engaged in major processes of structural 
transformation, whose common pattern reveals a progressive shift from agriculture to 
industry and services, towards urbanization. However, each country follows its own path 
of economic transition, strongly influenced by the historical conditions of its emergence 
and integration within the world economy. 
In an increasingly urbanized world, agriculture still provides a living to 2.6 billion people 
(41% of the world population), 97% being in developing countries. The agricultural 
sector and, more generally, rural economies are directly participating in these processes 
of change exacerbated by the broad restructuring driven by globalization. Greater market 
connections, new players and new rules of the game lead to confrontation between 
diverse agricultural systems that fundamentally differ in terms of assets, productivity, and 
economic and institutional environments.  
Confrontation between these types of agriculture is a main issue. For many countries, 
particularly “agriculture-based countries”, the current period corresponds to a unique 
moment in world history where they have to deal with the early stages of their economic 
transition and, at the same time, with the competition related to globalization. Their 
challenge is reinforced by another commanding transition – the demographic transition, 
which puts significant additional pressure on economic growth and employment creation. 
Due to their demographic structure, several regions of the developing world – particularly 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia - will face a huge increase of their labor force over 
the next three decades. This “demographic dividend” presents two possible scenarios: on 
the one hand, it could be a major opportunity for growth, as long as its drivers are strong 
enough to provide massive increases in productive jobs; on the other hand, it could be a 
major burden on the economy, if growth is lagging, generating exceptional economic, 
social and political tensions. 
In this quickly evolving context, the rural economies of developing countries are engaged 
in a deep reshaping process. Depending on rural economies’ connections to markets, 
globalization creates new opportunities and also new constraints. At the same time, 
technical revolutions in communication and transport have changed the lines of spatial 
organization and have faded the old rural-urban divide. They offer new options to rural 
households, which can now design new composite systems of activities and incomes for 
sustaining their livelihood. However, little is known about these processes, although their 
understanding is a crucial for policy design: How do rural households cope with these 
changes? What is the impact of the restructuring processes in agriculture? How do rural 
dwellers manage to grab the opportunities and deal with the constraints of an increasingly 
open global economy? How many are able to overcome these challenges?  
Many case studies from around the world and targeted research programs provide useful 
information about these on-going developments and their new features. Nevertheless, it 
appears that while we certainly need to know more about the processes underway, it is 
important to put them into perspective with the global dimension of structural 
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transformation, in terms of how these changes within agriculture and rural economies 
align with the global economic structure of the developing countries and how economic 
transition occur. What is the number of people involved in these processes and the 
number of farmers that will leave agriculture? And what are the existing alternatives in 
terms of activity or employment in the rural economy, in cities, abroad? 
The discussion about the exit options from agriculture echoes one of the major issues of 
the last World Development Report (World Bank 2007). Even if its main focus is the role 
of agriculture in poverty alleviation, the WDR08 provides a powerful vision of what it 
calls the three possible pathways out of rural poverty: specialization in agriculture, the 
development of rural diversification, and migration to cities or abroad. However, the 
decisive question is the viability of each pathway and its implications, especially in 
countries where 65% of the labor force is still engaged in agriculture. What is the share of 
the current agricultural population that could engage in each pathway:30-40-30%? Or, 
perhaps, 20-20-60%? These “big numbers” must be discussed, because they relate to 
what is often missed in the current debates: the challenge of economic and demographic 
transition within globalization. 
Due to the conditions of the first phase of the RuralStruc Program, the national reports 
did not elaborate much on the existing alternatives. The on-going second phase of the 
program will provide a better understanding of the processes underway. Nevertheless, we 
can draw several conclusions from this first phase which main results have been 
previously developed. 
First, in the SSA countries of the RS program, agriculture remains the major sector 
absorbing the growing labor force, which is related to their on-going demographic 
transition. These countries face a process of urbanization marked by limited – if any –
industrialization and few formal employment opportunities. This type of urbanization 
relies heavily on the development of a “sponge-like” informal sector characterized by 
vulnerability, low paid jobs, poor labor conditions and low productivity. As a 
consequence, the evolution of the agricultural sector is decisive for the structural 
transformation of the SSA economies. In the non-SSA countries of the program, 
agriculture clearly plays a different role: in spite of major differences, their economic 
transition is well underway and the diversification of the overall economy fosters more 
employment alternatives. However, a common feature is the huge role played by 
international migration, which appears as a powerful exit option: around 10% of the 
population lives abroad and a significant flow of remittances contributes to the coping 
strategies of rural families. 
Second, the global agrifood market restructuring and the development of the integration 
processes do not affect agriculture and rural economies in the same way. Very little 
information is available on the extent of farmers’ inclusion in the new markets 
(particularly high value chains): we know more about the processes than about the 
numbers of farmers involved. This is a real issue when discussing policy options. 
However, we can say that, in SSA, based on the RuralStruc countries’ first phase results 
and on the existing literature, these new markets account for only a few hundred thousand 
producers, while what is at stake is the future of tens of millions of small farmers. In the 
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other RS countries, some integrated value chains are more developed but the global 
process remains limited and contributes to the differentiation among producers: new 
patterns of supply and marketing are inherently biased in favor of larger specialized 
farmers because small producers cannot afford to invest to meet the high requirements 
that define new markets. 
Based on these preliminary results we can put forward several first lessons which can 
contribute to the policy debate. 
1. Agriculture is not an island but a sector that is embedded within the overall economy 
and society, and the discussion concerning its future must imperatively be put in 
perspective with the process of economic transition. For the “agriculture-based 
countries”, structural transformation is particularly challenging because they must 
simultaneously face the opportunities and constraints of both globalization and 
demographic transition. As a consequence, policy options must be articulated within 
development strategies. Stand-alone policies cannot be sufficient to deal with the 
imperatives of structural transformation which request a careful design and sequencing of 
the goals, objectives and means of action that form the core of a strategy of development. 
Agricultural policies cannot be disconnected from other central issues like employment, 
urban growth management, or the development of infant industries. As reminded by 
Stiglitz (1998), a development strategy is a public good, like the rule of law, because it 
expresses an agreement between the different stakeholders in the processes of economic 
and social development. Because they are unique and depend on a country’s specific 
characteristics, development strategies cannot adopt “one size fits all” solutions and 
require the implementation of carefully tailor-made policies. As Haussman and Rodrick 
(2003) point out, a country has to identify its best options for development, build its 
comparative advantage, and government has to find efficient policies to promote a self-
discovery process. In this perspective, global policy design must be fully assumed by 
governments and supported by the donor community. The alignment of agricultural 
policies with the needs of structural transformation is an integral part of their success. 
2. Agriculture’s role goes beyond poverty reduction and food security, which are the 
current core issues in the international debate. These two objectives are obviously 
indisputable, but in Sub-Saharan Africa, the decisive role of agriculture within the 
economic transition must be emphasized. Historical records clearly show that the careful 
management of the equilibrium between agriculture growth, rural depopulation and urban 
development has always been a main preoccupation of governments, which at all times 
tried to deal with the risks of urban concentration and unemployment. It was the case of 
Europe during the 19th century until the mid-20th century. It was also a central issue for 
the transformation of the Asian economies after WWII, where strong public incentives 
for the development of agriculture were main drivers for the promotion of private 
initiative. By contributing to the development of farm incomes, these incentives fostered 
local consumption and rural diversification, and helped to decrease pressure towards 
internal migration. By raising production, they helped to reduce food and labor costs and 
facilitated global economic transformation. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the policy debate, and 
particularly the CADDP agenda, must reconnect with this broader perspective. 
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3. The recipe to increase productivity must be carefully formulated. To bolster farm 
income and production, productivity increase is a common central target, particularly in 
lagging countries that did not engage in the intensification process and mainly relied on 
land colonization for their agricultural growth. Many well-known ingredients are part of 
the recipe for success: public goods provision (infrastructure, research, information, and 
capacity building), improvement of imperfect markets (typically inputs and sometimes 
marketing), incentives for the development of missing markets (credit, technical support), 
and specific regulation and risk mitigation mechanisms. What is more difficult is to mix 
these ingredients in the policy bowl, to devise tailor-made policies, to define their 
adequate sequencing, so as to take heed of the more global economic and demographic 
challenges. If productivity increase is central, it must seriously take into account the farm 
and agrarian structures and anticipate every option’s impact on employment. This means 
careful design of the techniques selected, which must avoid any immoderate job 
destruction if effective alternatives are not developed at the same time. 
4. Public policies must deal with the “big numbers”. Agricultural policies must first 
target smallholders – who constitute the overwhelming majority of farmers – because 
they play a major role in terms of creating activities and generating employment and 
income. This is an imperative with regard to the absence or the weakness of alternatives 
outside agriculture and to the strong pressure of a growing labor force. This choice does 
not exclude taking advantage of all the existing opportunities in terms of new markets. In 
this perspective, high value chains or niche markets can be powerful drivers but they are 
also limited by their high quality and safety requirements that limit their access only to 
the producers able to adapt to the rules of the game. Traditional agricultural exports are 
more accessible and have been strong boosters for the development of many DCs. 
Although new international prices trends create additional incentives, these international 
markets are increasingly competitive and require dealing not only with production costs 
but also with quality and volume of supply. Thus, domestic and regional food markets 
clearly remain the most accessible for the majority of farmers. Their potential 
development due to population growth and urbanization is huge. Indeed, domestic and 
regional markets do not face the same requirements as high-income demand driven 
markets do. Furthermore, they only compete with food imports on a segment of the local 
demand and transport cost increase acts as a protection. As a consequence, domestic and 
regional food markets are the most powerful drivers for “inclusive” agricultural growth. 
They have huge distribution effects with a direct impact on poverty alleviation and foster 
local consumption – a central determinant of rural diversification and other economic 
sectors’ expansion.  
5. The knowledge challenge remains a core issue. There is a continuous need for up-to-
date and renewed information on the processes underway in agriculture, in rural 
economies, and, more broadly, on the labor markets, which – in both rural and urban 
settings – remain poorly studied. Most of the time, international databases are the only 
provider of information, which is often inconsistent and, beyond specific case studies, 
there is no systematic information available. Governments and the donor community 
must reengage in the design and the management of information systems that are able to 
capture the new realities of these issues because they form a cornerstone for the definition 
and formulation of adequate public policies. 
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With the current soaring food prices, agricultural development is back on the agenda and 
is rediscovered as a crucial issue after many years of neglect. In this context traditional 
bilateral and multilateral donors are back with big money, as are new foundations and 
NGOs, which promote some innovative solutions, often with adequate funding. This new 
context presents two possible scenarios. First there is a major risk of a proliferation of 
projects and programs that could lead agriculture away from its important role as a 
cornerstone of development strategies that enhance the process of structural 
transformation. But secondly, and more hopefully, this context can provide a major 
opportunity to solidify agriculture as a permanent and irrevocable component of 
development policies and thus structural transformation. This is only possible, however, 
if governments as well as regional and continental initiatives, with the support of the 
international community, coordinate funding efforts and channel them towards tailor-
made policies dedicated to the challenge of economic transition.  
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Annex 1 
Structural change in historical perspective : 
A statistical comparative approach 
1960-2005 
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A statistical overview of the structural characteristics of the RS countries can only be 
fully executed if placed in context by other country cases. In this annex, four countries 
are chosen for comparative purposes: Brazil, Chile, Indonesia and Thailand. 
This selection is by no means random, these comparative countries are emerging 
economies, all within the middle-income category, that have made significant 
achievements on their path to structural change and economic development through 
growth strategies that are generally liberalized and export-oriented. In Latin America, 
Brazil recently achieved the ninth rank in world GDP, as measured by PPP (Purchasing 
Power Parity) (2006), whilst Chile has also been successful at maintaining the fastest 
growing economy in the region over the past 15 years. In Asia, Indonesia and Thailand 
have both recovered from the 1997 financial crisis with projections of economic growth 
rate pegged at 6% in 2007 for Indonesia and an average growth rate of 5.6 % for the 2002 
– 2006 period for Thailand.  
As a side-note, India and China are often chosen as comparative cases in current 
discussions on economic development processes but they are not presented here because 
their macro figures, particularly their large demographic sizes, make them both unique 
cases. 
Data and methodology 
The RS first phase national reports have served as a qualitative knowledge base for this 
statistical annex. Qualitative information on the four comparative countries was sourced 
from country briefs produced by the World Bank29. Data was extracted from the World 
Bank databases (GDF & WDI Central) for use in every section of this statistical annex 
and was accompanied by data provided by FAO (FAOSTAT) in the assessments of 
population variables such as economically active population (EAP) and rural population. 
The following notes are an outline of the compilation of the figures presented in this 
statistical annex. 
Trends of GDP per capita 
The data tables – annual data from 1960 until mid-2000s - will not be presented in the 
annex because they are extensive. There was enough data to assess trends for the “GDP 
per capita (constant 2000 US$)” indicator for the entire 40-year period but data records 
only start from 1980-onwards for the “GDP per capita, PPP (constant international $)” 
indicator. 
                                                 
29
 Country Briefs for Indonesia (August 2007), Brazil and Chile (October 2007), and Thailand (February 
2008). 
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Trade Composition 
Under this section, the aim was to assess the trends in trade composition for the sample of 
countries from 1960 until mid-2000s. The indicator illustrating the share of total exports 
held by agriculture was calculated as the sum of the indicators “Agricultural raw 
materials exports (% of merchandise exports)” and “Food exports (% of merchandise 
exports)” in the World Bank databases (originating from COMTRADE). The components 
of each of these indicators can be found below in section Table 20). 
The shares of total exports accounted for by agriculture was used to construct averages of 
5-year periods for the time period and was also used to construct the corresponding non-
agricultural exports for each country. Both results were tabulated before being presented 
in graphical form. This data is identical to that used in the structural transformation 
exercises. 
Primary, Secondary and Tertiary Sectors 
The indicator “Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)” was chosen as a proxy for the 
primary sector, “Industry, value added (% of GDP)” as a proxy for the secondary sector 
and “Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)” for the tertiary sector. Averages of 5-year 
periods were created and tabulated before being presented in graphical form. 
All RS countries had sufficient data for these particular series except for Morocco and 
Nicaragua. For the case of Morocco, actual shares of GDP were calculated using value 
added series, delineated in current US$m, for agriculture, industry and services and GDP 
in current US$m. For the case of Nicaragua, data was sourced from Banco Central de 
Nicaragua for the available years of 1960-1999 and the remainder of the series (2000-
2004) was sourced from the World Bank databases. The specific data that was sourced 
from the Central Bank was in total values, in current prices, from the country’s 
“Actividad Primaria” (Primary activity), “Actividad Secundaria” (Secondary activity) 
and its “Actividad Terciaria” (Tertiary activity). It must be noted that although the data 
components of the production sectors from the two data sources are broadly similar, they 
are not strictly comparable. For instance, the relatively small component of electricity, 
water and gas is included in the “Industry, value added (% of GDP)” World Bank 
indicator, but is excluded from the “Actividad Secundaria”, Banco Central indicator and 
included in the “Actividad Terciara”. The exact components of each of the variables are 
outlined below Table 21; 
Agricultural Indicators 
Structural transformation was assessed with the use of four indicators which were 
aggregated in diamond charts: Rural population (% of total population), Agricultural 
GDP (% of GDP), Agricultural exports (% of exports) and Agricultural EAP (% of EAP). 
For the RS countries, there was an incomplete set of data for the share (%) held of GDP 
by agriculture in Madagascar, Mali and Nicaragua (in the 1960s for the three countries 
and only for Nicaragua in the 1980s). The comparative countries – Brazil, Chile, 
Indonesia and Thailand – all have complete sets of data points for the required variables. 
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The “GAP” indicator (the difference between the share of GDP held by agriculture and 
that of EAP held by Agriculture) was also created from the available data. This was 
tabulated and used with the share indicators to create a graph that incorporates the three 
time-periods of 1961-1965, 1981-1985 and 2001-2005. 
Data Analysis 
Trends of GDP per capita 
GDP per capita is an indicator that is used universally as a comparative measure of 
national wealth and the following graphs (Figure 10 and Figure 11) illustrate the 
historical trends of the RS countries and the comparative countries.  
Mexico, which was chosen as a benchmark in the RS study, is an upper-middle-income 
country and OECD member, and is placed with the four comparative countries because 
its GDP per capita trajectory follows a similar trend to those of this group of countries. 
The six other RS countries are low-income or lower-middle-income countries and have 
trajectories that are comparable with each other and are thus grouped together. This is 
illustrated in Table 1 below with the chosen year of 2006 for GDP per capita (constant 
US$). 
Table 18: RS and comparative countries: GDP per capita and income classification 
 Income Classification3 
 
Population 
(MM)1 
GDP per capita 
(constant 2000 US$) 
(2006)2 
 
Madagascar 18.6 238 Low-income ($905 or less) 
Mali 11.6 250  
Kenya 35.6 456  
Senegal 11.8 473  
Nicaragua 5.5 904 Lower-middle-income ($906 - $3,595) 
Indonesia 226.1 983  
Morocco 30.5 1439  
Thailand 63.0 2549  
Brazil 186.8 4055 Upper-middle-income ($3,596 - $11,115) 
Chile 16.3 5846  
Mexico 104.3 6387  
Note: High income bracket: $11,116 or more3  
Sources: 1 United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 2005 figures, 2 World Bank (2007), 3 Income 
categories based on World Bank Atlas method: 2006 GNI per capita statistics 
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Figure 10: 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)
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In Figure 10, the RS countries are seen to have GDP per capita trends that are in 
accordance with their country classifications; the lower-middle-income countries of 
Nicaragua and Morocco are logically at a higher level than the four other RS countries. 
However, the progress made by Morocco over the four decades must be noted and 
assessed relative to the higher platform reached by Thailand and Indonesia, countries that 
started at the same level (see below). In the case of Nicaragua, the trend clearly shows the 
impact of the civil war. All the other low income countries from the RS group share a 
common characteristic of stagnation.  
As for the comparative countries of Brazil, Chile, Indonesia and Thailand, along with 
Mexico, they are all on rising trajectories, in line with their respective country 
classifications as seen in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11 
GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$)
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The assessment of the GDP per capita indicator can be enhanced by using the GDP per 
capita (PPP) which takes into account the differences in the cost of living across different 
countries. As seen in a comparison of Figures 1 and 2 with Figures 3 and 4, the trends 
(and subsequent country rankings) in the series remain largely unaltered although the 
levels logically change, when GDP per capita (PPP) is used. 
Assessing the trend of the GDP per capita indicator as GDP per capita (PPP) provides no 
spectacular differences in marked trends as seen in the Figures 3 and 4 below even 
though the shortage of data for the period 1960 – 1980 renders an assessment of this 
earlier period impossible using this data alone. However, Brazil and particularly Mexico 
show a certain stagnation over the last two decades, and Thailand and Indonesia appear 
closer to the other RS countries group in the early 1980s. 
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Figure 12: 
GDP per capita, PPP (constant international $)
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Figure 13: 
GDP per capita, PPP (constant international $)
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Trade Composition: Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Shares of Exports 
Economic change can be assessed through an evaluation of the composition of exports in 
trade. This is because as a country develops from being agriculturally-based to 
industrially-based, the development is expected to be directly reflected in the evolution of 
the composition of its exports. This process is broadly evident in the sample of countries 
– there is a general trend of a transformation in the composition of exports from 
agriculturally-based to industrially-based over time. Chile (Figure 10) appears to be a 
very specific case over the designated time-period: the share of exports held by 
agricultural products rises whilst non-agricultural exports decline over time and clearly 
illustrates the success of an agricultural exports-led growth strategy. 
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Figure 14: Figure 15: 
Brazil
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Figure 16: Figure 17: 
Thailand
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Figure 18: Figure 19: 
Morocco
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In the RS group of countries, Madagascar, Nicaragua and Mali each have persistently 
high agricultural export shares over time, whereas countries like Senegal and Kenya do 
not exhibit this trait because they are engaged in export diversification, particularly in the 
case of Senegal. However, it must be noted that in the case of Madagascar and Mali, 
there is a clear decline in the agricultural export shares accompanied by growing shares 
of non-agricultural exports, since the mid-1990s, reflecting the development of apparel 
exports in the case of Madagascar, and the development of gold exports in the case of 
Mali.  
Figure 20: Figure 21: 
Madagascar
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Figure 22: 
Nicaragua
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Figure 23: Figure 24: 
Kenya
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Structural Transformation:  
- Changes in Economic Structure 
Trends in structural transformation are a means by which the economic development of 
countries can be gauged. Structural transformation is a process which is characterized by 
a decline in the relative importance of agriculture to industry and services and has been 
witnessed in the historical paths of modern-day’s industrializing and post-industrialized 
nations as they have developed. The decline in relative importance of agriculture is due to 
the net transfer of production factors from agriculture into industry and services as 
agriculture experiences its own transformation which is triggered by the rising 
productivity within that sector. 
From the group of comparative countries, Thailand and Indonesia are both cases where 
structural transformation is clearly underway with the visible decline in agriculture, as a 
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share of GDP, over time, alongside the increase in the share of GDP held by industry. 
The only marked difference between these two cases is the generally higher share of GDP 
accounted for by services for the case of Thailand. 
 
Figure 25:              Figure 26: 
Thailand
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The other cases of Brazil and Chile produce results that are less striking because 
structural transformation had already occurred in both countries before the time-period 
under analysis – in the 1940s and 1950s. In both Brazil and Chile, there is the key feature 
of declining shares of agriculture, albeit subtle declines, alongside rising shares held by 
services in Brazil. Brazil is seen to have declining shares held by industry, though, whilst 
that in Chile remains virtually unchanged. Mexico exhibits a picture of declining 
agricultural shares of GDP with rising shares accounted for by services but a slight 
decline in the shares held by industry. 
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Figure 27: Figure 28: 
Brazil
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Figure 29: 
Mexico
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In view of the evidence from Thailand and Indonesia, it cannot be stated that the process 
of structural transformation is ‘clearly underway’ in the rest of the RS countries. For the 
cases of Kenya and Morocco, although there is a decline in the share held by agriculture, 
there is virtually no change in the share held by industry over the 40-year period from the 
1960s to mid-2000s whilst the share held by services has slightly risen throughout the 
entire period, notably in Kenya. Does it mean that this country has been experiencing a 
specific transformation with a more direct path from agriculture to services? 
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Figure 30:              Figure 31: 
Kenya
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In Madagascar, the situation is broadly static – the share of agriculture has actually risen 
whilst the share of industry has risen modestly and the share held by services has 
decreased. For the case of Senegal, although a decline in the share held by agriculture is 
accompanied by a slight rise in the share held by industry, the share held by services has 
virtually remained unchanged from the 1960s to the mid-2000s. 
 
Figure 32: Figure 33: 
Madagascar
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Nicaragua exhibits a slight decline in the GDP share held by agriculture in the last period 
which is accompanied by a rise in the share held by industry. Out of all the RS countries, 
Mali could be seen to exhibit the largest decline in the agricultural share of GDP, from 
over 65 % in 1965-1969 to just over 35 % in 2000-2004. This trend is accompanied by 
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dual trends of rising shares held by both industry and services. However, this change is 
brought about only because of the recent developments in the country’s gold industry. 
Despite these changes, agriculture still holds a significant share of the country’s GDP of 
approximately 45 % of GDP, the highest of all the RS countries.  
Figure 34: Figure 35: 
Nicaragua
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- Changes in Rural and Agricultural Indicators 
To add to this analysis, it is useful to illustrate the trends regarding the general weight of 
agriculture within the economy as well as the rural/urban divide in the demographic 
structure, agriculture being the main activity in rural areas. The combination of the share 
of agriculture in EAP, GDP and trade over 40 years illustrate the economic 
transformation within the selected countries.  
From the group of comparative countries, Thailand (Figure 27) and Indonesia (Figure 28) 
follow similar transitions with their respective shares of AgEAP and of rural/total 
population decreasing less than the agriculture share in exports and GDP over the 40-year 
period. This is in line with a common observation stating that with rapid developers, 
shares of GDP held by agriculture fall faster than their shares of the labor force. Brazil 
(Figure 29) and Chile (Figure 30) show a clear convergence over the period and they are 
structurally similar by the 2000s.  
From the group of RS countries, Mexico (Figure 31) is most like the Latin American 
countries in the comparative cases, with all its agricultural/rural shares falling below 50% 
of the respective total indicators and a GDP share under 5%, the exception being the 
small share of agriculture in exports. Morocco also presents a process of change contrary 
to the other RS countries with marked reductions in its shares. Madagascar (Figure 33) 
and Kenya (Figure 34) reflect little change. The trends seen in the case of Mali (Figure 
37) reflect the developments which have been noted to have been in occurrence in the 
country since the mid-1990s, notably the decline in the share of exports held by 
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agriculture in recent years because of the developments in the country’s gold industry. 
Nicaragua (where there is an issue of missing data) is characterized by the strong 
resilience of its export structure. It must also be noted that the rapid decrease of the EAP 
reported by the FAO is contradicted by national sources which report higher levels for 
this indicator. 
Figure 36: Figure 37: 
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Figure 38:                Figure 39: 
Brazil
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Figure 40 
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Figure 41 
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Figure 42:              Figure 43: 
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Figure 44:          Figure 45: 
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Figure 46 
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Timmer and Akkus (2008) remind us that analyses of structural transformation tend to 
focus on the share of GDP and the share of EAP held by agriculture, when it is also 
important to assess the gap between these two indicators. They address the argument for 
the use of the “GAP” indicator by showing that one of its advantages is to exhibit the 
inequality of incomes between agriculture and the other sectors of the economy.  
Figure 38 incorporates the three time-periods for the sample of countries in showing the 
evolution of the Agricultural GDP, Agricultural EAP and the GAP indicator with 
reference to the evolution of the GDP per capita. In the graph, one can view clear 
differences in the evolution of the “GAP” indicator with the cases of Brazil, Kenya, and 
Indonesia. 
Figure 47: 
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Timmer and Akkus stress that the rural-urban income gap widens during the early stages 
of economic development. This characteristic is very evident in assessing the “gap” for 
Indonesia where the difference in the shares has widened during the 1980s from the 
figure of the 1960s (Table 2). Countries like Brazil and Chile which had already 
experienced their own economic transitions, prior to the time-period under analysis, in 
the 1940s and 1950s, exhibit a declining difference from the 1960s until the 2000s; this 
characteristic is also true of Mexico, even if the last period clearly shows a lag. In the RS 
countries, the change is very slow – the exception being Mexico and Morocco – 
confirming the global stagnation of their trajectories of structural change. 
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Table 19: “GAP” indicator 
 1961-1965 1981-1985 2001-2005 
Brazil -34.84 -23.18 -9.06 
Chile -19.47 -13.90 -9.53 
Indonesia -19.02 -34.04 -31.55 
Kenya -48.41 -48.36 -45.42 
Madagascar  -46.14 -44.20 
Mali  -45.19 -42.91 
Mexico -37.92 -25.53 -16.28 
Morocco -47.16 -38.68 -18.87 
Nicaragua1   -0.31 
Senegal -59.81 -60.60 -55.11 
Thailand -49.41 -50.84 -45.09 
 
Source: World Bank, 2007; FAO, 2007  
1Nicaragua: Missing data: Agricultural GDP (% GDP) for 1960s and 1980s 
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Table 20: Composition of Total Exports: Agricultural and Non-Agricultural Shares 
Brazil 1960-
1964 
1965-
1969 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
Ag.exports(%of Total 
exports) 
87.75 82.70 70.35 57.73 44.84 35.18 29.80 33.95 31.48 
Non-ag. exports(%of Total 
exports) 
12.25 17.30 29.65 42.27 55.16 64.82 70.20 66.05 68.52 
                    
Chile 1960-
1964 
1965-
1969 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
Ag.exports(%of Total 
exports) 
8.99 7.49 9.00 20.70 28.25 34.12 36.23 36.58 35.12 
Non-ag. exports(%of Total 
exports) 
91.01 92.51 91.00 79.30 71.75 65.88 63.77 63.42 64.88 
                    
Indonesia 1960-
1964 
1965-
1969 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
Ag.exports(%of Total 
exports) 
62.40 49.63 43.48 25.20 14.43 20.89 16.03 16.53 15.29 
Non-ag. exports(%of Total 
exports) 
37.60 50.37 56.52 74.80 85.57 79.11 83.97 83.47 84.71 
                    
Thailand 1960-
1964 
1965-
1969 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
Ag.exports(%of Total 
exports) 
86.19 79.28 71.42 68.81 61.12 48.23 29.43 22.80 18.20 
Non-ag. exports(%of Total 
exports) 
13.81 20.72 28.58 31.19 38.88 51.77 70.57 77.20 81.80 
                    
Kenya 1960-
1964 
1965-
1969 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
Ag.exports(%of Total 
exports) 
    64.21 58.47 71.25 56.96 64.22 57.82 
Non-ag. exports(%of Total 
exports) 
    35.79 41.53 28.75 43.04 35.78 42.18 
                    
Madagascar 1960-
1964 
1965-
1969 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
Ag.exports(%of Total 
exports) 
91.08 87.19 82.39 82.66 82.54 80.40 74.24 57.72 59.90 
Non-ag. exports(%of Total 
exports) 
8.92 12.81 17.61 17.34 17.46 19.60 25.76 42.28 40.10 
                    
Mali 1960-
1964 
1965-
1969 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
Ag.exports(%of Total 
exports) 
95.96 97.00 88.93 91.59 98.20 99.24 98.34 89.37 58.57 
Non-ag. exports(%of Total 
exports) 
4.04 3.00 28.86 8.41 1.81 0.76 1.66 10.64 41.44 
                    
Mexico 1960-
1964 
1965-
1969 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
Ag.exports(%of Total 
exports) 
56.39 57.76 45.94 36.80 10.48 14.01 10.53 7.35 5.70 
Non-ag. exports(%of Total 
exports) 
43.61 42.24 54.06 63.20 89.52 85.99 89.47 92.65 94.30 
                    
Morocco 1960-
1964 
1965-
1969 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
Ag.exports(%of Total 
exports) 
55.83 56.47 50.10 33.14 27.65 30.12 30.13 29.83 22.61 
Non-ag. exports(%of Total 
exports) 
44.17 43.53 49.90 66.86 72.35 69.88 69.87 70.17 77.39 
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Nicaragua 1960-
1964 
1965-
1969 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
Ag.exports(%of Total 
exports) 
  86.66 81.23 82.91 88.95 89.04 87.08 79.17 84.64 
Non-ag. exports(%of Total 
exports) 
  13.34 18.77 17.09 11.05 10.96 12.92 20.83 15.36 
                    
Senegal 1960-
1964 
1965-
1969 
1970-
1974 
1975-
1979 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
Ag.exports(%of Total 
exports) 
87.85 83.12 61.28 59.68 37.45 48.83 47.14 16.97 40.25 
Non-ag. exports(%of Total 
exports) 
12.15 16.88 38.72 40.32 62.55 51.17 52.86 83.04 59.75 
                    
Source: World Bank, 2007 
Notes:  
Definition of “Agricultural raw materials exports (% of merchandise exports)”, World Bank: “Components 
may not sum to 100 % because of unclassified trade. Agricultural raw materials comprise SITC section 2 
(crude materials except fuels) excluding divisions 22, 27 (crude fertilizers and minerals excluding coal, 
petroleum, and precious stones), and 28 (metalliferous ores and scrap). World Bank staff estimates from the 
COMTRADE database maintained by the United Nations Statistics Division.” 
Definition of “Food exports (% of merchandise exports)”, World Bank: “Components may not sum to 100 
% because of unclassified trade. Food comprises the commodities in SITC sections 0 (food and live 
animals), 1 (beverages and tobacco), and 4 (animal and vegetable oils and fats) and SITC division 22 (oil 
seeds, oil nuts, and oil kernels). World Bank staff estimates from the COMTRADE database maintained by 
the United Nations Statistics Division.” 
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Table 21: Agriculture, Industry, Services 
Brazil 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
Agriculture(%) 18.30 15.36 12.90 12.48 10.62 10.27 8.20 5.53 6.50 
Industry (%) 37.14 35.27 38.80 39.86 44.56 44.53 39.03 26.25 27.93 
Services (%) 44.56 49.37 48.30 47.66 44.81 45.20 52.76 68.21 65.57 
            
Chile 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
Agriculture(%) 9.12 8.26 7.18 8.07 6.49 8.68 9.44 6.71 5.36 
Industry (%) 37.80 41.10 41.88 38.06 37.81 39.48 38.18 38.06 38.66 
Services (%) 53.29 50.64 50.93 53.87 55.69 51.84 52.37 55.22 55.97 
            
Indonesia 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
Agriculture(%) 52.29 50.76 39.08 28.96 23.38 22.98 18.30 17.52 15.44 
Industry (%) 14.70 14.22 25.09 35.04 39.96 36.29 39.90 43.64 45.57 
Services (%) 33.02 35.02 35.83 36.00 36.67 40.73 41.80 38.85 38.99 
            
Kenya 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
Agriculture(%) 39.39 35.61 34.14 37.10 33.33 31.45 30.25 31.28 29.92 
Industry (%) 17.05 18.77 20.41 19.35 19.87 18.96 18.25 17.28 17.44 
Services (%) 43.56 45.62 45.45 43.54 46.80 49.59 51.50 51.44 52.64 
            
Madagascar 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
Agriculture(%)  24.60 26.95 32.43 33.69 34.91 27.98 29.21 29.35 
Industry (%)  14.63 16.71 16.66 14.02 13.57 12.01 12.28 14.90 
Services (%)   60.78 56.34 50.91 52.30 51.53 60.02 58.51 55.75 
            
Mali 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
Agriculture(%)  66.16 60.38 61.08 44.74 44.14 45.54 47.77 37.91 
Industry (%)  10.96 12.70 10.77 14.07 15.49 16.75 17.23 24.39 
Services (%)   22.88 26.92 28.16 41.19 40.37 37.71 34.99 37.69 
            
Mexico 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
Agriculture(%)  12.21 12.21 10.99 8.79 9.14 6.86 5.53 4.01 
Industry (%)  28.07 31.65 32.70 34.08 33.93 27.63 28.41 26.76 
Services (%)   59.73 56.14 56.31 57.13 56.93 65.50 66.06 69.22 
            
Morocco1 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
Agriculture(%)  21.59 20.91 18.07 15.36 17.09 17.28 17.37 16.36 
Industry (%)  28.18 28.96 32.75 32.68 33.04 31.74 30.53 27.96 
Services (%)   50.24 50.14 49.17 51.63 48.16 47.38 50.53 55.81 
           
Nicaragua2 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
Agriculture(%) 24.23 24.15 24.68 24.16 22.58 26.82 30.19 32.36 19.33 
Industry (%) 21.14 22.33 25.27 25.77 29.55 25.98 20.52 21.03 29.18 
Services (%) 54.63 53.51 50.05 50.07 47.86 47.20 49.29 46.61 51.49 
            
Senegal 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
Agriculture(%) 25.48 26.41 24.51 27.99 20.81 23.20 19.68 19.81 17.38 
Industry (%) 14.80 16.49 17.92 19.07 20.59 20.74 23.22 23.75 24.58 
Services (%) 61.32 57.96 58.01 53.98 58.61 56.07 57.10 56.44 58.05 
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Thailand 1960-1964 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004 
Agriculture(%) 34.00 30.38 25.98 25.37 20.16 15.69 11.04 9.73 9.66 
Industry (%) 20.27 24.04 26.62 28.53 30.17 33.82 39.00 40.46 42.73 
Services (%) 45.73 45.57 47.41 46.10 49.67 50.49 49.96 49.82 47.61 
Source: World Bank, 2008 
1For the case of Morocco: series calculated using value added series for agriculture, industry and services 
delineated in current US$m and current US$m GDP  
2 For the case of Nicaragua: Years 1960-1999 calculated using data from Banco Central de Nicaragua, 
May 2008, http://www.bcn.gob.ni; years 2000-2004 calculated using data from World Bank, 2008 
Notes: Definitions of production indicators, World Bank 
“Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)”: “Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes 
forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and livestock production.”  
“Industry, value added (% of GDP)”: “Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes 
manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37). It comprises value added in mining, manufacturing (also reported as 
a separate subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas.”  
“Services, etc., value added (% of GDP)”: “Services correspond to ISIC divisions 50-99 and they include 
value added in wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants), transport, and government, 
financial, professional, and personal services such as education, health care, and real estate services. Also 
included are imputed bank service charges, import duties, and any statistical discrepancies noted by 
national compilers as well as discrepancies arising from rescaling.” 
For each of the World Bank definitions, the following note is attached: “Value added is the net output of a 
sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The 
industrial origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), 
revision 3. Note: For VAB countries, gross value added at factor cost is used as the denominator. World 
Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.” 
Components of production indicators, Banco Central de Nicaragua: 
- “Actividad Primaria” (Primary Activity): agriculture, livestock, fishing, forestry. 
- “Actividad Secundaria” (Secondary Activity): industrial manufacturing, construction, mining. 
- “Actividad Terciaria” (Tertiary Activity): commerce, general government, transport and 
communication, banks and securities, energy, electricity and potable water, housing property and 
other services. 
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Table 22: Radar Chart Data 
  1961-1965 1981-1985 2001-2005 
Brazil       
Rural Population (% total population) 51.66 31.92 17.61 
Ag GDP (% GDP) 17.93 10.73 6.51 
Ag % exports 86.45 42.67 31.91 
Ag EAP (% EAP) 52.77 33.91 15.57 
      
Chile       
Rural Population (% total population) 29.73 18.09 13.34 
Ag GDP (% GDP) 8.98 6.57 5.66 
Ag % exports 8.50 29.80 33.32 
Ag EAP (% EAP) 28.45 20.47 15.19 
      
Indonesia       
Rural Population (% total population) 84.68 76.34 55.50 
Ag GDP (% GDP) 53.19 23.22 15.43 
Ag % exports 62.40 13.26 16.12 
Ag EAP (% EAP) 72.22 57.26 46.98 
      
Kenya       
Rural Population (% total population) 91.89 82.31 61.69 
Ag GDP (% GDP) 38.81 33.33 29.13 
Ag % exports  62.26 55.29 
Ag EAP (% EAP) 87.22 81.69 74.55 
      
Madagascar       
Rural Population (% total population) 88.28 80.44 73.68 
Ag GDP (% GDP)  34.70 29.14 
Ag % exports 90.93 81.79 65.82 
Ag EAP (% EAP) 85.57 80.84 73.34 
      
Mali       
Rural Population (% total population) 88.02 80.52 68.39 
Ag GDP (% GDP)  43.14 36.91 
Ag % exports 96.00 97.74 31.93 
Ag EAP (% EAP) 93.43 88.33 79.82 
      
Mexico       
Rural Population (% total population) 46.71 32.33 24.81 
Ag GDP (% GDP) 13.74 9.00 3.94 
Ag % exports 57.75 9.31 5.78 
Ag EAP (% EAP) 51.66 34.53 20.22 
      
Morocco       
Rural Population (% total population) 69.23 57.28 43.22 
Ag GDP (% GDP) 23.45 15.00 15.68 
Ag % exports 55.55 27.02 22.58 
Ag EAP (% EAP) 70.61 53.67 34.54 
      
Nicaragua       
Rural Population (% total population) 58.78 49.15 43.01 
Ag GDP (% GDP)   18.20 
Ag % exports 90.02 90.48 84.03 
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Ag EAP (% EAP) 59.33 37.28 18.51 
      
Senegal       
Rural Population (% total population) 67.61 63.59 51.08 
Ag GDP (% GDP) 23.70 19.34 17.97 
Ag % exports 87.90 14.40 35.59 
Ag EAP (% EAP) 83.50 79.94 73.08 
      
Thailand       
Rural Population (% total population) 79.82 72.61 68.40 
Ag GDP (% GDP) 33.09 18.67 9.78 
Ag % exports 85.61 60.69 17.88 
Ag EAP (% EAP) 82.50 69.51 54.86 
Source: World Bank, 2007; FAO, 2007 
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KENYA REPORT 
Paul Gamba, Betty Kibaara, January. 2007, 
138p. 
 
During the colonial period, policies in 
agriculture and rural development favored 
white settler agriculture. The indigenous 
populations were confined to reserve lands 
mainly providing labor to settlers. Land 
policies articulated during this time 
favored the settler-run, large-scale 
agriculture with commodity boards 
instituted to cater for marketing and 
regulating agricultural production. 
Towards independence (early 1960s) land 
subdivision consolidation, registration 
reallocation and relaxing restrictions on 
commercial enterprises through the 
Swynerton plan permitted the entry of 
indigenous population into hitherto 
exclusive and lucrative agricultural 
enterprise. The post-independence 
economic experience in Kenya can be 
viewed in three stages: pre-liberalization 
era (period before 1980), liberalization era 
(1980-2002) and post-liberalization era 
(2003 and the period thereafter) 
Upon gaining independence, the new 
government inherited a colonial economic 
structure that put an emphasis on import 
substitution policy propped with 
overvalued exchange rates. To achieve 
macroeconomic stabilization, the 
government imposed quantitative controls, 
high tariffs on competing imports, highly 
overvalued exchange rates, price and wage 
regulations, taxation of exports and 
requirement of ‘no objection certificates’ 
from domestic producers. The rapid 
economic growth realized during this time 
was attributed to inward-oriented policies 
and stable macroeconomic management. 
During this period, agricultural funding 
and rural development was imbalanced 
with resources directed towards high 
potential areas and marginalization of low 
potential areas. The effects emanating from 
the first and second oil shocks and the 
coffee boom served to destabilize the 
economic trend. 
The introduction of Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAPs) in 1980 marked the start 
of liberalization in Kenya. The aim of 
SAPs was to shift the economy from 
inward-orientation to externally-oriented 
policies that subject economic agents to 
competition. The SAPs required the 
following:  
• liberalization of prices and marketing 
systems 
• financial policy reforms 
• international trade reforms 
• government budget rationalization 
• divestiture and privatization 
• parastatals reforms, and 
• civil service reforms. 
The early 1980s were marked by 
government reluctance to implement the 
SAPs. By 1985, the shortcomings of 
import substitution policy were evident 
leading to the enactment of Session paper 
No. 1 of 1986 on Economic Management 
for Renewed Growth. This marked the 
turning point of economic policy from 
protectionism and import substitution 
policies to export promotion. This 
committed the government to moving 
away from import controls, gradual 
reduction in tariffs, tariff harmonization 
and tariffication of quantitative restrictions. 
The system of export incentives included 
Manufacturing under Bond (MUB), 
general import duty and VAT exemption 
scheme, government financed export credit 
guarantees and a proposal of a fully 
functioning Preferential Trade Area (PTA). 
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Kenya was classified as an ‘open’ 
economy in 1993 by the World Bank 
(WB). Although unsuccessful, the first 
wave of liberalization culminated into the 
second wave in which new export 
promotion strategies were instituted and 
unsuccessful ones were abandoned. The 
whole period of the implementation of 
SAPs occurred in the backdrop of limited 
democratic space. The government 
implemented the reforms with little or no 
consultation from the private sector or 
stakeholders. The timing and sequencing 
of the reforms varied and the pace of 
implementation was uneven resulting in 
periods of progress and stagnation. The full 
opening of the economy in 1993 coincided 
with a rapidly changing political scene, 
embracing multiparty democracy and 
reduced external aid. Nevertheless, 
economic growth continued, albeit in a 
declining manner. In 1995, the country 
signed onto the World Trade Organization 
agreement (WTO) in accession to General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). 
Other pacts which followed were the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), African Growth 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the 
reviewed African Caribbean Pacific-
European Union (ACP-EU). 
The onset of the liberalization saw the 
economy grow at a slow pace with real 
GDP and real agricultural GDP (AgGDP) 
growth rates declining. Real GDP grew 
from 32 billion in 1980 to 84 billion in 
1990 and 103 billion in 2000. The annual 
average growth rate was estimated to be 17 
% and 2.2 % in 1980/90 and 1990/00 
respectively The country’s’ real GDP in 
2005 was estimated at 1172.1 million Kshs 
signifying a 5.8 % increase from 2004 
(CBS, 2006).The real GDP has been on the 
rise since independence... The decline in 
economic growth which followed is 
attributed to the opening up of the 
economy which saw the exposure to 
external competition. 
Agriculture and rural developmenst 
Economic growth in Kenya is still strongly 
pegged on agricultural contribution with an 
estimated 1 % growth in agriculture 
resulting to 1.6 % growth in the overall 
GDP. Despite this role, over the last two 
decades agricultural contribution to overall 
economic growth has declined from 34.18 
% in 1980, 28.38 % in 1992 and finally 
26.4 % in 2003. The sector declined from a 
growth of 4.4 % in 1996 to 1.5 % in 1999 
to a negative of 2.4 % in 2002 but showed 
a minimal growth of 0.7 % in 2003. 
Agricultural development and rural 
development cannot exist independently of 
each other. Agriculture is the major 
livelihood source to the rural households in 
Kenya. About 80 % of Kenya’s population 
live in the rural areas and derive their 
livelihood from agriculture through crop 
and livestock production, forestry and 
exploitation of other natural resources. 
This population constitutes over 70 % of 
the Kenyan population living below the 
poverty line. The decline in agricultural 
growth coincides with the economic 
liberalization that opened the economy 
agricultural imports and decline in 
governmental support to agriculture. 
Reduced government support led to an 
increase in production costs which reduced 
the country’s comparative advantage by 
making the country’s agricultural products 
relatively more expensive. 
The effects of liberalization on different 
sub-sectors and economic agents are 
varied. While some sectors of the economy 
have been casualties, others have managed 
to perform well under similar economic 
conditions. Sub-sectors such as coffee and 
sugar have regressed under liberalization 
with declining crop area, output, 
productivities and low world prices. 
Despite the general increase in area under 
coffee, production fell from a high of 128.3 
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thousand tons in 1988 to a low of 45.2 
thousand tons in 2005 while unroasted 
coffee exports declined from 126,498 tons 
in 1986 to as low as 50,951 tons in 2005. 
The poor trend in coffee exports is due to 
the decline in world coffee prices. In 
contrast, tea and horticulture have had an 
increase in area, output, productivity, and 
international returns during this period. 
The sector export value was estimated at 
42.29 billion in 2005, up from 22.8 billion 
in 1997. The area and output of tea had 
also increased significantly. The 
development of the tea sector is mainly 
attributed to the KTDA which has been in 
the forefront of fostering smallholder tea 
growth and the efforts of TRF which has 
fostered research on high-yielding tea 
varieties. On the other hand, the 
development of the horticultural sector 
which was dominated by the private sector 
is attributed to little government 
interference. The sector exports were 
estimated at 13.75 billion in 1997 and 
44.56 in 2005. Despite the setting of 
quality and safety standards in the EU 
market, the sector has performed well. 
Informal (off-farm) sector 
The exit option for the declining 
agricultural performance, over the period, 
has been the informal sector. The sector 
has developed since 1992 and has 
employed an estimated 6.12 million 
directly and indirectly. This accounts for 
nearly a third of the country’s labor force. 
Most of the sector is rural-based and with 
trade, service provision and manufacturing 
being the significant sub-sectors. The 
growth of the informal sector is largely 
attributed to the liberalization of the 
communications sector and the cotton 
industry. The AGOA pact although cited as 
a cause of the cotton industry losses, is also 
recognized as having created many jobs 
through the sale of imported secondhand 
clothes. Liberalization in the 
communications sector opened the gates to 
the new communication technologies and 
service delivery. 
Migration, urban concentration and 
rural depopulation 
Both domestic and international migrations 
have taken place with rural-urban 
migration characterizing most of domestic 
migration. Urban centers have increased 
simultaneously with the increase in the 
urban population. Urban population 
reached an estimated 5.4 million in 1999 
up from 0.7 million in 1962. Urban centers 
increased from 34 in 1980 to 380 in 1999. 
The rate of rural-urban migration, when 
taken as the rate of growth of annual 
successive urban population, sometimes 
surpassed the rural population growth rate 
resulting in rural depopulation and urban 
concentration. It is hypothesized that the 
educated, skilled and productive people are 
more inclined to migrate from the rural 
areas so the rural-urban migration has 
deprived the rural areas of agricultural 
labor force hence leaving rural areas with 
less skilled labor. However, currently 
rural-urban migration trend is negative 
indicating that, either urban households are 
migrating back to the rural areas or the 
rural households have stopped migrating to 
the urban areas. International migration 
declined from the pre-independence period 
to the early 1990s, when it was triggered 
by political agitation for a multi-party 
system. This trend persisted to mid- 1990s 
when it became reversed. In 2005, 
estimates of international migrations 
indicate that majority of the Kenyans are in 
the UK which accounted for 33 %, and 
surprisingly, Tanzania, which accounted 
for 26 % ahead of USA and the Southern 
American countries which accounted for 
19 %. The reasons for the pattern of 
international migration observed here are 
probably anchored in the strict entry rules 
and the anticipated job or educational 
opportunities. 
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Remittances 
It is evident that migrants do not sever 
their relationship with rural areas. The 
transfer of funds between urban and rural 
inhabitants has been enhanced by reforms 
in the financial and communications 
services. Although there is little 
information available on the remitted 
amounts and the specific uses, evidence 
exists to show the increasing importance of 
remittances in agriculture and rural 
development. Currently, the Kenyan 
government has started to recognize the 
significance of remittances from abroad 
and is assessing the possibility of these 
remittances being a substitute to Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) by creating an 
investment environment. While there may 
be limitation to international data, 
domestic remittances have been shown to 
increase by 1.98 % from 1997 to 2004 
Trade 
Kenya’s imports have exceeded its exports, 
even in the import substitution period and 
the trend of imports and exports became 
more pronounced after the economy was 
opened up and the reforms had taken place. 
Exchange rate fluctuations also became 
more pronounced and dictated the import-
export trends. Trade liberalization led to an 
increase in the trade volume with higher 
imports than exports. The cover ratio 
declined over the period indicating an 
increase in imports. Following the same 
trend, agricultural imports are on the rise 
relative to exports signaling the declining 
competitive strength of agricultural 
production. The extent of these effects to 
the country’s comparative advantage 
however remains unknown. 
Poverty and inequality 
Under the economic reforms regime, 
poverty prevalence has increased. Poverty 
increased from 48.8 % in 1981/82 to 59.56 
% 2000 within the rural areas, 29.3 in 1992 
to 51.48 in 2000 and nationally it increased 
from 46.8 in 1981/82 to 56.78 in 2000. 
Economic reforms are clearly linked to 
poverty under the assumption that trade 
reforms reduce poverty and enhance 
human development through fostered 
economic growth. Trade reforms influence 
the enterprises, distribution channels and 
government expenditure thereby affecting 
poor households. The poor in Kenya are 
mainly found in rural and marginal areas 
where agriculture is the main livelihood 
source. Arable land resource is on the 
decline due to the exploding population, 
labor force migration is leaving the rural 
areas depopulated and without human 
capital resources. Environmental 
degradation is pushing resources further 
away from the reach of poor households 
trapping them in the environment-poverty 
convolution. The decline in productivity 
occurred in the middle of a rising 
population leading to increasing 
unemployment and, subsequently, rising 
poverty levels. The reduced revenue in the 
agricultural sector, especially in the sugar 
and coffee planting areas, has resulted in a 
loss of livelihoods. It is evident that 
between 1997 and 2004, household income 
declined by 6 %. The disparity in income 
changes witnessed in various agro-
ecological zones is an indicator of the 
extent of the income inequality. 
Furthermore, the inequality gap has 
widened over the years, as the Gini 
coefficient has increased from 0.52 in 1997 
to 0.55 in 2000. 
Structure and evolution of agricultural 
marketing chains 
Agricultural marketing in Kenya was 
dominated by boards which were 
responsible for controlling production and 
marketing of the output. Some of the 
boards were: Kenya Dairy Board (KDB) 
(created in 1958), the Maize and Produce 
Board (1950) later evolving into the 
National Cereals and Produce Board, Tea 
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Board (1951) and the Coffee Marketing 
Board (1946). Upon liberalization, the 
roles and functions of these boards were 
refocused to make them more efficient and 
competitive in service delivery. The 
liberalization of the market saw the entry 
and exit of marketing agents, with 
concentration and integration took place 
along the chain. The dairy sector, maize, 
coffee and tea sub-sectors witnessed the 
entry of new market agents while those 
incompetent agents withdrew from the 
market. The boards partly maintained 
regulatory roles mainly to maintain 
standards and quality of produce. There 
was also the emergence of alternative 
marketing chains especially in maize and 
dairy were it is estimated that these 
alternative chains control a significant 
share of the market. For instance, in dairy 
it is estimated that the informal chain 
control over 80 % of the marketed milk. 
Input supply chains such as those of maize 
seed and fertilizers were also liberalized. 
Increased use of these inputs is attributed 
to the extensive availability which was 
achieved after freeing the market. 
Segmentation in production structures 
Agricultural production in Kenya is 
characteristically regional. The country is 
divided into segments that each support 
major agricultural production on the basis 
of climatic conditions. This segmentation 
was developed during the colonial period 
and was perpetuated by post-independence 
governments which emphasized the 
development of the high-potential regions 
at the expense of the rural-arid areas. 
Economic reforms initiated in the early 
1980s further segmented even the high-
potential areas triggering inner-regional 
segmentation. Today, segmentation can be 
viewed in terms of agricultural production 
that is dictated by climatic conditions and 
public investment in infrastructure. 
Economic reforms have had different 
effects in different regions depending on 
the type of agricultural production in the 
area and resulting in economic imbalances, 
poverty and inequity. 
Liberalization appears to have reinforced 
differential development that was initiated 
during the colonial period through the 
classification of regions on the basis of 
crop potential and subsequent resource 
allocation. Liberalization effects on large 
and small-scale farmers does not present a 
clear picture but can be discerned more 
clearly along commodity lines. 
While this study has identified structural 
changes that have taken place in the rural 
setting under the pre-liberalization, 
liberalization and post-liberalization eras, 
at the analytical level, liberalization cannot 
be stated to be the cause of these changes 
per se. While it is possible to match 
changes in policy with changes in 
economic variables, the causality remains 
an empirical issue. 
Manifestations of economic reforms and 
reshaping of the rural economies 
While the vulnerable groups are those 
losing their livelihoods due to economic 
reforms, they are distributed within the 
country irrespective of the production 
potential of the regions. These are 
characterized by declining agricultural 
revenues which lead to declining education 
and health levels, declining food security 
and increasing poverty. It is shown that 
different regions exhibit varying levels of 
poverty that is consistent with the loss in 
agricultural income of the main 
agricultural products especially export 
crops. 
The government has initiated several 
programs and policies to reverse these 
trends. These efforts include The Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) (2001) 
and the Economic Recovery Strategy for 
Wealth and Employment Creation (2003) 
that spells out strategies for rural economy 
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reconstruction focusing on sectors that 
have a direct impact on the rural economy 
through industrialization, employment 
creation and decentralization of social 
infrastructure and services. Other strategies 
include The Ministry of Livestock and 
Fisheries Development Strategic Plan 2003 
– 2007, Strategy for Revitalizing 
Agriculture, 2004 – 2014, The National 
Development Plan (NDP), 2002-2008, and 
the Ministry of Agriculture Strategic Plan 
(2006-2010) that all seek to address the 
ailing agricultural sector. 
This study was carried out to elicit the 
structural implications of economic 
liberalization on agriculture and rural 
development. Several outcomes and 
challenges were identified apart from 
tracing agricultural policy evolution. 
While economic growth declined, the 
population increased over the reform 
period. The population increase continued 
to exert pressure on natural resources so 
agricultural performance, ad subsequently 
household incomes, deteriorated. 
Increasing urbanization, internal and 
external migrations and the corresponding 
rural depopulation and human capital 
depletion pose new challenges. 
Liberalization of markets has stimulated 
wide interest and encouraged the entry of 
many players from different channels. 
While this is seen as enhancing market 
efficiency, the problem of enforcing food 
safety and the maintenance of quality 
standards is creeping into the system. Exit 
of players from the channels has led to 
concentration in the market and requires 
the development of contract farming and 
adherence to business ethics. Structures for 
competitive and ethical behavior of 
economic agents have to be developed. 
Segmentation initiated during the settler 
period has been perpetuated by the 
reforms. This can be witnessed in view of 
agricultural production that is shaped 
by regional climatic conditions and public 
infrastructure investments. New livelihood 
strategies, especially the non-farm 
activities have emerged due to declining 
farm revenue emanating from declining 
land and labor productivity, farm sizes and 
arable land per capita. 
Vulnerable groups are distributed all over 
the country and their livelihoods are at 
stake due to the economic changes. Loss of 
these livelihoods is perpetuated by a 
decline in agricultural income triggered by 
increasing input prices and declining per 
unit output. This has forced rural 
households to venture into alternative 
agricultural and non-agricultural 
enterprises. Rural economies are currently 
reshaping under the thrust of migration, 
remittances and the development of non-
farm activities. The new configuration is 
being dictated by government expenditure 
on agriculture and investment choices for 
domestic and international remittances. 
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Rice always at the core of Madagascar’s 
society and agricultural policies 
In order to fully grasp the structural 
changes in Madagascar’s agriculture, it is 
necessary to understand the role that rice 
has played in the country’s economy. Since 
the reign of King Andrianampoinimerina, 
who developed the Antananarivo plains at 
the end of the 18th century, the history of 
Madagascar and of the Malagasy society 
and economy have been closely linked to 
the cultivation of this grain. Rice has 
always been and still is at the core of 
agricultural and development policies in 
Madagascar. Examples to support this 
statement include the creation of the large 
irrigated farm areas in the 1950s, the rice 
productivity operations of the First 
Republic, and the nationalizations during 
the socialist period. 
Consequently, throughout history, rice 
cultivation has shaped the country and its 
farmers. Today, 87 % of farms and 60 % of 
crop acreage are involved in rice 
production. The dominant position of rice 
explains why the GDP structure has not 
changed over the last 30 years. The 
agricultural sector still accounts for 35 % 
of the country’s wealth, and the GDP trend 
is greatly influenced by the development of 
the agricultural sector. The rice sub-sector 
is therefore still one of the key engines of 
Madagascar’s economy. However, 
Madagascar has a wide range of temperate 
or tropical products, intended mainly for 
the local and national markets which also 
structure the agricultural landscape.  
Liberalization has changed the 
operation of markets after a period of 
nationalization and state intervention 
While successive agricultural and rural 
development policies have contributed to 
establishing the predominance of rice, 
other products have benefited from state 
support during colonization and the First 
Republic, particularly traditional export 
products (coffee, spices, lychee, etc.). 
Above all, the agricultural sector was 
shaped greatly by the socialist period. 
Nationalizations and state intervention 
between 1975 and 1986 often had negative 
impacts on the production and marketing 
of many agricultural products. These 
impacts are still there for some sub-sectors 
such as sugar, which is being privatized, 
and cotton, which was recently privatized. 
State divestiture and liberalization of trade 
initiated under the structural adjustment 
plans, as well as deeper integration into the 
world economy since the 1980s, have had 
very significant consequences on the 
operation of markets and strategies of 
agricultural sub-sectors, without 
challenging the predominance of rice. 
Have these changes to the economic and 
institutional environment, as suggested by 
the assumptions underlying the study, led 
to greater integration of the sub-sectors and 
segmentation of markets? 
Prices determined more by the markets 
Before the period of structural adjustment 
and gradual liberalization were initiated in 
the mid-1980s, markets for basic 
agricultural products were subject to direct 
state intervention. Producer prices were the 
same throughout the country, and 
marketing operations were fairly simple, 
with a limited number of actors. Today, 
most of the sub-sectors have been 
privatized, and prices are now fixed by the 
forces of demand and supply with, for 
some sub-sectors, a strong influence from 
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world prices (cotton, sugar, coffee, and 
rice). 
With the existence of residual public 
monopolies (sugar, chewing tobacco) or 
private pseudo-monopolies and oligopolies 
(cotton, smoking tobacco, or milk), 
producers are still forced to accept 
purchase prices (sugar, cotton, green 
beans, milk in some cases), while the 
prices of agricultural products are 
generally variable and change according to 
seasons (rice, maize). For the same 
product, the prices can also vary 
considerably depending on the production 
area, the degree of inaccessibility to the 
area, and the existence or lack of dominant 
marketing positions. 
Evolution of key sub-sectors 
As in many other countries, the 
liberalization of the market has led to the 
emergence of several types of marketing 
channels and an increased number of 
actors. The number of middlemen between 
the producers and the final consumers, 
have increased; the rice sub-sector serves 
as a good example. This situation has a 
significant impact on the structure of the 
sub-sector, distribution of the value of the 
product, and pricing. For some sub-sectors, 
such as vanilla or lychee, supervision is 
exercised by professional bodies in 
consultation with the state. Depending on 
the level of connection with the local or 
world market, adjustments of the sub-
sectors to new economic constraints are 
diverse as shown by the examples analyzed 
in the report: 
The rice sub-sector, which is the pillar of 
Madagascar’s economy, remains a 
strategic sector for the state. It is marked 
by high atomization of agricultural 
production (the average farm size is less 
than 1 ha, and rice farmers are generally 
versatile), high concentration of wholesale 
marketing and imports, and a more 
competitive processing structure. There 
is some degree of integration since some 
rice industrialists have contractual relations 
with rice farmers who supply them with 
rice. 
Despite price liberalization and 
privatization of production and marketing, 
state intervention is frequent (tax policy, 
building of stocks, price regulation, import 
operations, etc.). However, economic 
relations between agents depend on the 
market, which is more or less competitive 
depending on the situation. Since 2004, 
there is also a consultation platform 
involving all the stakeholders of the sub-
sector and the state. 
While liberalization and state divestiture 
have led to a higher number of actors in 
marketing, they have not had the expected 
impacts on rice production. The price of 
paddy rice has remained too low to act as 
incentive for farmers to increase 
production. Production has remained very 
traditional, with little use of inputs, and its 
increase is mainly due to extension of crop 
areas. The reduced size of parcels as a 
result of population growth and 
transmission of lands does not really 
encourage farmers to take risks. The 2004 
crisis, which led to sharp increase in the 
price of paddy rice, had an incentive 
impact and producers increased crop areas, 
and in certain cases, intensified production. 
The price of local rice, and therefore the 
price of paddy rice, depends on world 
prices. Today, producers are benefiting 
from the high world prices which enable 
them to be competitive. However, it should 
be noted there is not only one rice price, 
but several rice prices in Madagascar, 
depending on its variety, the season (pre-
harvest gap or harvest), as well as the 
inaccessibility of the production or 
consumption area, and organization of the 
marketing network. 
The key challenge facing this sub-sector in 
coming years is to rapidly achieve food 
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self-sufficiency and position itself on the 
rice world market, by making efforts 
towards quality and competitiveness. Some 
big rice industrialists have already 
positioned themselves within this 
perspective. 
The sugar sub-sector, which still has a 
public operator, is being privatized. It is 
concentrated as there are only two sugar 
cane processing companies, and organized 
in two ways: integration and 
contractualization between sugar cane 
producers and SIRAMA (Siramamy 
Malagasy, a public processing enterprise) 
and production under state control for 
SUCOMA (“Sucre Complant de 
Madagascar”, a private enterprise). The 
crisis in the sub-sector shows the 
inadequacies of public management, 
whereas SIRAMA has benefited from 
guaranteed export quotas to European and 
American markets at prices higher than the 
world price, for a long time; indeed, this 
advantage ought to have fostered its 
development. The imminent privatization 
of SIRAMA should, in the short term, 
change the evolution of the sub-sector, 
with the development of bio-fuel 
production. 
The cotton sub-sector was privatized 
recently (2004). It is a historically 
integrated sub-sector which has benefited 
from significant state support and was 
privatized in 2004. The state monopoly has 
been replaced by private monopoly. The 
health of the sector depends very much on 
world prices. Following the sharp decline 
in prices, the cotton sub-sector in 
Madagascar, as in most African cotton 
producing countries, experienced a very 
difficult period, leading to a sharp decline 
in production in the early 2000s. Under 
privatization, “HASYMA-Dagris” made 
huge investments to boost production and 
improve the quality of cotton produced, 
and their initial effects are being felt. 
Downstream, there are only two mills, 
even though the textile sector is very 
developed and export-oriented. In 2004, 
fiber production was estimated at 4,545 
tons, with 2,400 tons for the local market, 
whereas domestic demand was estimated at 
27,500 tons. To support the recovery of the 
sub-sector and in collaboration with the 
private sector, Madagascar has established 
a cotton-textile consultation platform 
aimed at finalizing an Action Plan that can 
receive support from EU-Africa 
partnership on cotton. 
• The milk sub-sector is much more 
atomized upstream with a relatively low 
average productivity and problems of 
quality of the milk produced. Most of the 
output is for home-consumption, and a 
small part is processed. The milk sub-
sector is relatively segmented, and most of 
the milk is sold fresh to consumers. There 
are also many small processing plants. On 
the other hand, the industrial segment is 
relatively concentrated, with two 
processing companies (TIKO and 
SOCOLAIT) established in the 1980s, 
following privatization of SMPL for 
SOCOLAIT. It is one of the rare sub-
sectors with such a processing level. The 
sub-sector is partly integrated, because the 
industrialists have cattle but also receive 
supplies from stockbreeders’ organizations 
to which they provide guidance and inputs. 
Although the per capita consumption is 
extremely low, milk production has always 
been unable to meet demand, leading to 
considerable imports of powder milk by 
the two industrial companies. However, the 
protection of processed products offers 
enough guarantees for the development of 
production with high added value. The 
price of milk is determined freely, but in 
reality it is highly influenced by the 
purchase price paid by TIKO Company in 
the milk triangle (Antananarivo region). 
Lychee has become a flagship of 
Madagascar’s exports to European 
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markets. Production employs nearly 2.5 
million rural people each season on the 
East coast of the island, and is mainly 
through harvesting. About 30 lychee 
exporters operate in the Main Island for a 
few European importers who fix the price 
of lychee; it is therefore a sub-sector that is 
relatively concentrated downstream. With 
the development of standards (for example, 
Eurepgap) and the establishment of 
traceability in Europe, the quality of 
products is today the major challenge for 
development, and even the future of the 
sub-sector. To meet these expectations 
with respect to quality, the sub-sector is 
being organized (creation of a consultation 
platform) and is receiving significant 
technical support. Today, some enterprises 
have created orchards to facilitate 
standardization, rendered difficult by 
harvesting. 
The shrimp sub-sector is segmented, since 
there is a traditional fishing sub-sector, an 
industrial fishing sub-sector, and an 
aquaculture sub-sector. However, the 
different segments are connected. 
Industrial fishing and aquaculture are very 
concentrated sectors. The sector has 
developed towards integration of 
traditional fishing into the supply channels 
of industrial enterprises, which alone have 
access to export markets. Diversification of 
fishing to aquaculture is a guarantee for 
sustainability of the sub-sector. 
Furthermore, Madagascar’s shrimp 
occupies a very good position among high 
quality products on the world market. One 
of the driving forces in the organization of 
this export-oriented sub-sector is 
compliance with standards. All the 
industrial enterprises comply with HACCP 
standards to meet the expectations of 
consumers, particularly European 
consumers. 
For the last two export-oriented sub-
sectors, quality is a major challenge. 
Compliance with standards may be a 
constraint for producers and exporters who 
do not often have the facilities or technical 
capacity to meet the requirements of 
international markets (cf. the European 
embargo on animal products since August 
1997 following a negative health 
evaluation). Compliance with standards 
may be an advantage in comparison with 
less organized competitors. 
In Madagascar, contractual agriculture is 
still not well developed, except for a few 
historical products such as sugar or cotton. 
The green bean sub-sector, which is 
export-oriented, is a limited example of 
successful contractual agriculture, based on 
efforts towards quality. The green bean 
sub-sector is segmented, made up of a 
traditional sub-sector for the local market 
and a completely integrated export sub-
sector. Lecofruit Company, which 
concludes contracts with producers on the 
basis of pre-fixed prices and specifications, 
provides the required inputs and technical 
supervisions. It has been certified by 
HACCP, and exports beans in cans under 
contract with a European partner (Maille). 
An analysis of these different sub-sectors 
shows that ongoing trends vary, depending 
on the region and the product. However, 
market differentiation and segmentation 
factors can be identified in terms of 
accessibility (existence or not of marketing 
facilities) and the final destination of the 
products: almost exclusively local market 
(cassava, most fruits and vegetables, tubers 
and legumes, dairy products, flour, and 
meat), exports (vanilla, spices, essential 
oils, lychee, and shrimp), or dual, for the 
local market and for export (sugar, maize, 
cotton, coffee and, to a lesser extent, rice). 
Connection with the international market, 
with regard to export products or local 
products competing with imports, calls for 
adjustments in terms of quality and 
standards. 
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An undeveloped agro-industrial sector 
Despite the wide variety of products which 
offer processing opportunities, the agro-
industrial sector is astonishingly under-
developed. The atomization of production, 
dispersal over a large territory with limited 
local output and often difficult marketing 
conditions make it difficult to obtain 
economies of scale. Great variability of 
volume and quality is another constraint on 
processing. 
Despite the existing potential, agro-
industry concerns only a few sub-sectors, 
and accounts for only 0.3 % of the working 
population. The most developed processing 
sectors, such as dairy products, oils, flour 
or biscuits and confectionery obtain 
supplies mainly from imported products, 
and do not include or include only a little 
local products. Agro-industrial production, 
based on local products, include sugar, 
tobacco, cotton, brewery, chocolate 
factories and canning of sea products. 
Development of mass marketing 
In Madagascar, most agricultural products 
are consumed locally (particularly food 
crops, and primarily rice), and sold in rural 
and urban markets. Since the liberalization 
of the economy, supermarkets are 
participating in marketing. Three groups, 
linked to international mass marketing, 
share the market: the South African chain 
“Shoprite”, located in Madagascar since 
1992, after buying “Champion” shops, the 
French chain “Leaderprice”, and “Score” 
supermarkets of Vindémia Company, a 
subsidiary of the French group “Casino”. 
However, mass marketing is still 
concentrated only the big towns: 
Antananarivo, Antsirabe, and Toamasina. 
While in some countries the establishment 
of supermarkets has promoted the 
development of contractual agriculture, 
this is not yet the case in Madagascar. 
Indeed, their local purchase strategy does 
not attach importance to quality as is the 
case, for example, in Europe. Furthermore, 
in view of their rather recent development 
and the persistence of small retail 
companies, supermarkets could be 
estimated to handle only a limited part of 
the marketing of fresh products. On the 
other hand, they play an important and 
growing role in the marketing of imported 
agrifood products. 
Agriculture that remains traditional and 
with low production 
While state intervention has not always 
provided effective access for all producers 
to factors of production, its divestiture, 
sometimes only partial, has not improved 
the situation. Consequently, Madagascar’s 
agriculture is generally traditional, not 
intensive, not mechanized, while using 
relatively small amounts of inputs. The 
reduced farm size certainly worsens the 
low degree of intensification, which is a 
strategy to minimize risks: 
With regard to fertilizers (but it is also true 
for phyto-sanitary products), the quantity 
used is very low and the imports, 
compared to the area sown, have virtually 
stagnated since 1972. As a result of 
ignorance, difficulties of access or 
uncertainties about its technical or 
economic effectiveness, manure is not 
frequently used. The high prices of 
imported fertilizers, especially when 
compared to paddy rice price trends, and 
the obstacles to the creation of a 
competitive fertilizers market, do not 
encourage farmers to use them; 55 % of 
the farms do not use fertilizers. 
Mechanization is also very low, and a large 
majority of farmers continue to use only 
“angady” (spade). Here again, the reduced 
farm size does not encourage investment in 
the purchase of agricultural equipment. 
Seed production has not yet been 
privatized, and improved seeds are not 
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widely used by farmers. The reasons 
include: preference for traditional seeds, 
inadequate domestic production, problems 
of quality, certification and control, little 
commercial dynamism of multiplication 
centers, etc. 
Access to land is a major obstacle to 
improvement of agricultural productivity. 
The technical and financial possibilities of 
the administration to satisfy demand for 
recognition of land rights are largely 
inadequate, creating potential situations of 
insecurity and conflict. The lack-of-land 
certificates penalizes farmers in their 
efforts to obtain loans, and therefore to 
make investments. Wide expanses of 
uninhabited and uncultivated lands coexist 
in the country with regions where 
anthropogenic pressure has led to 
fragmentation of farms and adoption of 
survival strategies. Land reform, which is 
underway, aims at securing farms at lower 
cost and within a fairly short time. If the 
reform is properly implemented, it will 
revolutionize the development of the 
agricultural sector. 
Apart from the factors presented above, the 
limited use of inputs is also due to low 
rural credit and virtual absence of 
agricultural services: 
Microfinance has been developing in 
Madagascar since 1990 to remedy the 
inadequacies of the banking system in rural 
areas. However, the overall amount of 
rural loans is still low. These loans come 
mainly from decentralized financial 
systems and, in most cases, from credit 
unions. Despite a high demand for loans, 
which is still largely satisfied by informal 
financing at very high interest rates, the 
penetration rate of rural financial services 
did not exceed 5 %-6 % of households in 
2005. Furthermore, the rates charged by 
microfinance institutions (MFI) are 
relatively high (close to a nominal rate of 
36 % per year). 
Recently, banking institutions have been 
increasingly interested in microfinance, 
and the products proposed by development 
partners are also increasing. Since 2006, 
the government has, with the support of 
donors, been engaged in an interest rate 
reduction program for loans. Lastly, one of 
the main obstacles to loans is inadequate 
land security, which limits the 
development of credit. The ongoing reform 
should contribute to overcoming this 
constraint. 
Until the end of the 1970s, agricultural 
extension services were provided by the 
government, without, however, meeting 
the needs of producers. The mixed results 
of the National Agricultural Extension 
Program in the 1990s marked the start of a 
period of state divestiture, replaced more 
or less by NGOs, projects or local 
administrative services with limited 
financial and human resources for 
operation. The lack of technical support is 
one of the causes of low productivity of 
Madagascar’s agriculture. The needs today 
are considerable. Recently, several 
initiatives taken by the state and donors are 
aimed at meeting the needs of the farmers: 
creation of Chambers of Agriculture and 
establishment of Agricultural Services 
Centers and Agriculture Business Centers. 
Consequently, liberalization has not 
specifically contributed to improving the 
productivity of farms. The yields for major 
crops have increased little, and remain very 
low. In 2005, the rice yields stood at 2.75 
t/ha, for maize 1t/ha, and for groundnut 
0.72 t/ha. 
Diminishing portion of agricultural 
products in Madagascar’s trade 
The trade liberalization, accompanying the 
development of Madagascar’s agricultural 
sub-sectors, has led to a sharp decline in 
agricultural exports, while food imports 
have continued to increase. 
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Indeed, Madagascar has concluded or is 
committed to different multilateral, 
bilateral and regional trade agreements, 
which have, on the whole, worsened trade 
deficits. Between 1984 and 2005, exports 
more than doubled, while imports tripled. 
Consequently, the trade balance, which 
already showed a deficit of USD 74 
million in 1984, worsened to a deficit of 
USD 701 million in 2005. 
With regard to agricultural products, their 
share of total exports has declined over the 
past ten years, from 62 % in 1995 to 34 % 
in 2005. In absolute value, agricultural 
exports declined from USD 316 million to 
USD 286 millions. This trend is due to the 
growth of non-agricultural exports over the 
period, especially clothing textile, as a 
result of the development of free trade 
areas. The decline in agricultural exports is 
also due to a drop in the production of 
some key products, in particular coffee, 
which fell from 22 % of exports in 1995 to 
1 % in 2005, as a result of the fall in world 
prices that completely destroyed domestic 
production. The situation is the same for 
sugar exports which, despite quotas on 
European and American markets, declined 
from 90,000 tons in 1995 to 25,000 tons in 
2003. Lastly, it should be noted that some 
agricultural exports, such as vanilla and 
clove, have very volatile prices with direct 
impact on the amount of harvesting. 
The relative share of food imports has 
remained stable (12 % in 1995 and 11 % in 
2005), and Madagascar still records 
significant deficits in rice, sugar, wheat, 
flour, edible oil and dairy products. 
Indeed, the opening up of markets has not 
significantly improved Madagascar’s 
agricultural and agrifood exports. Since the 
agricultural sector is one of the main 
sources of foreign exchange for country, 
this situation has weakened the national 
currency over the past few years. Despite 
the existence of growth-oriented 
preferential markets (Europe, USA, 
COMESA, and IOC), Madagascar has not 
been able to seize the opportunities offered 
to its agriculture: exports have 
concentrated on a few products and 
markets, and only a few products are 
processed. 
Farms adapting to an increasingly 
difficult context 
Increase in crop areas but reduction in 
average size 
To date, the majority of new entrants in the 
labor market have been employed by the 
agricultural sector, following the creation 
of new farms. This trend has been 
spectacular, since nearly one million new 
farms have created in ten years, between 
1985 and 2005. The growth in production 
stems from an increase in the crop areas, 
rather than intensification, especially as 
yields have not increased. 
There is also gradual reduction in farm 
size, which shows that the absorptive 
capacity saturation point for the rural 
population, particularly the most densely 
populated areas, has been reached. 
Consequently, there are current growing 
trends in land saturation. In 20 years, the 
total farm area has increased by 19 %, with 
an annual increase rate (0.86 %) much 
lower than the annual increase rate of the 
agricultural population (3.2 %) and number 
of farms (3.3 %). Consequently, the 
average farm size reduced from 1.2 
ha/farm in 1984-85 to 0.86 ha/farm in 
2004-05, with a reduction of nearly 30 % 
in 20 years. 
Diversification and pluriactivity to limit 
risks and improve viability 
In addition to climate-related risks in a 
region subject to cyclones, the farmers face 
difficulties in having access to markets of 
factors of production (inputs, loans, 
equipment, and agricultural services), 
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which have hardly improved with state 
divestiture. Access to loans has been made 
difficult by the lack-of-land certificates, 
thereby limiting the investments required 
to improve production and increase 
incomes. 
To adapt to this difficult situation within a 
context of land tension and maintain the 
viability of their farms, farmers have had 
to develop adaptation strategies, 
particularly diversification of products and 
development of pluriactivity. This is aimed 
at spreading the risk over several products, 
by increasing the number of products or 
implementing several crop cycles, or 
diversifying sources of income. Additional 
activities at the local level include: 
handicraft, brick production, production of 
charcoal, small-scale transport services, 
and paid agricultural labor. Some farmers 
do not hesitate to temporarily emigrate to 
other agricultural regions depending on the 
crop cycle or to the towns. However, in 
some critical cases, the poorest farmers are 
forced to give over their farms, and 
become tenant farmers or paid laborers. 
In terms of differentiation, several factors 
of division can be noted: 
Regional differentiation, due to the 
presence of natural resources in each 
region and exposure to unstable climatic 
conditions. 
Differentiation between producers 
according to: 
(i) their extent of diversification: 
Accordingly, the purchasing power of 
farmers who diversified was less affected 
than that of producers specialized in rice, 
who suffered from stagnation of the actual 
selling price of paddy rice and increase in 
the prices of staple products; 
(ii) their participation in structured sub-
sectors that help to secure the sale of 
products (contracts with processing, export 
or large surface companies): capacity for 
compliance with standards is therefore a 
distinguishing factor; 
(iii) their accessibility to markets: in 
inaccessible areas, producers are in a 
precarious situation because of the low 
selling price of products and difficult 
access to basic services. 
Significant risks of impasses 
In addition to an overview of 
Madagascar’s agriculture and an analysis 
of ongoing adaptation efforts in the major 
sub-sectors and in farms, the study 
identified a number of critical points and 
key issues, which will be either open or 
closed doors for the future, depending on 
the nature of answers that will be provided. 
A key demographic factor 
Due mainly to the role of rice in the 
economy and society, Madagascar has 
remained and should still remain for many 
years, a rural country. The urbanization 
rate is low (less than 30 % in 2005, with 12 
% in Antananarivo), and should remain 
low in the next two decades (40 % in 
2030). 
Madagascar is not a heavily populated 
country (nearly 18 millions inhabitants in 
2006), for a country the size of the sum of 
that of France and Belgium. However, it 
has a high population growth rate. Its 
population has been multiplied by 3.8 in 50 
years (1950-2000) and, even if the 
population rate drops, Madagascar’s 
population should continue to grow to 45 
million inhabitants in 2050. One of the 
challenges for Madagascar and its 
agriculture will therefore be to meet the 
food requirements of this fast growing 
population, thereby underscoring the 
predominant role of rice in agriculture and 
the economy. 
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Last but not the least Madagascar’s 
population is very young, since 56 % of the 
population in 2004 was less than 20 years 
old. This population, most of whom live in 
rural areas, is poor (78 % of farmers) and 
often uneducated. 
Absorption of cohorts into the labor 
market 
The major challenge is undoubtedly the 
massive arrival of new people on the labor 
market over the past many years. 
Currently, 300,000 youths join the working 
population each year. They will be more 
than 600,000 per year in 2030. These are 
mainly rural youths who are often 
uneducated. To date, the agricultural sector 
absorbs most of this inflow of labor, but 
can this continue for a long time? 
However, apart from agriculture, the 
absorptive capacity of the economy is very 
limited. For example, the textile and 
tourism sectors, which appear as 
expanding and reference sectors of 
Madagascar’s economy, are likely to 
absorb 43,000 additional workers at best 
per year in the next few years. 
The risk of land saturation and pressure on 
natural resources 
So far, population growth has been 
absorbed without many problems by the 
agricultural sector as a result of the 
development of new arable land, mainly 
rice farms. However, it is clear that the 
land has begun to be saturated, particularly 
in the densely populated areas, leading to 
significant reduction of the average farm 
size and increased rural poverty. This 
tension is further compounded by the low 
propensity to emigrate because of strong 
attachment to the land, many insecurity 
problems (land and social), as well as the 
lack of a real migration policy. Within 
such a context, farmers continue to use 
traditional farming systems (slash and burn 
cultivation), leading to very rapid 
environmental degradation. 
Increasingly uncertain viability of farms 
and the risk of impoverishment of the rural 
population 
Limited access to means of production as a 
result of incomplete factor markets and the 
predominance of traditional production 
methods have led to stagnation of 
productivity. 
This low productivity, coupled with the 
reduced farm size, jeopardizes the viability 
of many farms in Madagascar. In addition 
to the fragmentation of farms and low 
yields, the related price trends have not 
been favorable. As a result of 
liberalization, even though the prices of 
agricultural products have increased, 
inflation, increase in the prices of inputs 
and the emergence of multiple middlemen 
have reduced the room for maneuver. At 
the structural level, incomes have declined, 
and only a few specialized rice farmers 
saw an increase in their incomes in 2004-
2005. Such a situation, if it worsens, will 
impede achievement of the objectives of 
poverty reduction, which concern farmers 
more than the other socio-economic 
groups. 
In addition, the predominance of rice can 
also be an aggravating factor and impede 
the development of the agricultural and 
agrifood sector. Indeed, since rice is the 
staple food, farmers adopt a rational 
strategy and prefer to produce it 
themselves rather than having to buy it at 
unstable prices. Consequently, agriculture 
is being oriented towards self-subsistence, 
with limited connection to the market and 
very low productivity levels. 
Increasing competition of imports and for 
exports 
Another constraint on Madagascar’s 
agriculture is the increased liberalization of 
its markets. Rapid exposure of its market 
or the regional market can lead to 
increased competition with products from 
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developed countries or emerging 
developing countries, which have obvious 
advantages in terms of facilities, research, 
financing support and sometimes 
significant support to production and 
export of products that in Madagascar do 
not benefit from any of these advantages, 
with the exception of cheap labor. This 
could be case of products from SADC and, 
in particular South Africa or Europe. 
Concurrently, this generalized opening-up 
of the markets has resulted in increased 
competition on traditional preferential 
markets (Europe) with more competitive 
countries (Latin America and Asia in 
particular), with which competition in 
quality and compliance with standards is 
increasing. 
Ongoing adaptation measures and 
solutions being implemented 
To meet these challenges, adaptation 
measures are already underway and 
solutions are being implemented. These 
trends will be confirmed in the second 
phase of the study. 
Adaptation measures in farms 
At the farm-level, the diversification of 
crops, increasing use of paid workers, and 
the development of non-agricultural 
activities contribute to the emergence of 
pluriactivity systems. This trend is 
accompanied by greater mobility, which 
reinforces the impacts of urban/rural links 
and contributes to boosting secondary 
centers. 
Sub-sectors being structured, and 
improvement of the operation of markets 
Concerning the sub-sectors, inter 
professional organizations and consultation 
platforms are being established to solve 
upgrading problems (compliance with 
standards, promotion of labels, evaluation 
of import or export volumes, etc.). 
As for the operation of markets, it has 
started improving, with the establishment 
of market information systems (Rice 
Observatory) which contribute to better 
integration of the domestic market, and 
incidentally, to stabilization and 
understanding of market mechanisms. 
With respect to public institutions, a vast 
project is also underway, with the 
overhauling of the missions of public 
administrative services, as well as transfer 
of operational tasks to the communal and 
regional levels, through de concentration 
of sectoral ministries and decentralization. 
Development of internal and external 
migration 
Since the urban labor market, which is 
often too demanding with respect to skills, 
will be not be able to absorb all the youths 
entering the labor market, the problem of 
accompanying inter-regional and rural-
rural migrations to potential rural areas 
will certainly be very important in the 
medium-term. It should be noted that 
Madagascar still has large uncultivated 
arable land. The development of secondary 
towns will also be a key factor. 
This aspect concerns the territorial 
development policy, and goes well beyond 
the agricultural sector alone. Within this 
context, land reform will certainly be a key 
tool. These temporary or other migrations 
should lead to an increase in the labor 
absorbed by the informal sector, which is 
still difficult to estimate. 
Lastly, as a result of Madagascar’s 
adhesion to various trade agreements 
(SADC, COMESA, IOC, and WTO), 
international migrations in the sub-region 
or elsewhere could also be a way out. 
However, this would concern only a tiny 
part of the population. Indeed, there are 
opportunities, such as facility to enter 
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South Africa and Mauritius, which seek 
labor. However, there are still constraints: 
language barrier, inadequate financial 
resources to cover travel and installation 
expenses, as well as risk and adventure 
aversion. 
Establishment of growth poles and agro-
technopoles, and political will for market-
oriented agriculture 
Under the decentralization policy, the 
development of growth poles, agro-
technopoles and agricultural investment 
areas should be a driving factor to boost 
the openly market-oriented agriculture. 
This concerns, in particular, developing 
agricultural and agro-industrial activities 
through “support to growth-oriented sub-
sectors” determined by the regions 
themselves. 
These initiatives fall within the 
Madagascar 2007-2012 Action Plan 
(MAP), which lays emphasis on the 
agricultural sector strategic plan and 
defines the sectoral growth objectives in 
terms of the development of production, as 
well as the development of agro-industry. 
The Action Plan also lays emphasis on the 
key role of agro-industry as a driving force 
for production, be it agricultural or 
fisheries production, or livestock 
development for the domestic, regional and 
international markets. Such political will 
should contribute to attracting potential 
investors, lacking in this sector in 
Madagascar. 
Development of exports in opening up to 
regional and international markets 
Opening up to regional and international 
markets offers serious opportunities for 
Madagascar’s agricultural and agrifood 
products (COMESA, SADC, IOC, APE, 
and WTO), on condition that significant 
efforts are made in the area of standards, 
quality and vocational training for farmers 
and investors. 
Accordingly, the preparation of the SADC 
Regional Integration Agreement has 
enticed the expectations of Madagascar’s 
operators. The prospect of privileged 
access to a market of more than 200 
million consumers is an attractive 
opportunity. The major exports (vanilla, 
shrimp, clove, essential oils, coffee, cocoa, 
sugar and cotton) should continue to be 
oriented towards the markets of developed 
countries, although there will probably be a 
space for products currently exported in 
small quantities, such as fruits and 
vegetables (potatoes, tomatoes, onion, and 
melon), maize, which is the main food crop 
of Southern Africa, and even rice. 
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Mali is a large country with a long history 
in West Africa. Since the 4th century, the 
presence of great empires and kingdoms 
has shaped the social groups which occupy 
the country today. Over and above this 
diversity, present-day Mali is a peaceful 
country which is politically stable, with 
unquestionable national unity, and which 
for the past fifteen years has been 
undergoing a democratic process that is a 
benchmark in Africa. 
Population Growth, Urbanization and 
Poverty 
Mali has a very high population growth 
rate, with an average rate of 2.56 % over 
the 1961-2004 period, coupled with a high 
urbanization rate. In 2004, the population 
of Mali was estimated to be 11.42 million 
inhabitants, 69 % of whom live in rural 
areas and 31 % in urban areas. The urban 
population recorded an annual increase of 
4.6 % from 1961 to 2004.  
In 1956, towards independence, Mali was 
barely urbanized, with only 1.8 % of the 
population living in towns of 20 000 or 
more inhabitants; no town in Mali had a 
population of 100 000 inhabitants. In 1961, 
the country’s population was in the 
proportion of about 8 inhabitants in rural 
areas to only 1 in urban areas; the domestic 
market for food products was therefore 
very narrow. In 2004, there were about 
2.25 inhabitants in rural areas to 1 in urban 
areas. These figures show a profound 
change in the functioning of the Malian 
society, with the creation of a growing 
urban domestic market, even though it is 
limited by the 10 % “urban farmers’ (cf. 
infra). The market was to grow in the 
future.  
Demographic challenges are crucial for 
Mali. Around 345,000 people are expected 
to be yearly integrated to the economic 
activities in 2025, including 85 000 people 
in rural areas and 260 000 people in urban 
areas. Before that, the annual number of 
people to be economically and socially 
integrated will be between 50 and 90 000 
people in rural areas and between 100 and 
260 000 people in urban areas.  
Mali is one of the heavily indebted poor 
countries and is one of the countries with 
the poorest HDI ranking. Poverty is a 
major factor throughout the country, even 
though there are disparities between urban 
and rural areas in terms of incomes so the 
farmers’ “wealth” in the cotton growing 
zones should be seriously called into 
question. Available data show that income 
levels for the main jobs are generally very 
low; for 46 % of the population, it is below 
CFAF 24 700 each month, while the 
average monthly income is CFAF 35 000 
with a high concentration towards the low 
incomes. Only 6 % of the employed 
working population earn more than CFAF 
84 000 per month throughout the country 
(OEF, 2004). For comparison purposes, in 
the cotton-growing zones which are 
considered privileged areas, the income 
(including home consumption) per person 
and per year is between CFAF 50 000 and 
CFAF 80 000 (2003-04) depending on the 
type of farm considered, while the poverty 
line (CSCRP, 2006) in 2005 was CFAF 
153 000 per person per year. The “richest” 
cotton farms therefore have incomes that 
are barely 50 % of the poverty line.  
At a time when internal migration, between 
the regions, occurs frequently and 
contributes to the intermixing of the 
Malian population, emigration outside the 
country has been adopted as a strategy by 
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many Malians. It is certainly impossible to 
know the exact figure, but some sources 
estimate it at nearly 25 % of the current 
population, that is between 3 and 4 million 
nationals. This population, made up mainly 
of young men, leave some rural areas that 
suffer from labor power deficit, a deficit 
which should be viewed in relative terms 
since these departures are due to the 
limited possibilities and prospects offered 
by the local economy.  
Permanent Factors and Changes in 
Economic Structures  
The independence of Mali, in 1960, did not 
fundamentally change the major economic 
policies of the colonial period despite the 
change that could be brought about by the 
choice of planned economy and 
reorientation of trade in favor of socialist 
countries. The options adopted were never 
as radical as the speeches, and they soon 
turned out to be reversible. The ties with 
the former colonial masters and beyond 
that, with the countries of the European 
Union, soon became dominant even though 
Mali maintained special relations with 
some of the countries which accompanied 
it during the early stages of its 
independence.   
After periods of stagnation, Mali has 
recorded a good level of growth since the 
early 1990s. From 1994 to 2004, after the 
devaluation, Mali was the WAEMU 
country with the highest growth (5.7 % 
real GDP growth per year), and it had a 
longer period of sustained economic 
growth than the average of WAEMU 
countries (whose growth recorded a sharp 
decline after 1996). This led to gradual 
increase of the per capita GDP in Mali by 
more than 3 % per year on average after 
1994, following a decline in the early 80s – 
higher than the population growth, which 
ranged from 2.4 to 2.7 % per year (World 
Bank, 2006) 
In the long term, the Malian economy 
shows great stability in its productive 
structure with the predominance of the 
primary sector which employs more than 
80 % of the working population and which 
contributes nearly 45 % to the country’s 
GDP. This structural characteristic is seen 
in the composition of its exports made up 
almost entirely of raw or barely processed 
products. The polarization of trade is also 
very stable with two great regional 
economic sub-entities as the main trade 
partners: Europe and the WAEMU 
countries into which Mali is integrated. 
However, the stability of this polarization 
conceals a high diversification of trade 
partners within these two sub-entities and 
the emergence of new polarities with Asia, 
South Africa, and America.  
However, the economic structure of trade 
is very fragile. Malian exports are based on 
a small number of products, which makes 
the country’s economic structure 
susceptible to external shocks. This 
sensitivity affects a very large proportion 
of the Malian population because the two 
major exports are agricultural products 
(animal products and cotton) which 
directly or indirectly affect a very large 
proportion of the population (more than 3 
million people for cotton); gold is an 
exception because its spill-over effects on 
the direct incomes of households remains 
limited.  
Like many countries with major structural 
imbalances, Mali in the 1980s embarked 
on the liberalization of its economy which 
had been controlled, planned and 
administered by the state with a large 
number of nationalized companies in all 
the sectors. The case of agriculture is 
somewhat special since the private sector – 
based on family organization of work and 
production – has never really been called 
into question as was the case, for example, 
in Guinea. During that period, the state had 
firm control over the agricultural sector 
  
142 
through supervision and control of trade. 
The other forms of organization of 
agriculture are almost non-existent: agro-
industry is limited to a few thousand 
hectares for sugar production, and 
integrated contractual agriculture is not 
represented in Mali.  
Agriculture within the Malian Economy 
Mali is essentially an agricultural country 
given that the population lives directly or 
indirectly on agricultural activities and the 
primary sector contributes significantly to 
the country’s economy. From a GDP of 
about CFAF 2 500 billion at current prices, 
agriculture accounts for about CFAF 1 000 
billion, remittances from emigrants about 
CFAF 100 billion, and external aid CFAF 
150 billion.   
Agriculture a key factor that determines 
the activities of nearly 80 % of the 
population: According to available 
information on the entire Malian 
agriculture (RGA, 2004), Mali has about 
805 200 agricultural holdings with a 
population of 8.9 million people; this is 78 
% of the national total of 11.42 million 
inhabitants and 69 % of the rural 
population. Accordingly, many people in 
urban areas, including Bamako, are also 
farmers. Mali has the peculiarity of a 
rapidly urbanizing population but whose 
links with farming remain strong, since 
about 10 % of the urban population could 
be considered as having farms and a large 
proportion of the urban population is 
migrants who settled only recently.  
Out of approximately 800 000 agricultural 
holdings, a little less than 700 000 (86 %) 
engage in cropping activities, with an 
average cultivated area of 4.7 ha in 2004 or 
0.43 ha per person; 100 000 agricultural 
holdings belong to strictly stockbreeders 
and fishermen. 
While the proportion of agricultural 
products in exports has been declining 
since the mid-1990s because of the 
development of gold production and 
export, agriculture nevertheless maintains a 
structurally key position within the Malian 
economy of about 45 % of GDP since 
independence. 
This permanence of agriculture does not 
imply immobility within the sector because 
groundnuts have been replaced in exports 
by cotton, which accounted for 1 % of 
exports at independence and which reached 
between 40 and 50 % of exports in value 
between 1980 and 1995; cereal production 
coped well with the liberalization of the 
market, and livestock and animal products 
remain a stable and key component 
(around 30 % of primary GDP value) of 
the agricultural economy. Rain-fed cereals, 
rice and livestock account for nearly 60 % 
of the total primary GDP value, and cotton 
accounts for less than 10 %.  
Since Mali’s economic structure is not 
diversified, the secondary sector remains 
one of its weak points, and agricultural 
exports are almost raw products 
irrespective of the type of market (national, 
sub-regional or international).  
The proportion of agrifood products in 
imports has remained stable since the end 
of the 1970s. Agriculture has therefore 
contributed strategically to the overall food 
security of Mali in urban and rural areas 
with the development of domestic markets 
and the dynamism of its economy through 
cotton and cattle exports. This limited 
diversification is also found with 
agricultural products, because while the 
range of possible products is broad in light 
of the agro-climatic potential and water 
resources of the country, diversification for 
domestic markets and exports still remains 
limited.  
The proportion of food imports in the 
balance of trade does not show high 
growth of food dependence as was feared 
in the 1970s or 1980s. It seems to be 
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stable, and does not appear to follow a 
trend of high growth, which also implies 
that production and local markets (which 
have undergone reforms since the early 
1980s) could provide supplies to the 
domestic market. However, the recent and 
rapid increase in rice imports since the 
early 2000s should be a cause for concern. 
However, the real dynamism of the 
agricultural sector is based on a small 
number of primary products, which are 
marketed as raw products. Furthermore, 
with the case of cotton, there exists unfair 
competition with countries that receive 
significant public subsidies.  
The Malian small-scale family 
agriculture 
Agriculture in Mali is based on 
smallholders, with 68 % of the farms 
cultivating less than 5ha, 18 % with areas 
between 5 and 10 ha, and only 14 % with 
more than 10 ha. These farms are based on 
mixed cereal production and livestock; 
some farms in the North of the country are 
very highly specialized because of the 
Sahelian and sub-Saharan agro-climatic 
conditions.   
Livestock is a key component of all the 
production systems, because it is present in 
88 % of the farms with 43 % of the farms 
possessing less than 10 head of cattle. 
Unlike the land cattle is fairly concentrated 
since agricultural holdings with more than 
20 animals are few (14 %) but have 53 % 
of the cattle population. The animals 
account for a capital of about CFAF 1,000 
billion, which is equal to the annual 
agricultural GDP.  
Cereals are the other structurally important 
component of farms because they occupy 
about 72 % of the cultivated area, while 
“industrial” crops occupy only 20 % of the 
area within which only cotton is significant 
with areas estimated at 500 000 ha, 
according to the sources. Approximately 
200 000 farms grow cotton; about 3 
million people live directly or indirectly on 
cotton.  
On the whole, this small-scale agriculture 
has not intensified its practices, since only 
2 % of the cereal-sowed areas use 
improved seeds, 26 % of the cultivated 
areas receive mineral supply, and only 28 
% of the areas are cultivated with animal 
draught. For the rest, i.e. for the vast 
majority of small family farms in Mali, 
cultivation is manual without the use of 
conventional intensification factors. Since 
nearly 80 % of the areas under cereal 
cultivation are devoted to millet and 
sorghum which do not cope with 
intensification, the extensive practices have 
prevailed. The challenges for the 
intensification of cereal production remain 
unresolved, just as the challenges for the 
sustainability of cotton production, which 
faces stagnation and even decline in 
average yields. 
Actual response capacity by food 
products to market signals  
Since the gradual liberalization of the 
cereal market in the early 1980s, the 
agricultural structures have responded 
positively to market signals. This 
liberalization process corresponds to state 
divestiture from inefficiently-managed 
economic functions. It was envisaged right 
from the time it was designed as a series of 
economic measures accompanied by 
institutional changes and in the 
organization of stakeholders in the sector. 
It took 25 years and was managed by the 
public authorities in interaction with 
donors.  
Areas under cereal cultivation and total 
production of cereals which had stagnated 
since independence, have multiplied by 1.8 
and 2.3, respectively, between 1961-70 and 
1995-2004. Rice and maize production has 
multiplied by 5 because of the increase in 
areas under cultivation and a sharp 
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increase in yields as a result of an increase 
in irrigated areas with complete water 
control and improved varieties of maize in 
rotation with cotton. Indeed, even though 
yields show a trend towards improvement, 
the improvement is rather limited. The 
production levels each year and the annual 
average yields depend on climatic 
conditions, showing the artificialization of 
the cultivated areas and the rather low 
intensification. Consequently, two 
phenomena seem to account for the 
improved availability of food products 
(cereals and groundnuts), namely the 
extension of areas under cereal cultivation 
(with limited intensification) and the 
supervised and managed liberalization of 
economic and institutional conditions for 
marketing.  
Intensification capacities of production 
systems in special situations 
The policies adopted since independence 
have continuously laid emphasis on the 
improvement of food security and 
development of monetary resources for the 
state through the development of exports. 
These policies were implemented in 
priority in two situations, with different 
characteristics: in the Sudanese zone with 
the development of cotton production as 
from 1964 entrusted to CMDT in 1974 and 
in the Sahelian zone with the boosting of 
rice production through a barely 
operational colonial scheme, the Office du 
Niger, which was restructured as from 
1979. These two zones concentrated most 
of the public investments in agricultural 
and rural development: about 30 % of the 
farms concentrated about 70 % of the 
public investment.     
The results are spectacular, and some 
people even talk of “white revolution” for 
cotton and “success story” in the 
intensification of rice cultivation in the 
case of the Office du Niger. The figures 
speak for themselves: cotton production 
and areas under cotton cultivation as well 
as seed cotton production have multiplied 
5 times since 1980 to between 500 and 600 
000 tons in 2004-2006; rainy season rice 
yields have multiplied 3 times over the past 
20 years [1987-2007] and currently stand 
around 6 tons per hectare. Much has been 
written on these clear success stories of 
Malian agriculture; these two experiences 
show the importance of combining price 
and non-price factors that could be 
considered as institutional and 
organizational factors: to react to the 
positive market signals (price factors) and 
initiate serious intensification, access to 
credit and equipment, securing markets, 
access to information and technical and 
economic advice are key factors. In the 
two situations, and under different 
institutional forms, these elements are 
present and combine to account for the 
success stories.  
However, taking into account the overall 
diagnosis of the major agricultural trends, 
these success stories are based essentially 
(to a lesser extent, however, in the Office 
du Niger irrigation area) on the 
mobilization of “non-market” factors. This 
applies mainly to the use of fertility 
resulting from the extensive development 
of lands and natural resources which are 
still abundant but whose long-term 
abundance is uncertain (prospects of 
saturation of space not yet well known) as 
well as the conditions for maintaining the 
fertility of already developed lands (which 
are also not well known).  
Threats to positive agricultural trends  
Some indicators should be considered 
more closely, because while it is necessary 
to underscore and highlight the response 
capacities of Malian agriculture as assets 
for the future, it would be inconsistent at 
the end of this review not to indicate some 
worrying signals some of which are part of 
significant structural trends which 
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characterize Malian agriculture: (i) cereal 
intensification remains very limited in rain-
fed cultivation and the variability of yields 
remains high, which is a feature of 
unstable and insecure technical systems; 
(ii) the average yields of seed cotton which 
have peaked around 1.3 t/ha have declined 
and are currently at their 1972-75 level; 
(iii) the cattle population is at a significant 
capitalization level, but this has not been 
put to use as yet; (iv) in the long term, 
primary products with low value added 
will continue to marketed, and there is very 
limited diversification of agricultural 
products; (v) the development of structural 
inequalities between farms in the 
“modernization” zones; (vi) at the national 
level, continued high regional polarization 
of investment since independence in favor 
of the south zones and the Niger Authority 
zone. 
Questions on the future role of 
agriculture in the Malian economy 
In view of the general characteristics of 
Malian agriculture which we have 
indicated – importance of agriculture in the 
GDP and limited farm areas and areas for 
each worker – it seems that agriculture 
remains a key economic sector in the 
country’s economic prospects in the sub-
region. However, if the current policies 
and trends continue without any major 
changes, it is unlikely that the sector will 
contribute significantly to resolving the 
population and economic problems posed 
by the arrival of contingents of 150 000 to 
350 000 youths on the labor market each 
year. Indeed, it is likely – although there is 
no available data on this point – that the 
extension of farm areas under extensive 
cultivation will soon reach its limits. 
Furthermore, the current conventional 
intensification methods generate high 
structural inequalities and contribute 
somewhat to the exclusion and phasing out 
of agriculture. This seems to show that if 
agriculture will have a key role to play, it 
cannot alone meet the population and 
economic challenge on the basis of only 
the current trends.    
Structures and functioning of markets 
Mali went through the first two decades of 
independence in an administered economy 
in which the major agricultural products 
were marketed by a state Authority 
(OPAM), and import/export was under the 
responsibility of a State corporation 
(SOMIEX). OPAM played a clearly 
disincentive role for cereals, which are the 
leading products of Mali. The recurrent 
food crises and droughts led to the 
liberalization of the sector in the early 
1980s.  
Cotton, one of the major sectors in Mali, is 
integrated and the State has played a key 
role in the promotion of the sector since 
1964. The “Compagnie Malienne de 
Développement des Textiles” (CMDT) 
(Malian Textile Development Company) 
was later established in 1974. It was during 
this 30-year period that Mali became the 
leading cotton-producing African country 
with 600 000 tons of seed cotton.  
Due to difficulties in its governance and 
under pressure from the donors, 
discussions on its privatization were held 
recently under the auspices of the Cotton 
Sector Restructuring Authority. The State 
intervenes not only as major shareholder of 
the company but also in the price 
determination mechanism, which brings 
together the producers, CMDT, and the 
State. The latter can decide to subsidize 
cotton through price determination.  
The only other sector which is regulated is 
the sugar sector, which is an agro-industry 
with mixed capital (China and Mali) in 
which exporters are required to buy Malian 
sugar at a fixed price in proportion to the 
quantities imported.  
The changes since 1980 mostly involve the 
  
146 
liberalization of the cereals sector under an 
assistance program supported by the 
donors, the PRMC with the gradual 
abolition of OPAM’s role as direct actor of 
the market to enable it to refocus on its 
regulatory function. The process of State 
divestiture and liberalization of the cereals 
market is exemplary, because it was 
initiated at a time when Mali was 
experiencing food insufficiency. More than 
25 years later, Mali is an exporting country 
in the sub-region today (even though this 
position remains fragile as shown by recent 
indicators).   
The other major products for Mali, such as 
those from livestock, have never been 
controlled by the State. 
Apart from cotton, there are no 
concentrated market structures except for a 
few big traders who intervene in an 
oligopsony on the cereal market as 
importers/exporters when Mali has a 
surplus. They were included in the reform 
process and benefited from support when 
necessary. Marketing is essentially based 
on atomized supply, and only about 20 % 
of the cereal production is marketed. The 
marketed quantities are low, and the daily 
marketing structures are based on a 
multitude of actors who are organized only 
a little or not at all. Mass or medium-scale 
distribution is very limited, and is found 
only in Bamako. These are groups, which 
have national coverage and are engaged in 
the import of food products. Some locally 
processed agrifood products of quality not 
comparable to imported products are also 
marketed in these networks, but the 
quantities are very limited. The 
development of these marketing channels 
is also limited because of the structural 
weakness of the purchasing power, 
including the urban environment.  
Formulation of agricultural and rural 
development policies 
Significant changes have taken place in 
Mali since the period 1960-1991, when 
democratic freedom was confiscated. The 
political transition from 1991 to 1992 
ushered in a new period; the 
democratization process is in place, and is 
gradually being consolidated with the 
adoption of a new constitution, the 
introduction of the multiparty system, and 
the regular organization of democratic 
elections.  
The democratic liberalization led to the 
development of new forms of organizing 
farmers through more autonomous 
methods than in the past. The most 
remarkable change took place in 1992 with 
the establishment of the Cotton and Food 
Producers Trade Union (“Syndicat des 
Cotonniers et Vivriers du Mali”) 
(SYCOV), and a few years later with the 
Framers Trade Union of the Office du 
Niger (“Syndicat des exploitants agricoles 
de l’Office du Niger”), (SEXAGON). More 
generally, producer and rural organizations 
are structured at the national level; the 
“Association des organisations paysannes 
et professionnelles du Mali” (AOPP) is a 
very good example in this respect, 
extended later to the creation of “CNOP du 
Mali” and the development of consultation, 
representation and decision-making 
frameworks for agricultural development 
at various levels (sectoral, territorial and 
national). This situation of farmer and rural 
organizations is changing, and constantly 
adjusting to the changing contexts and 
under the influence of internal changes. 
Until recently, organization of the rural 
population was considered a sensitive 
subject, and the focus of attention for 
control by the political and administrative 
machinery. 
The room for freedom and initiative for the 
farmers is not without risks, and while the 
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political and administrative control of the 
period of the single party have 
disappeared, there are other forms of 
destabilization or instrumentalization 
within a complex framework where the 
key actors tend to ignore long-term 
perspectives the agricultural sector so as to 
preserve some short-term interests. 
 These changes are part and parcel of the 
economic reform process initiated from the 
early 1980s; they constitute the 
institutional component that shows the 
empowerment of producers through their 
organizations in the governance of the 
agricultural and rural sectors. 
In rural areas, the reforms should also take 
into account the emergence of local 
authorities, Councils, to which new 
responsibilities are entrusted, particularly 
with regards to land management, 
economic and local development, and 
management of natural resources. These 
responsibilities interfere directly with the 
management of agricultural affairs and, to 
some extent, determine the conditions of 
their viability.  
Agricultural policies, as negotiated today, 
can no longer be considered to be actual 
negotiations with the producers and their 
organizations which was the case in the 
past. Whether it is a subject of the 
challenges of poverty reduction or 
sustainability of the performance of the 
cotton sector, producer organizations have 
to be involved: consultation, negotiation 
and coordination frameworks for better 
competitiveness and quality of products, as 
well as increase and greater stability of 
incomes. Building their capacities to 
discuss policy themes has become a 
challenge of national interest; their 
autonomy in reflection on these strategic 
topics is ever more indispensable to break 
away from practices inherited from the 
past. This challenge is not specific to Mali; 
it also concerns producer organizations in 
the West African sub-region and other 
organizations in other continents. The case 
of the cotton sector and the preparation of 
the agricultural policy clearly demonstrate 
these challenges. 
Return to the assumptions of the 
RuralStruc Program 
An analysis of the role of agriculture in the 
country’s economy brings us back to the 
assumptions in the RuralStruc program. 
The issue of segmentation of agriculture 
and market structures 
Mali is currently not affected by the major 
reconfiguration trends of the world 
agrifood system. It should be noted that the 
process is marked by “growing 
segmentation, not only of the agricultural 
production structures, but also of 
marketing, processing and distribution 
structures. This segmentation is portrayed 
simultaneously by the processes of 
concentration, polarization (with the 
emergence of two-tier agriculture), 
marginalization and exclusion”.  
In Mali, imports were kept within 
reasonable limits, which was rather 
remarkable, while the country was opening 
up to foreign trade, including the cereals 
market. This is certainly one of the great 
achievements of the period of State 
divestiture from economic activities in the 
cereal market, and trade-opening to the 
world market in this sub-sector.  
Apart from the policy and management 
measures of the liberalization process 
which were initiated under the 
Restructuring of Cereal Market Program 
(PRMC), other factors helped to limit 
recourse to imports. Indeed, in Mali, 
consumption methods are based on the 
purchase of unprocessed products, carrying 
out most of the preparation in households, 
and recourse to a diffuse urban marketing 
system that mobilizes a large number of 
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semi-wholesale and retail actors. Purchases 
are fragmented, often from day to day 
because of the chronic and structural low 
incomes of the households. Furthermore, 
the urban population is sometimes engaged 
in agricultural production activities, and 
many urban dwellers maintain close ties 
with the rural areas, undertaking non-trade 
movements based on close social relations. 
The domestic markets are still rather 
limited by the overall low incomes, the 
high levels of home consumption, and deep 
involvement of town dwellers in the 
Malian agricultural sector.  
Concerning agricultural production, there 
exist phenomena of social differentiation, 
and sometimes of land concentration in 
areas of relative intensification, which are 
causes for concern but which are not likely 
to jeopardize social peace at the moment. 
International agrifood mass and medium-
scale distribution chains are not found in 
Mali, and the overall low incomes of the 
population, coupled with the landlocked 
position of the country, are certainly 
disincentive factors from their point of 
view. Nevertheless, there are some rare 
exceptions, like in the area of drinks, for 
example. However, recent trends, which 
show reduced availability of cereals per 
capita and sharp increase in rice imports 
since the early 2000s, are causes for 
concern. They could be indicating that the 
agricultural production system will soon 
reach its limits. These limits could concern 
the intensification processes, in terms of 
space in areas with high concentration of 
public investments. They could also 
concern the massive extension of 
cultivated areas under demographic 
pressure since the land reserves (unknown 
today) in the south of the country seem to 
be relatively limited in comparison to the 
population challenges.  
However, the processes are still too new 
for there to be an analysis made of them so 
knowledge is still incomplete. They 
currently form the new working 
assumptions.  
In short, Mali is still unaffected by the 
world reconfiguration of agrifood systems 
because of its geographical position, its 
historical and political past which have 
shaped a specific integration into the 
national and regional markets, coupled 
with a competitive and dynamic integration 
into a small number of international 
markets.  
This is certainly part of the reason for the 
stability and capacity of resilience of the 
Malian agricultural configuration, but it is 
also the source of its structural rigidity.  
The issue of structural rigidity 
In the case of Mali, it seems, indeed, 
possible to talk of a situation of structural 
rigidity. However, unlike what can be seen 
in Mexico, for example, it is not rooted in 
the liberalization of the agricultural sector. 
Several factors could account for the 
situation. They stem from our analysis of 
the economic and agricultural structure of 
Mali over a long period.    
The first factor lies in the recent massive 
monetarization of the economy. The 
liberalization of the cereal markets is 
taking place within a context of low 
monetarization of the economy of rural 
households (1980s) with a high propensity 
for self-supply of food needs. This 
characteristic has remained for the most 
part even though in some zones (cotton and 
rice) and also in the North, money 
economy has developed more vigorously.  
The landlocked position of Mali, the poor 
roads, communication and service 
infrastructures (electricity, cold) as well as 
the low level of urbanization, coupled with 
the narrow national market, are somehow a 
form of trade barrier to imports. These 
characteristics, coupled with the overall 
low incomes available for consumption 
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limit returns on foreign productive 
investments as regards supplies to the 
domestic market or positioning themselves 
on foreign markets.    
Furthermore, the economy of Mali is 
currently still not diversified, with the 
primary sector accounting for nearly 50 % 
of GDP in the long term. The secondary 
sector is very weak, and the tertiary sector 
is still dominated by the State through 
service enterprises that create added value. 
The economy of Mali has continued to 
specialize in exports based on primary 
products, whereas the world economy has 
been restructured on the basis of 
manufactured goods from the secondary 
and tertiary sectors that had benefited from 
massive public and private investments 
(Asia or Latin America). On the other 
hand, the primary sector is based on a 
small number of raw products with little 
added value and low intrinsic value 
compared to agricultural products with 
higher market value, such as horticultural 
and market gardening products (fresh 
vegetables), short cycle animal products, 
milk or other processed products of animal 
origin. These products are not absent from 
Mali, but they are limited by the narrow 
market and the low investments, leading to 
poor downstream structuring of these 
sectors.    
The history of the Malian economy and the 
above-mentioned rigidity factors keep the 
secondary sector undeveloped in the 
processing of agricultural products and in 
diversification, apart from the agrifood 
sector.  
This situation stems from public policies 
based on development strategies that 
include economic diversification, recourse 
to external investments, with overall 
voluntarist public policies in the areas of 
education, training, infrastructures and 
private investment incentives. In a nutshell, 
what is needed here is the creation of new 
competitive benefits, and this process does 
not concern only the agricultural sector, 
even though it should be given the 
deserved priority. 
Reorganization of rural economies 
This study has provided information on the 
areas that have received significant public 
investments. In these relatively favored 
areas, there are issues relating to social 
differentiation, and we have shown that 
poverty is persistent despite the incomes 
from cotton or rice. In these areas, very 
little is known about the scale of migration 
and the related remittances. There is also 
no information in the other regions of 
Mali, apart from the irrigated rice and 
cotton areas. What are the rural strategies? 
What is the actual role of agriculture in 
these strategies? What can be constructed 
for the future based on these strategies 
alone?   
Malian agriculture cannot be the subject of 
broad and open reflection on the 
development model for production, 
processing and trade for the future. It is not 
possible here to conclude on this point, but 
to suggest avenues for deeper reflection in 
the form of questions.  
What agricultural development model can 
be proposed that combines economic 
growth, development of rural and urban 
employment, improvement of productivity, 
and that efficiently and sustainably uses 
natural resources that are fragile and 
subject to strong anthropogenic pressures? 
What methods of land use planning could 
be proposed that takes into account the 
diversity and complementarities of the 
different regions in Mali, and how can the 
diversification of agricultural products and 
diversification of incomes and employment 
for the rural population be included? How 
can we reflect on technical systems that 
help us to meet the challenges for 
agriculture in the 21st century, that is by 
sustainably protecting natural 
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resources, protecting and increasing 
biodiversity, and developing quality 
products? On what bases can Mali open up 
to the outside world without making its 
economy fragile? In this light, what could 
be the avenues for developing the historic 
and cultural heritage of Mali as a 
comparative advantage that would better 
develop agricultural products that are 
geared towards specific qualities for its 
image? What could then be the role of the 
Malian Diaspora in addition to monetary 
transfers?  
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The Evolution of Agriculture 
When analyzing the effects of 
liberalization on a country’s economy, on 
rural society and on agricultural growth, 
we should first take into account the 
complexity of economic structures. 
Particularly when these structures have 
played an important role long before the 
process of liberalization was put in motion. 
In Mexico, the process of liberalization has 
simply aggravated the changes, or has 
given them a different direction. 
The agrarian structure in Mexico is highly 
concentrated and public policy is the 
primary driver behind an asymmetrical 
structure and the resulting consequences. 
In the first place, the Agrarian Reform 
fragmented (“pulverized”) agrarian 
property, establishing “el minifundismo”. 
These tiny landholdings have come to be 
the poor pole of agriculture, and have been 
an ongoing source of poverty and 
migration. The other pole, the favored, was 
also the product of a state decision: to 
convert medium and large ownership into 
the economic motor of the rural sector. 
This segment was responsible for 
producing the food and foreign currency 
needed for industrial growth. 
The failure of agriculture in Mexico was 
caused by the government’s approach to 
agrarian reform. In effect, the state 
conducted agrarian reform to resolve social 
and political problems; but it failed to 
create a modern agricultural sector for 
small landowners. One of the challenges 
facing agriculture has been to satisfy the 
needs of a growing population. The 
population dynamics of the twentieth 
century can be divided into two major 
stages: from 1900 to the end of 1960, when 
the country needed more people and the 
population more than tripled (from 13.6 to 
48.2 million); and from 1970 to the present 
day, where over-population came to be 
recognized as a problem, such that 
something had to be done to halt its 
growth. In any event, demographic inertia 
would continue the rise leading to a 
population of approximately 103 million in 
2005, or a doubling in 35 years. 
Land distribution combined with the 
construction of dam—that made new lands 
available for cultivation—started a phase 
of extensive development that increased 
agricultural production between 1930 and 
1964, above the rate of population growth 
for the same period. Another element of 
change during that same development 
phase was the application of modern 
agricultural/biological technology, known 
as the Green Revolution. This led to 
intensive growth based on increasing 
productivity rather than on simply 
extending the frontiers of agriculture. 
However, the Green Revolution was 
confined to the irrigated regions in the 
north-west, and to large producers. 
In 1965, signs of exhaustion began 
showing in the extensive rural growth 
model, in that, agriculture was no longer 
structurally capable of responding 
satisfactorily to the needs of the economy 
or rural society. Domestic production has 
not kept up with the needs of a growing 
urban population demanding new foods. 
This led to an increase in food imports that 
continues today. 
The government’s response to this loss of 
self-sufficiency in food production and 
growing social discontent was to initiate, at 
the beginning of the 1970s, a wide-
reaching program of institutional change. 
Through this program, the government 
intervened extensively in the markets. This 
lasted until 1982, and during that time 
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public spending on agriculture rose 
substantially. This ambitious government 
effort to play an active role in the attempt 
to drive the productive capacity of the 
countryside upward—the last such attempt 
in Mexico’s agrarian history—did not 
furnish the results hoped for, and the 
response from production was 
disappointing. Two reasons for this failure 
are discussed below. 
The government response had concentrated 
its support instruments in the regions with 
greater productive capacity (the north of 
Mexico), on large-scale producers, and on 
the upper sub-sector of the peasant 
farmers, who were able to produce at a 
surplus. The ordinary small farmers, the 
majority of Mexican producers, were 
excluded. Moreover, the policy consisted 
of raising subsidies for fertilizers, credit, 
water and other basic materials, but the 
policy kept food prices low to benefit 
urban consumers. This was a disincentive 
to farmers, and equally inevitably the 
subsidies were taken up by the medium 
and large producers, leaving little for the 
small producers. The result was almost 
stagnant production plus a reinforcement 
of the already concentrated structure of 
agriculture. 
1983-1990 saw the Mexican economy in 
crisis, and the government began to apply 
structural adjustment programs and 
programs to liberalize the economy. 
Mexico came to these changes with a 
worn-out model of agricultural growth. 
The agricultural process was in clear 
decline; and the sector was segmented, 
unequal, had more than half of its small 
producers living in poverty, and created 
production units with little economic 
viability. In short, Mexico’s agriculture 
was weak and its rural society vulnerable. 
A bias against agriculture is clear in the 
economic strategy adopted during the first 
years of the structural adjustment 
programs, because the economy did not 
consider agriculture an important sector. 
Public spending and public investment, 
which had been a key growth factor during 
the previous stage, fell noticeably and as 
public investment in farming declined, so 
did farming credit. 
Another attempt at reforming agriculture, 
this time with a more liberal bent, began in 
1992. This reform altered the system of 
rural ownership, started dismantling state-
owned companies, and began applying a 
new agricultural policy that was more 
acceptable to the directors of GATT and 
NAFTA. The results fell far short of the 
reformers’ expectations, and agriculture 
continued to grow very slowly indeed. 
When NAFTA (North American Free 
Trade Association) came into force in 
1994, it propelled Mexican agriculture 
more rapidly into international commercial 
circuits. The Treaty lays down a scaled 
process of tariff reductions from zero, to 
five, to ten or to fifteen years, until 2008 
when all the tariffs on agricultural products 
will have disappeared. Mexico reserved its 
sensitive products (corn and beans) for the 
15-year period, but freed almost 
immediately products such as soya and 
sorghum, where it had little comparative 
advantage. From the beginning, the USA 
removed almost all duties on Mexican 
exports of vegetables, except in the case of 
a few sensitive products such as tomatoes. 
The volume of agricultural commerce 
increased substantially, but imports of food 
rose faster than exports, and thus the 
overall commercial balance in agriculture 
has been negative. 
In the period since the signing of NAFTA, 
state intervention has continued to be 
significant but operates differently. The 
accent is now more on direct transfers 
instead of on guaranteeing minimum 
reserve prices. Even though compensatory 
social spending has risen substantially, 
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there is still no integrated strategy to 
strengthen the sector’s productivity. 
The rural labor market is also not 
generating enough jobs to satisfy the 
demand from rural young people. On the 
contrary, rural employment has actually 
fallen. The way out of this grave problem 
has been an exodus from the sector, in the 
form of emigration or the search for non-
agricultural jobs. 
Summing up, the overall balance is 
negative. Agriculture is proving 
increasingly less able to produce the food 
required by a population on the rise; it has 
ceased to be a foreign currency earner; and 
it no longer represents a source of jobs for 
the up-coming generations of rural young 
people. 
The General behavior of rural markets 
As was expected, NAFTA gave a huge 
boost to the commerce of farm produce 
between Mexico and the USA. Exports of 
Mexican fruit and vegetables grew rapidly, 
consolidating Mexico as the principal 
supplier of fruit and vegetables to the 
North American market. The result is that 
producers, packers and exporters of 
agricultural products are indisputably 
among the main beneficiaries of the 
Treaty. 
Following projections made before the 
enforcement of NAFTA, there has been an 
increase in imports of the grains and basic 
products in which national production does 
not have a competitive edge. This brought 
domestic prices into line with international 
prices, which have tended to fall, put the 
squeeze on farmers whose production costs 
have risen due to a reduction in 
government subsidies to productive 
factors, and support institutions for 
producers. By contrast, the subsidies paid 
to North American farmers have gone up, 
thereby creating asymmetrical commercial 
competition in the framework of the 
globalized economy. Imports of wheat, 
rice, sorghum, corn and milk powder have 
grown significantly, offsetting the positive 
effects of increased exports. Indeed, the 
commercial balance for farming has 
operated at a loss almost every year since 
1995. Agriculture has thus ceased to be a 
generator of foreign currency, which it had 
previously been for a number of decades. 
The effects of globalization and NAFTA 
on prices have been unfavorable to the 
agriculture of basic products. The fall in 
agricultural prices has put the majority 
sector, the grain producers, at a 
disadvantage; moreover, national 
production of wheat, rice and sorghum has 
dropped. By contrast, white corn, Mexico’s 
principal agricultural product and staple 
food, has maintained its levels of 
production. The overall losers have thus 
been the grain producers. Indeed, the 
balance of NAFTA-plus-10 seems to be 
negative for most rural producers, and 
many of them have taken to the streets to 
express their discontent, demanding 
termination or at least modification of the 
Treaty. 
The behavior of the factors markets has 
been to the detriment of rural dwellers. 
Rural labor markets have shrunk, thus 
failing to provide enough jobs to meet the 
expansion of the rural population. The 
number of the rural population in work has 
fallen, losing 400,000 jobs in the period 
1995-2003. The response of the rural 
population has been to look for work 
elsewhere outside agriculture or to 
emigrate, most of all to the USA. 
Real rural wages fell in the period 1995-
2003, hitting agricultural day-workers and 
“minifundista” peasant families, obliged to 
sell their labor. These two groups represent 
the majority sector of Mexican agriculture. 
As wages being paid in other jobs have 
grown faster than rural wages, more and 
more of the younger population are joining 
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the exodus from farming. 
The financial institutions servicing the 
countryside are totally inadequate. The 
money market is characterized by credit 
rationing, which means there are producers 
ready to pay the going rate of interest, but 
they simply cannot find the credit. The big 
banks will only finance the large producers 
or agricultural industries, and refuse to 
service the small producers. These then are 
forced to turn to loan agencies, or to formal 
or informal micro-financing institutions, 
scarce in Mexico. Reforms to the financing 
system are as yet incomplete, and it is this 
incomplete financial reform plus failures 
on the part of the credit market, that are 
hindering attempts to invigorate farming-
related investments, productivity and 
production. 
Microfinance institutions have proved to 
be suitable instruments for providing credit 
to small landowners and small business. 
They are however a relatively new 
phenomenon in Mexico. The construction 
of a system of rural financing that 
effectively reaches the small producer is 
priority number one, and microfinance 
seems to be a promising option. 
Privatization of the market for technical 
support services to rural producers has not 
proved to be an efficient replacement for 
the previous state system. There is a 
demand for these services, but the supply 
falls far short of that demand. The majority 
of the small producers lack technical 
assistance, and this puts them at a 
disadvantage in a context where a 
competitive edge is essential. 
The products markets are functioning in a 
context of abrupt privatization that was 
poorly planned, and went straight from 
marked state intervention to an entirely 
different scheme controlled solely by 
market forces. This has sparked further 
oligopolistic concentration of the agro-
industrial chains, which were already 
heavily concentrated before globalization 
and the reforms to the farming commercial 
system. 
One characteristic of the Mexican agro-
industrial system is that the supply of raw 
materials has not kept up with growing 
demand, an imbalance which has had to be 
made up by imports brought in by big 
companies. The system of supply under 
contract, operating in different forms, has 
been developed at the initiative of the big 
agro-industrial companies which are 
concerned with guaranteeing supply 
according to both quality and price. 
However, the old supply methods based on 
the traditional markets still continue as 
well. 
With incomes on the rise, the demand for 
foods rich in animal proteins has grown 
rapidly. This has caused marked tension in 
the agro-industrial system, because it has 
not been able to produce enough of the 
farming raw materials necessary to 
produce animal protein which consumes 
large quantities of vegetable protein. The 
inadequacy of the Mexican agro-industry 
with regard to sorghum, soya, and, in 
particular, the yellow corn coming from 
the USA, effectively means dependency 
and potential fragility. To illustrate this 
fragility, one only has to consider the 
current crisis in the corn system, caused by 
price rises in North American exports, and 
by the program in the USA to produce 
ethanol. 
Globalization in the food chain of fruit and 
vegetables has implied an increase in 
production and productivity on a scale 
never before seen in Mexico. This increase 
in crops of greater commercial value on the 
national and export markets, has been 
achieved at the cost of: a) degradation in 
the natural and human resources of the 
productive regions, which has affected 
small landowners most of all, and they are 
the ones who already benefited least from 
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the intensive farming methods applied to 
these products, b) greater control and 
benefit for distributors over producers, and 
c) greater concentration in larger-scale 
economic units in production and 
distribution. The small horticultural 
producers have not been displaced 
altogether; they have simply been re-
accommodated in secondary positions 
within this dynamic agro-industrial chain. 
Functioning of the Markets and Rural 
Segmentation 
The hypothesis being put forward is that 
rural segmentation has increased with 
globalization. To test this, a model of 
convergence was constructed to compare 
the evolution of income in rural regions of 
high and low economic development. The 
analysis indicates that Mexico’s economic 
growth has not led to any appreciable 
reduction in regional disparities over the 
last 20 years. In fact, the regional 
agricultural income of the provincial states 
diverges between the regions of higher and 
lower incomes. This is indicative of public 
policy’s inability to reduce the regional 
inequalities that arise out of the 
development process. In short, there has 
not been convergence, but rather an 
increase in rural segmentation. 
The main reason for the continuation of 
inter-regional economic disparities, and of 
disparities in family incomes is the 
persistence of a totally unjust and polarized 
agrarian structure. The system is the legacy 
of agrarian reform and public policy that 
have favored conservation of the 
noticeable differences existing in the 
appropriation of means that generate 
wealth and income. 
It can, thus, be said that the way the 
markets function has not contributed to a 
more equitable agrarian structure, but that, 
on the contrary, has actually been 
responsible for widening the disparities 
and creating further segmentation. 
i) The land market has become more active 
in the last 20 years, and dealing in land has 
increased significantly. The huge 
disparities between the parties have meant 
that the principal beneficiaries have been 
the medium and large producers. The 
number of “minifundista” peasant farmers 
has fallen. Presumably they have 
emigrated, and leased or sold their minute 
land-holdings. A growth can be observed 
in the number of the small properties of 2 
to 5 hectares, which would indicate a new 
process of land consolidation. 
ii) The supply of jobs on the rural labor 
markets has fallen, even though there has 
been a rise in the rural population seeking 
work. Significantly, too, rural wages have 
fallen in real terms. These two factors have 
most significantly affected the families of 
workers and peasant farmers, and these are 
the poorest families in the country. 
iii) The credit market has only served to 
underscore inequalities by rationing loans 
most noticeably to small rural producers, 
who have limited access to credit. These 
small farmers do not have proper access to 
farming insurance or technical advice, and 
this is in a context of significant risk due to 
natural disaster and growing commercial 
competition. 
iv) The transition from a system of 
agricultural commercialization heavily 
managed by the state to a system ruled by 
the markets and private capital, has 
propitiated concentration and asymmetrical 
commercial dealing between economic 
players, who are highly disparate with 
regards to their economic and commercial 
power. The gaps left by state-owned 
companies have been filled by private 
capital, which have further concentrated 
production. 
v) The process of economic concentration 
in the agro-industrial chains has continued, 
particularly with regard to export-related 
activities—import and end-distribution 
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(supermarkets). Commercial dealing 
between monopsonies and small producers 
is asymmetrical, and works heavily in 
favor of the former. Contract agriculture 
represents an improvement for the latter, 
but is still not sufficiently developed. 
vi) The increases in agricultural 
productivity observed in the last decade 
have not converged at a regional level. 
They have been concentrated in the more 
developed irrigated regions with greater 
access to investment resources and closer 
ties with agro-industries and dynamic 
markets. The parts of the country where 
peasant agriculture prevail continue to fall 
behind. 
vii) Public policy on agriculture has 
fomented segmentation because it has 
favored the medium and large producers, 
as well as the agricultural zones of greater 
productive potential, which are the more 
developed areas. 
Risks and Possible Obstacles: the 
possibilities of adaptation and 
recomposition under way 
As mentioned above, Mexico found itself 
at a disadvantage when the process of 
liberalization began not only in economic 
terms, but also in social and environmental 
terms. This was the result of a combination 
of economic, socio-demographic, political 
and bio-physical environmental factors 
taken in a historical perspective. There 
already existed significant regional 
differences in a country where inequality, 
exclusion and discrimination are the order 
of the day. These differences - which 
manifest themselves socially and in terms 
of terrain - impacted the less favored 
population groups, excluded by the 
development process, to a disproportionate 
degree. Liberalization has only served to 
accentuate differences and inequality, in 
part also because it has coincided with a 
demographic transition in the country that 
has meant on the one hand, significant 
population growth and on the other hand, a 
change in the age-distribution resulting in 
an ever-growing population of working 
age, who have put increasing pressure on 
the demand for jobs. 
The Processes of Differentiation: 
conditions in the natural environment, 
marginalization and poverty 
Mexico is a land of mountain chains with 
steep slopes, abrupt precipices and narrow 
valleys, in contrast to the wide-open desert 
plains of the north. The result reduces the 
area open to farming. About 65 % of 
Mexico’s territory is unsuitable, and only 
about 30 million hectares have a gradient 
of less than 2 degrees, but these areas lie in 
the arid north-west, north and north-east 
where rainfall is low.  
In addition, 76 % of the population resides 
in the north, centre and north-west of the 
country, where naturally-available water is 
not plentiful, but where paradoxically 77 % 
of the GDP is generated. The region where 
water is plentiful is the south-east, home to 
only 24 % of the population and generating 
23 % of Mexico’s GDP. 
The agricultural frontier has been pushed 
to its limits; the soil is losing its fertility, 
deforestation continues unabated, 
provoking erosion, desertification and 
environmental degradation. All this, added 
to unsustainable productive systems, not 
only compromises the areas of the small 
farmers, but affects the areas of medium 
and large producers too, and this only 
serves to restrict the expansion of 
production. In addition, Mexico is 
vulnerable because of its exposure to 
natural disasters (earthquakes, hurricanes, 
floods, drought), and to the effects of 
world climate change. 
During the period 1970 to 2000, the 
incidence of marginalization fell, thanks to 
progress in education and improvements in 
housing. Thus, the number of provincial 
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states with a very high degree of 
marginalization, eight in 1970, fell to five 
in 2000; but the number of states with very 
low marginalization, rose from three to 
four in the same period. However, this 
overall reduction did not mean any 
significant reduction in the breach between 
the two extremes, and thus regional 
inequalities persist. Advances have been 
made in almost all the regions when it 
comes to marginalization, but the inter-
regional inequalities remain because the 
poorest regions have not managed to 
advance more rapidly than the wealthier 
regions. The greatest incidence of extreme 
marginalization is concentrated mainly in 
the nucleus of the indigenous rural 
population. The differences noted in the 
Human Development Index reveal the 
existence of vastly disparate worlds in 
Mexico. 
In 2002, half of Mexico’s population was 
living in poverty, and a fifth of the 
population was living in extreme poverty 
caused by slow growth in the economy and 
inequality in income distribution, a 
structural characteristic of the Mexican 
economy. In 2002, 20 % of the poorest 
population earned only 3 % of the total 
income, whilst the wealthiest 10 % earned 
more than 40 %. About 65 % of the 
Mexicans in extreme poverty live in the 
countryside. 
The Exit Options: the development of 
transfers, non-agricultural employment and 
migrations 
Mexico’s agricultural sector has not been 
dynamic; indeed, agricultural wages and 
remunerations have fallen. This stagnation, 
in addition to job shortages in the sector, 
has caused many rural families to give up 
agriculture, and to look for work in non-
agricultural activities. At the same time, 
private and public transfers coming from 
outside the rural economy have grown 
rapidly, and reach the target population 
much more effectively, representing a 
quarter of the total income of poor 
families. However, this clearly 
compensatory social policy cannot 
substitute for the lack of economic growth, 
in the long-term. The problem is 
compounded by the absence of a viable 
strategy for rural development. 
Public spending on rural development has 
increased markedly, and has contributed to 
the relative decrease in the indices of 
poverty in recent years. Private transfers, 
especially the remittances sent home by 
Mexican workers in the USA, have 
increased spectacularly and have helped 
mitigate the poverty of their families. Rural 
remittances, estimated in dollars, grew 
annually at a rate of 22.5 % during the 
period 1988-2003. The share of these 
remittances in the total income of rural 
families was 5.9 % in 2002, higher than 
that of all the public transfers combined at 
5 %. 
Inter-urban migration tends to be the 
predominating form of displacement. The 
majority of migrants head for the medium-
sized cities and almost a third for cities 
with populations of over a million. Even 
though urbanization is the dominant 
demographic direction in Mexico, there 
still remains an appreciable proportion of 
the population in non-urban ambits. Some 
11.2 million live in villages of 2,500 to 15 
thousand inhabitants, and 24.7 million live 
in the 196 thousand scattered settlements 
of fewer than 2,500 inhabitants. By the 
same token, the traditional movement of 
agricultural day-workers has remained as a 
recurring phenomenon that involves 
thousands of families who leave their 
homes to work in the crop-growing fields 
in the north and north-west of the country. 
Migration to the USA is on the increase 
too. It has been estimated that the number 
of Mexicans who live north of the border 
increases annually by more than 400 
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thousand people, such that the current total 
of Mexicans resident in the USA is 
calculated to be almost 10 million, about 
half being illegal immigrants. The changes 
registered in internal migratory flows, and 
the growing international currents heading 
for the USA can be explained, in large 
measure, as a product of the current stage 
of the economic crisis. A relevant 
reference is given in Polanski S. (2006), 
who estimates that there was a loss of 2 
million jobs in agriculture between the 
start of NAFTA and the beginning of 2006, 
even though not all those job losses can be 
directly attributed to the Treaty.30 
Between 1990 and 2000, the provincial 
states with the highest indices of poverty 
and inequality (the south-eastern states) 
continued to be the main origins supplying 
the exodus. The directions of the migration 
flows led mainly towards the centre of the 
country, which is now losing some of its 
‘pull’ power. However, cities along the 
northern border and the USA cannot be 
taken out of the picture. 
The changes in migration patterns vary in 
volume and composition according to the 
age of the population. These leave behind 
striking imbalances in different towns, 
states and regions across the country in 
terms of demand for services, workforce 
availability, relationships between 
dependent population, working-age 
population, and between the rural 
environment and the urban environment. 
The relative under-development of the 
indigenous regions sums up the inability of 
public policy and the development model 
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 Testimony submitted to the Subcommittee on 
International Trade of the Senate Finance 
Committee, Washington DC, Sandra Polanski, 
2006.  
to improve the living conditions of the 
local population, who are the most 
marginalized in Mexico. 
Bottlenecks, vulnerabilities, challenges 
and solutions 
• The principal agricultural and rural 
problems today are closely related to an 
old but renovated agrarian structure. They 
are definitely not the result of the insertion 
of Mexico into the process of 
globalization. This is not to say that 
globalization has not made a marked 
impact on agriculture, but simply that the 
basic problems—insufficient production, 
dependence on the outside world for food, 
scant dynamism in rural employment, rural 
poverty and emigration—already existed 
prior to the process. 
• “Minifundismo”, subsistence farming on 
very small lots which is an ongoing 
generator of poverty and migrants, is the 
hardest problem to solve. If we include 
those who own less than 5 hectares, within 
the “minifundistas”, the group makes up 59 
% of all producers. They have existed 
since the time of the Agrarian Reform, but 
what are their prospects now? There is no 
productive agricultural way out for them, 
because they lack the necessary resources. 
Their only alternative is to find a job 
outside agriculture, which is not that easy 
because those who have stayed behind in 
the fields are the old and the less well-
educated. 
• Another problem is how to foment the 
growth of those small producers who do 
have the capacity to produce a surplus, 
even though they do not have the backing 
of adequate support institutions, and they 
operate in imperfect markets, with 
fragmented infrastructure, and face an 
asymmetrical international commercial 
system. There has not been any 
development strategy for them, in the 
present time or in the past. In the absence 
of such a strategy, the possible scenario is 
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stagnation into progressively more difficult 
conditions, except for those who manage to 
position themselves in market niches, or to 
associate themselves with other dynamic 
agents as has happened in the case of small 
market-gardeners. 
• The medium and large-scale producers, 
who supply the industry, find themselves 
in a difficult situation because of high 
costs—due to inadequate support 
institutions and imperfect markets—and 
subsidies received by their competitors in 
the USA. Exporters face growing 
competition and a loss of dynamism in the 
traditional export markets, and there are 
serious doubts about a continued boom for 
Mexican vegetable exports to the USA that 
first became possible because of NAFTA. 
• Public spending on farming has remained 
high, but it is scattered and there is no 
organized rural development strategy. 
Productive spending is regressive too, 
because it only benefits the medium and 
large producers. Social spending does 
indeed reach the rural poor, but it does 
nothing to improve their productive 
capacity. 
• Agriculture in Mexico has ceased to 
fulfill its functions in the process of 
economic development: domestic 
production is unable to satisfy the growing 
internal demand for food and raw 
materials, and the shortfall has to be made 
up by imports. The sector’s capacity to 
generate foreign currency is nil. The 
commercial balance in agriculture and food 
is negative, and everything indicates that 
this is the trend for the future. The 
degradation in the country’s base of natural 
resources has compromised the capacity of 
the sector to provide even basic 
environmental services. 
• Agriculture ceased to be a driving force 
in the Mexican economy many years ago, 
but is a poly-faceted collection of rural 
activities that still absorbs a fairly sizeable 
proportion of the population 
(approximately a quarter). However, 
farming activities with their lack of 
dynamism, are contributing progressively 
less to the generation of rural jobs. 
Between 1995 and 2003, the rural 
workforce diminished by 400,000 workers, 
to a total of 9.3 million in 2003. 
Agriculture continues to be the main 
employer of rural inhabitants, but its share 
in total rural employment fell from 62 % to 
55 % between 1995 and 2003, and other 
non-agricultural sectors have increased in 
importance, which means that the greater 
part of the job losses are in agriculture. 
• The low remuneration associated with 
agricultural activities, as compared to other 
activities, is forcing labor out of agriculture 
and into a search for non-agricultural 
income in non-agricultural labor markets. 
When this strategy is successful, it can 
mean an improvement in the income of 
many rural families; the growth of non-
agricultural income as a proportion of total 
rural family income, has been rapid. 
• The rural economy has ceased to be a 
source of employment for the young 
people who are born into these 
communities, and they now find that 
emigration is one solution for the lack of 
jobs. Moreover, due to the growth in the 
underground economy and to the fall in the 
real value of rural wages, the majority of 
those who remain in the countryside live in 
poverty or close to the poverty level. 
• Rural poverty fell between 1998 and 
200431, in relative terms. This was not due 
to the growth of agriculture but to the 
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 However, preliminary data from the National 
Survey of Incomes and Family Spending indicate 
that relative poverty rose between 2004 and 2006.  
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increase of non-agricultural employment, 
public transfers and remittances. In other 
words, all the factors that explain a way 
out of rural poverty are external to the 
agricultural sector. 
• This implies great external vulnerability 
for the rural economy, as almost all the 
possible ways out depend on the health of 
the North American economy and on that 
country’s politics, as well as on the price of 
oil. If there is an economic crisis in the 
USA, the Mexican economy itself will go 
into crisis. Jobs would be destroyed in the 
sectors that attract workers from rural 
zones, rural social spending would be 
reduced, and the demand for workers and 
Mexican exports would fall. 
One useful way of conceptualizing the 
problems deriving from this diagnosis is to 
see them as challenges to be faced both 
now and in the future. The main ones are 
the following: i) the demographic 
challenge, ii) the environmental challenge, 
iii) the challenge of marginalization and 
segmentation, and iv)  the indigenous 
challenge. 
The challenge for public policy and society 
is enormous because the current context is 
actually unfavorable to a solution for these 
problems. The agrarian structure is so 
concentrated and so deeply entrenched that 
it has remained virtually unchanged despite 
decades of public policy on the issue and it 
is the structure, itself, that is an ongoing 
source of segmentation and inequality. 
The greater insertion of the Mexican 
economy into international economic 
circuits, and the transformation of public 
policies and institutions, have brought with 
them changes in market organization and 
the functioning of institutions. However, 
these changes have not served to reduce, 
but rather to increase inequalities and 
segmentation. An economic policy that 
sees the solution to society’s economic 
problems in the satisfactory 
functioning of the markets (which in 
reality are neither free nor perfect, but 
markedly concentrated and dominated by 
big companies), will be incapable of 
resolving Mexico’s already widespread 
inequalities. 
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Place and Roles of Agriculture in the 
National Configuration: Major Trends 
Morocco has a population of about thirty 
million inhabitants, 45 % of which live in 
rural areas. This rate has been declining 
steadily for the past fifty years, although 
the rural exodus rate seems to have slowed 
down over the past decade. With a 
population growth rate that has also slowed 
down (1.4 % per year), the country is 
going through a demographic transition, or 
“demographic windfall”, with a significant 
increase in the working population 
estimated at 11.2 million people in 2005. 
On the whole, agriculture employs 43 % of 
the economically active population, but 
this rate goes up to 80 % in rural areas. 
Keeping in mind the “entries” and “exits” 
from the workforce, the additional number 
of individuals able to work was estimated 
to be 460,000 people in 2005, and the 
additional number of job-seekers is 
estimated at 380,000 per year for the next 
ten years. 
Consequently, the net job creation rate has 
continued to remain below demand (on 
average 137,000 between 1982 and 1994, 
and 217,000 between 1995 and 2003). 
Conditions therefore seem to favor a 
structural increase in unemployment. Even 
though the unemployment rate appears to 
have declined slightly over the past two 
years (10-12 % overall and 18-20 % in 
urban areas), the structural characteristics 
of unemployment remain a cause for 
concern: long-term unemployment, 
particularly high among youths, especially 
graduates of higher education, and women. 
In any event, the pressure on the labor 
market will certainly remain strong for the 
next ten years. According to a recent study, 
285,000 jobs on average need to be created 
each year between 2005 and 2014 for the 
current rate of unemployment to be 
maintained. 
Judging from experience over the past five 
years, economic growth in Morocco is 
neither strong nor stable enough to 
generate such a job creation rate. In the 
long-term, the GDP growth rate appears 
low and too volatile, still excessively 
dependent on the results of crop seasons, 
which are themselves heavily dependent on 
climatic conditions. Analyzed in terms of 
its key determinants, however, this modest 
growth appears to be driven more by 
household consumption than by 
investments (private or public), while 
external trade indicates a rather negative 
impact, pulling GDP downwards. Yet, the 
poor performance of external trade is 
offset, at the level of balance of payments, 
by transfers by Moroccans resident abroad, 
tourism earnings and direct foreign 
investments. Indeed, these external flows 
have guaranteed a relatively comfortable 
cushion of currencies, and contributed to 
some stability of the Dirham at the external 
level, and of prices at the domestic level. 
The same applies to public finance, 
basically overburdened by the rigidity of 
public expenditure and inadequate 
performance of the tax system. Yet, it has 
so far been maintained at more or less 
acceptable levels of budget deficits (3 to 
5% of GDP), mainly as result of 
privatization income and surging domestic 
debt. 
Within such a macroeconomic context, 
Morocco’s agriculture has not followed a 
particularly favorable trend, and its 
contribution to growth has been rather 
disappointing. After witnessing its 
contribution to GDP decline from more 
than 30 % to nearly 15 % during the first 
twenty years after independence, the 
agricultural sector subsequently recorded a 
  
162 
very low growth rate, at least too unstable 
to allow it make the giant progress in 
quality expected by everyone. Indeed, 
whereas productivity has remained 
mediocre, per capita production has often 
declined, particularly for the major basic 
food crops. For example, as the agro-
export sub-sector, which focuses on certain 
fruits and vegetables (citrus fruits, melon, 
strawberries, early vegetables, etc.), 
expanded rapidly, the country’s 
dependence on vital foodstuffs (grains, 
sugar, edible oils…) are unprecedented. 
Beyond agriculture, this situation also 
affects rural areas as a whole. Like 
agriculture, rural areas continue to face 
many problems that constitute formidable 
obstacles to their development: limited 
natural resources, lack of infrastructure, 
inadequacies in land structures, poor 
quality of human resources, lack of 
financial resources, etc. 
Obviously, this situation has not come by 
chance; it is the result of government 
policies, all of which have always had the 
shortcoming of avoiding basic structural 
reforms, starting with policies concerning 
land issues, organization of farmers, or 
development of production and marketing 
conditions. Consequently, three major 
phases have been identified in this fifty-
year trend of agricultural and rural 
development policies: the “dams policy” 
phase (1965-1985) with a selective 
modernization project based mainly on 
massive state intervention, but focalized on 
limited spaces and production; the 
“structural adjustment policy” phase 
(1985-1993), primarily determined by the 
objectives of state divestiture, sector 
deregulation, and liberalization of domestic 
and foreign trade; and the last phase, which 
is ongoing, based on a cross-fertilization of 
“strategies” that have remained latent, the 
multiplication of free trade agreements, 
and an ultimate quest for “upgrading” an 
agriculture that is forced to meet the 
challenge of open-door policy. 
Structure and evolution of agricultural 
and agrifood markets 
Although the desire to liberalize trade and 
introduce a market economy has been 
reiterated since the 1980s, it has often 
come up against hard realities. Indeed, 
both within and outside the country, the 
integration of agriculture downstream, in 
terms of processing industries or simple 
marketing channels, remains problematic. 
Integration into agro-industry generally 
still seems very limited, to such an extent 
that agro-industry hardly accounts for 5 % 
of GDP. 
In the absence of industrial processing, 
agricultural produce is therefore mostly 
sold fresh. However, because domestic 
markets have not undergone any 
significant reform since the country gained 
independence, they still suffer as a result of 
obsolete methods of distribution, 
uncontrolled marketing channels, and too 
many intermediaries who get most of the 
added value without letting the main actors 
concerned benefit from it upstream and 
downstream; these actors are the producers 
and the consumers. Wholesale markets, in 
particular, are handicapped by archaic 
structures and outdated regulations, and 
dominated by “agents” who merely collect 
a comfortable rent. Regarding exports, the 
inadequate logistic means, shortcomings in 
the organization of operators, the lack of a 
dynamic and aggressive marketing policy 
on external markets, and the protectionist 
options and practices of the authorities 
concerned (European, in particular) 
seriously limit Morocco’s export 
ambitions. 
Although sectors integrated into external 
markets are the most dynamic, their 
competitiveness has been hampered by 
inadequacies at various levels: promotion, 
diversification of products and markets, 
innovation and improvement of quality. 
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Furthermore, apart from packaging, the 
fruit and vegetable export sector suffers 
from the weak cooperative movement, 
which is the only way of organizing 
producers. Sectors focusing on the 
domestic market are still complex and 
disorganized. The atomistic structure of 
vegetable and animal products supply has 
led to the emergence of an excessive 
number of intermediaries whose activity is 
sustained by the unnecessary increase in 
sector segments. Sectors concerning staple 
products (bread, sugar, oil) are still 
partially regulated and highly handicapped 
by an oligopolistic or even monopolistic 
structure of markets. Contracts concluded 
between farmers and agro-industrial units 
(irrigation farmers and ONA agencies in 
the case of sugar, for example) are only 
“residues” of the era of strong state 
involvement through Agriculture 
Development Authorities. State 
involvement has simply been replaced by a 
private pole. 
This is because the state has not yet fully 
assumed its function of organizing and 
regulating the market economy so as to put 
in place instruments required for 
establishing a transparent market without 
the monopolies or oligopolies often found 
in the case of staple products. This is best 
illustrated by the stagnation that results 
from the statutes and operating rules for 
wholesale markets, which considerably 
slow down the development of modern 
distribution and impede any integrated 
marketing channel. In addition, sectors as 
sensitive and vital as those of sugar, seed 
oil or dairy products are indeed largely 
controlled by only one private group, the 
powerful “Omnium Nord Africain”, which 
also controls a large part of the emerging 
sector of modern distribution. 
The rigidity of Morocco’s land tenure 
systems has stifled the influence of 
modifications in the organization of the 
sub-sectors, except for export-oriented 
sectors. These sectors, which are 
increasingly required to fulfill certain 
conditions to cope with competition on 
external markets, are forced to change, 
particularly in light of the type profession 
and production organizations. Indeed, the 
sectors have the rare active and relatively 
well-structured professional organizations, 
as well as some limited experiences of 
“cultivation contracts” or long-term lease 
non-private lands. For the rest, the lands, 
handicapped by obsolete land regulations, 
are so atomized and divided that they 
continue to hamper any idea of significant 
recomposition of farm structures or 
relations between farmers and various 
actors that intervene downstream. Low 
specialization of agricultural production 
units and limited inter-branch integration 
(with very few practices of 
contractualization) appear as obstacles to 
the reconfiguration of the production 
space. 
In Morocco, changes in the operation of 
the sub-sectors have not yet reached the 
critical threshold to trigger any significant 
transformation of production structures. 
This is because the said sub-sectors are 
either inadequately structured, or are really 
absent. Given the situation, open-door 
policies have not promoted significant 
development of exports or competitiveness 
of national sub-sectors. In view of the rigid 
farming systems and the dominance of 
informal relations, agrifood firms – and, to 
a lesser extent, supermarkets – are not able 
to give fresh impetus to significant and 
sustainable segmentation of Morocco’s 
agriculture. 
Segmentation of production structures: 
Trends and consequences 
A review of the agrarian structures and 
methods specifically reveals the 
“composite nature” and variety of major 
production and management methods in 
rural farming areas. The processes leading 
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to such segmentation of agrarian structures 
show the complex and contradictory 
effects of capital intensification and market 
liberalization policies implemented since 
independence: long-term 
dissolution/conservation impacts of 
capitalistic methods and mechanization on 
traditional configurations. Several results 
have been identified through analysis over 
a long period: 1.) slow evolution of land 
structures, 2.) composite production 
configuration, 3.) extensive and intensive 
farming system 4.) low productivity of 
factors and 5.) competitiveness based on 
type of farm. 
Slow Evolution of Land Structures 
In the absence of agrarian reform, the land 
structures and legal status of lands have 
evolved very little over a long period, 
thereby maintaining the predominance of 
micro-ownership, heterogeneity and 
complexity of the status of lands, the 
precarious nature of rural leases, etc. 
The increase in usable farm area (UFA), 
coupled with the decline in the number of 
farms, led to a 20 % increase in the 
average size of productive units from 4.9 
ha to 6.1 ha from the mid-1970s to the 
mid-1990s. This trend concerns all the 
farms with, however, the exception of 
farms of more than 100 ha whose average 
area declined by 15 %. In addition, land 
parcellation has not slowed down, with the 
number of parcels in each farm increasing 
from 6 to 6.7 on average. 
Furthermore, there are still great disparities 
in the distribution of land: farms of less 
than 3 ha account for 55 % of the number 
of farms and cover 12 % of the UFA, while 
those of more than 50 ha account for less 
than 1 % of the total number of farms and 
cover more than 15 % of the total area. The 
intermediate categories account for 44 % 
of the farms and 7 2% of the usable farm 
area, with a predominance of farms of 5 -
10 ha (16.6 % of number of farms and 2.7 
% of total UFA). 
Lastly, the types of ownership have also 
evolved slowly: private property or Melk 
(75 % of the UFA and more than 85 % of 
the farms); lands for collective use (plus 
the Guich lands3) with less than 20 % of 
the UFA and farms; and state lands (plus 
Habous lands) covering less than 10 % of 
the UFA and less than 5 % of the farms. 
Composite Production Configurations 
Taking into account a series of indicators 
relating to the type of market, the degree of 
mechanization, and the management and 
working methods, four different 
configurations have been identified in 
terms of size by the study: 
(i) a private configuration marked by the 
large size of farms, high degree of 
mechanization, and export market-oriented 
production. It can have a blend of 
“methods” that are market-oriented and for 
domestic purposes (feudal in nature), with 
management structures and working 
methods that are both modern and archaic. 
Differentiations between farms within this 
configuration are based on dominant 
methods, for example. 
(ii) a second configuration of public status 
and relative large size uses a dominant 
agro-industrial method and substitutes for 
imports. In terms of management, the 
bureaucratic type combines a more 
statutory and relatively more stable 
working method (permanent paid workers) 
with more atypical forms (casual labor). 
(iii) small and medium-size farms 
operating with a domestic-oriented method 
are dominant. Their activity, capitalistic to 
a lesser degree, uses a traditional 
management method with a non-salaried 
component of labor. Such a domestic-
oriented configuration takes a wide variety 
of forms that bring them closer to market-
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oriented (private) and agro-industrial 
(public) configurations or configurations 
that could be considered as subsistence-
oriented. 
(iv) domestic-oriented micro-farms 
correspond to traditional subsistence and 
self-employment agricultural activities. 
Extensive /intensive Farming System 
This farming system refers to capitalistic 
intensification of production systems. 
Adopted in agricultural policies under the 
Protectorate and pursued since 
independence, this process gained 
momentum in the 1980s and 1990s with 
progress in the liberalization of trade and 
relocation to Morocco of some activities 
(tomatoes and green beans in Souss, melon 
and table vines in Haouz, strawberry in 
Loukkos, for example). This evolution has 
direct and indirect impacts on the 
agricultural and pastoral ecosystems, as 
well as on social relations (scarcity of 
natural resources, overexploitation of water 
and soil resources and their pollution, rural 
exodus, and breaking of community 
relations). 
The results of the intensification of 
productive farming systems have been 
considered in the light of a series of 
relevant indicators: 
(i) The Census data show a significant 
number of farms practicing irrigation: 37 
% of the total number cover an area of 
1,251,456 ha. Though representing only 
14.3 % of the total UFA, irrigated areas 
have increased by 72 % in comparison to 
1974. On the other hand, the number of 
irrigated farms increased only by 7 %, 
indicating intensive (internal to farms 
already irrigated) and non-extensive 
development of irrigation. Farms of less 
than 3 ha and covering 19 % of irrigated 
lands represent 12 % of the UFA. 
Furthermore, large farms (more than 100 
ha) cover 12 % of irrigated lands but their 
proportion in the UFA is less than 9 %. 
Consequently, the small and medium-size 
farms (3 to 50 ha) seem to be at a 
disadvantage: with 72 % of the UFA, they 
cover 63 % of irrigated lands. 
(ii) With regard to mechanization and 
modernization of farms, available data 
indicate that 47 % of the farms have 
mechanized their tilling works, with wide 
gaps between large farms (91 %) and 
micro-farms of less than 3 ha (40 %) or 
less than 1 ha (23 %). On the whole, and 
despite efforts towards intensification and 
modernization, the level of mechanization 
remains mediocre in comparison to 
international standards, as shown by the 
existing equipment pool: a total of 43,226 
tractors, or an average of one tractor for 
202 ha, as against one tractor for 86 ha in 
neighboring countries in the South 
Mediterranean. The situation since the 
early 1990s shows a marked deterioration: 
sales of farming equipment fell from 2,127 
units on average between 1990 and 1994 to 
1,151 units between 1995 and 1999, with 
the number of cultivated hectares per 
tractor at 230. 
Low Productivity of Factors over a Long 
Period 
Between 1961 and 2002, we have 
witnessed a sharp decline in the overall 
productivity of factors. The progress made 
in the 1960s in terms of technical 
efficiency has been gnawed away by the 
deterioration of technological gains. This 
trend continued in the 1970s before 
undergoing technical change. Particularly 
since 1992, a change offset by technical 
efficiency losses has led to stagnation of 
the sector throughout the period. 
In comparison with the international 
situation, Morocco, over the 1993-2002 
period, recorded one of the lowest 
productivities per cultivated hectare and 
per worker. Indeed, the productivity per 
cultivated hectare represents 11 % of 
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that of South Korea and 12 % that of 
Egypt. In comparison with the average 
productivity countries panel, Morocco’s 
productivity per hectare represents nearly 
23 % that of Chile and 26 % that of 
Greece. 
Competitiveness based on Type of Farms 
A review of the constraints and 
possibilities of farms following the 
liberalization of trade shows several 
situations that could be summarized as 
follows: 
(i) Potentially competitive farms: These are 
mainly large farms (28,000 units, 
representing 1.9 % of the total and 
covering 21.5 % of the UFA5), and a 
category of small and medium-size farms 
occupying relatively limited niches in 
terms of cultivated areas and agricultural 
population concerned: market gardening, 
some industrial crops and fruits. Operating 
in the export sectors, these farms have 
developed competitive advantages and 
specific assets in international competition. 
However, the composite nature of the 
farms, and in particular the continued 
domestic-oriented management methods 
have a number of organizational 
constraints (archaic management of human 
resources, poor mastery of technology and 
marketing channels, inadequate guidance, 
lack of research and development, etc.). 
(ii) Structurally non-competitive farms: 
This category comprises almost all 
subsistence micro-farms (about 600,000 
units, representing 41.4 % of the total 
number and covering 8.5 % of the UFA), 
as well as a significant part of small and 
medium-size farms close to the economic 
viability point. Corresponding to a 
domestic-oriented subsistence 
configuration, these farms produce food 
crops and vegetables and breed livestock 
for which Morocco’s competitive 
advantage is extremely low. 
(iii) The situation of small and medium-
size farms (nearly 822,000 units, 
representing 56.7 % of the total number 
and 70 % of the UFA). They include viable 
small and medium-size farms, as well as 
large farms operating with the domestic-
oriented model as regards management and 
behavior towards the market. Although 
these farms enjoy economic viability 
factors (land, water, labor, equipment), 
they face structural problems, particularly 
managerial problems that have negative 
impacts on their competitive potential 
(ambiguity of legal status of the land, 
inadequate farming systems, insufficient 
technical guidance, limited integration 
downstream, difficult access to financing, 
shortcomings in storage and transport 
infrastructure, etc.). They are found mainly 
in vegetable and animal production sectors 
(including market gardening and 
production of citrus), and their 
development requires coordinated and 
coherent action, particularly at the land, 
organizational and human levels. 
Consequently, in view of the constraints of 
open-door policy and challenge of 
competitiveness, there is not one but 
several farm profiles, with different 
behaviors and adjustment capacities. On 
the whole, there are farms which can 
already be considered as competitive, those 
that will probably never be competitive 
because they are structurally non-viable, 
and those which could become competitive 
provided they receive support, and 
adequate reforms are carried out. This 
typology suggests that there are several 
situations and approaches without it being 
possible to conclude, based on our current 
field knowledge, that there is a trend more 
marked by one “profile” rather than by 
another. 
Consequently, over and above the trends in 
question, the negative impact on the social 
situation in rural areas is quite certain. A 
recent World Bank report (2004) has 
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attempted to assess such an impact on the 
basis of various scenarios of de-protection. 
The major conclusion is that, to variable 
degrees, poverty in rural areas should 
increase significantly (the rate of poverty 
should, on the whole, increase from 19.6 % 
to 22.1 %). In some regions, it could even 
double. Such a trend is worrisome, in light 
of the fact that 72 % of the poor people in 
Morocco live in rural areas. 
Consequently, even if we consider only the 
category of micro-farms that are almost 
impossible to make “viable”, there are 
several hundreds of thousands of units that 
will in one way or another disappear. How 
will a trend that will halve the current 
population of 1.5 million farmers and their 
families be managed? How will such a 
transfer of population not radically change 
the urban-rural areas balance, and create 
new distortions in urban built-up areas, 
especially if they cannot develop their 
absorptive capacity as a result of lack of 
industrial drive? 
Risks, Impasses and Solutions 
In the attempt to provide answers to the 
questions, it is essential to start by 
determining the “areas of vulnerability” of 
Morocco’s agriculture. 
Areas of Vulnerability 
The areas of vulnerability of Morocco’s 
agriculture can be grouped under three 
main themes: the first is “natural”, the 
second “demographic”, and the third 
“policy”. 
 (i) Natural Resources: The first area of 
vulnerability concerns the precarious 
nature and intrinsic limits of natural 
resources. Unstable climatic conditions, 
repeated droughts, water stress, UFA 
limits, soil erosion or salinization, 
deforestation, desertification, etc. are 
natural sensitivities with high risks and 
threats for the sustainability of ecosystems, 
and consequently agricultural and agrifood 
productive systems. 
(ii) Population Growth: The second area of 
vulnerability is demographic. There is a 
problem primarily because the population 
living in rural areas still accounts for 45 % 
of the total population, and continues to 
increase in absolute value so that the 
pressure on natural resources remains 
strong. There is also a problem because, 
due to the lack of capacity to create an 
adequate number of jobs, the population 
windfall could very likely become a 
“burden”. 
(iii) Nature of Government Policies: The 
third area of vulnerability concerns policies 
- with shortcomings of government 
policies that ultimately increase constraints 
and sensitivities in the agricultural sector, 
and more generally in rural areas. The 
problems are all due to lack of reforms. 
Agrarian structures and land status, 
education and training of human resources, 
providing rural areas with basic 
infrastructure and income-generating 
activities, marketing and financing 
systems, agronomic education and 
research, and professional organization are 
all areas in which reforms have not been 
made. They ought to have been made 
decades ago. The costs of these areas are 
today becoming increasing difficult to 
bear. 
Indeed, all these factors of vulnerability 
have contributed to increasing the 
difficulties faced by agricultural sector. 
Despite the deteriorating living conditions, 
experience shows that the farmers 
concerned have so far demonstrated a great 
potential to adjust. 
Adjustments and Solutions 
The “solutions” for the temporary or 
durable crisis situations have been varied. 
They range from simple adjustments 
through search for alternative solutions “on 
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the spot” to outright abandoning of the 
“activity that can no longer sustain life”, 
including a number of intermediate 
options. Here are some of the major 
solutions: 
(i) Family and Community Solidarity: 
Solidarity in a village or tribe has often 
absorbed the shock of crises because it 
“distributes” the effects. Today, such 
solidarity is shown in a more monetary 
manner through children, generally girls, 
who are sent to work as servants in urban 
households, and the money is transferred to 
the families in rural areas. For diverse 
reasons, these possibilities are becoming 
scarce. 
(ii) Overexploitation of Resources: 
Adjustments on farms often even take the 
form of overexploitation of available 
resources and/or minimization of 
production costs with the risk of returning 
to some extensification of production 
methods. Indeed, usable farm areas (nearly 
22 % in 22 years) have mainly been 
extended to forest and pastoral spaces and 
other marginal lands, thereby increasing 
the risks of exhaustion of soils and 
destruction of their productive capacities. 
Accordingly, in view of the increase in the 
prices of factors of production, many 
farmers try to cope with the increase by 
reducing the quantity and quality of 
products, a phenomenon which, if it 
spreads, will slow down movement 
towards modernization and intensification 
of production conditions. Such an 
“adjustment from the bottom” is 
characteristic of the forms of adjustment 
by many farms. 
(iii) Choice of Production and 
Diversification Possibilities: The other 
adjustment in farms could concern 
production diversification possibilities. For 
the moment, these possibilities seem 
limited mainly to a few hundreds of 
thousands of hectares of olive trees and 
other fruit trees, and a few thousand 
hectares of various biological crops and 
lands in some regions of the country. In the 
north of Morocco, however, the growing of 
cannabis has increased significantly in 
recent years. This illegal crop has been a 
real solution for most farmers in the 
regions concerned, who would have 
probably been forced to emigrate. 
(iv) Non-agricultural Activities in Rural 
Areas: The development of such activities 
is another alternative that helps farmers to 
be less dependent on unstable agricultural 
production. Although there is currently no 
recent data on the amount and composition 
of the external income of farms in 
Morocco, we know, however, that 
according to the 1996 general agricultural 
census, more than one farmer out of every 
five are multiple jobholders. Salaried work, 
petty trade and various services, liberal 
professions, handicraft, building and public 
works, as well as fishing or rural tourism 
also offer possibilities to earn “external” 
income, partially compensating for the 
inadequate agricultural income. 
(v) Rural Exodus remains the solution that 
is chosen most often, it has reduced the 
proportion of the rural population of 
Morocco from three-quarters to less than 
45 % in half a century. Despite the 
slowdown noted during the 1990s, and in 
view of the potential which is still 
considerable, we could, in the coming 
years, see a resumption of movement, at 
least as much as in the 1970s and 1980s. 
(vi) International Emigration: The use of 
this option has been increasing since the 
1980s, such that the number of Moroccans 
abroad has practically tripled in less than 
one quarter century, from nearly 1 million 
to 3 million people at the moment, and 
one-tenth of the total population. Foreign 
exchange transfers by the migrant 
population are also increasing steadily, 
reaching nearly 5 billion dollars in 2006 –
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9.4 % of GDP. As for their contribution to 
the balance of payments, it has become 
vital. The problem is whether such an 
option is sustainable. This is doubtful, not 
only because of the extremely restrictive 
policies of the host countries, but also 
because the behavior of the migrant 
population is changing fundamentally, 
particularly with the new generations who 
feel less and less attached to their parents’ 
countries of origin, and increasingly tend 
to invest fully in their countries of birth. 
All in all, while all these possibilities of 
adjustment and solutions offer some 
opportunities which are more or less 
substantial solutions for the numerous 
crises, they remain subject to certain 
absolute or relative limits that are 
imminent or gradual. Consequently, none 
of these options, namely family or tribal 
solidarity, over-exploitation of resources or 
extensification of production conditions, 
possibilities of diversifying crops (even 
illegal) or activities in rural areas, and 
internal or external emigration, can serve 
as an adequate and sustainable alternative 
for the serious problems that will be faced 
by the agricultural sector in the coming 
years. Each of the options can offer a 
“safety valve” or respite for a moment, but 
none of them can sustainably make up for 
the inadequacies in agricultural activity. 
This shows that there is still a long way to 
go in providing appropriate solutions for 
the problems. Additionally, it does not 
suffice to identify the “areas of 
vulnerability” of agriculture and rural areas 
today to see the possible solutions. We also 
need to understand that these 
vulnerabilities have contradictory aspects 
that make their evolution more complex, 
and solutions more arduous. The current 
dynamics therefore require an assessment 
of the possible dead-ends, and real or 
possible risks of stagnation within a 
context of no reform and persistent wait-
and-see policy. 
Dead-ends and Risks of Stagnation 
The risks of stagnation may be considered 
at five levels: demography and 
productivity, the agricultural development 
model, state divestiture, the regulation 
system, and natural resources. 
(i) “Democratic Burden” and Productivity: 
The risk for the “demographic windfall” to 
become a “burden” is great because the 
rate of job creation generated by economic 
growth remains inadequate to absorb the 
cohorts of youths, which enter the labor 
market each year. This has been the case so 
far, and projections for 2014 and 2024 
concerning additional job offers and the 
growth rates required to maintain the level 
of unemployment within determined limits 
do not give hope for better future 
prospects. 
The problem becomes even more 
complicated when considered in light of 
the issue of productivity, which remains 
too low, constituting one of the major 
constraints on the development of the 
sector. Sustained progress is not possible 
without improvement of productivity. 
However, productivity, of labor in 
particular, is still hampered by the high 
population of agricultural workers. 
Improving the productivity of labor 
inevitably results in further “liberating” the 
labor force, and therefore in increasing the 
cohorts of job seekers in the non-
agricultural sectors. Will these sectors be 
able to absorb them? 
 (ii) Import-substitution and Promotion of 
Exports: the double dead end: The 
disappointing results of import-substitution 
and promotion of export strategies have led 
to perplexing situations, and even dead 
ends; consequently, abandoning 
compulsory crop rotation in the irrigated 
areas and substituting the concept of “food 
security” for that of self-sufficiency have 
created situations of non-determination 
with serious consequences. What 
  
170 
content and level can be given to the 
country’s food security? How can the 
freedom of individuals be reconciled with 
the collective needs of the society? How 
can public investments be made profitable 
while opting not to encourage production 
on lands developed with these 
investments? 
While the exports promotion strategy 
comes up against the protectionist policies 
of countries with major markets, the 
problems of Morocco’s exports cannot be 
attributed to this external factor alone. The 
internal factors are not less serious; for 
example, the de-monopolization of 
exports, which has had negative impacts on 
all: atomization of Morocco’s supply, 
dilution of “Morocco” label, weakening of 
the negotiating power of Moroccan 
exporters, lack of a marketing strategy, 
abuse of all types of new private groups, 
etc. The feeling of a dead end is very 
strong because while it is possible to 
criticize the status quo, nobody expects an 
outright return to the former system. 
In the final analysis, the agricultural 
development model seems to be blocked 
today within a double dead end, 
corresponding to its two “aspects”. 
Consequently, the import-substitution 
policy is at a dead end not only because it 
has not succeeded in increasing local 
production to enable it to satisfy domestic 
demand and thereby gain autonomy from 
imports, but it has also generated 
accumulation and distribution mechanisms 
which have increased inequalities, 
promoted situation rents and sustained 
ruinous immobility. The export promotion 
strategy has led to specialization, which 
has also ended up being blocked by the 
rampant protectionism of the European 
Union and by ill-advised choices of public 
authorities and inconsistent choices by 
operators. 
(iii) State Divestiture and Inadequacies of 
Replacement by the Private Sector: In the 
aftermath of structural adjustment policies, 
the state effectively withdrew from many 
production, guidance or marketing 
functions, but the problem is that the 
“replacement by the private sector” has 
had some shortcomings. In addition to its 
low contribution to investment, the private 
sector did not adequately get involved in 
activities left “vacant” by the withdrawal 
of the public sector, particularly in 
agricultural extension, advisory and 
support services. This reduced the capacity 
to supervise production, leading to a lag in 
the modernization process. On the other 
hand, in areas where private interests have 
always taken advantage of the situation, 
state divestiture only helped to perpetuate 
control of the market by new private 
oligopolies. 
Once again, the dilemma is as follows: 
how can the key guidance and sundry 
service functions of agriculture be 
maintained and developed without “re-
engaging” the state, bearing in mind that 
the private replacement structures, such as 
the professional organization, are still 
inadequate? 
(iv) Prices and Subsidies: Liberalization or 
Regulation? The price and subsidies 
policies for some staple foodstuffs are 
based on a public finance regulation 
method by which the state attempts to 
reconcile contradictory constraints and 
objectives, starting with the need to offer 
producers relatively remunerative prices, 
without putting a strain on the purchasing 
power of consumers, and running the risk 
of provoking salary increases that would 
be prejudicial to this major comparative 
advantage of the country – labor cost – and 
to its competitiveness. Experience has 
shown that this system has negative 
impacts and sustains situation rents for a 
minority of “middlemen” without 
contributing to improving productivity of 
the products in question. 
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Today, the liberalization of prices and 
elimination of consumer subsidies have 
been initiated, but the hardest part is still to 
come, since the two most sensitive sectors 
– national tender wheat flour and sugar – 
remain in a paradoxical situation that is 
neither total regulation nor full 
liberalization. However, the latter is more 
than ever before on the agenda. 
Consequently, we now face a double dead 
end. First, at the economic level, although 
labor cost is a key condition for 
competitiveness, the problem is whether it 
is possible to count on a “winning” 
integration into globalization and at the 
same time run the risk of thereby 
handicapping what remains the major 
comparative advantage of Morocco. Can 
we do without a state-managed method of 
regulation without substituting it with 
another, assumed by the market? 
As for the social dimension, while it is of 
major importance in a country where social 
inequalities are considerable and poverty is 
still widespread, elimination of the 
subsidies in question poses this difficult 
dilemma: How can we want to fight 
against poverty, promote human 
development and eliminate the only system 
which has so far enabled poor people to 
have access to staple foodstuffs at costs 
within their purchasing power? 
(v) Natural Resources: Economy or 
Ecology? Although it is generally accepted 
that poverty among the rural populations is 
a major cause of the degradation of natural 
resources (destruction of forests and 
pasturelands to earn a living, etc), we also 
know that uncontrolled liberalization of 
trade would probably ruin some traditional 
regions and activities, leading to transfers 
of populations, part of which could go to 
marginal zones (increasing the risks of 
desertification), whereas another could 
concentrate in intensive agricultural areas, 
subjecting the areas to such exploitation 
that would further degrade the 
environment. Moreover, putting the 
various types of agriculture in serious 
competition, particularly in South and East 
Mediterranean, could make operators 
disregard environmental protection 
measures and investments likely to 
increase production costs, and thereby 
weaken competitiveness. 
How can such a scenario be avoided? How 
can we continue to advocate free trade 
without being condemned to bear the 
environmental consequences? How can a 
market economy and preservation of 
natural resources be reconciled? How can 
competitiveness be sought without paying 
its “ecological price”? These are questions 
which, without appropriate answers, could 
lead to a dead end. 
Poor Governance: the First Dead End? 
The political reorganization of the early 
years of independence led to the assertion 
of a strong and authoritarian central 
government. In rural areas, this trend led to 
the abandonment of reforms – particularly 
agrarian reforms – and some rehabilitation 
of “local notables” who became, with the 
representatives of the Makhzen (the 
governors), pillars of local governance. 
Then it became clear that the primary 
concern of such governance was security. 
Law and order and security in Moroccan 
rural areas were placed at the forefront and 
influenced government choices and 
behavior with respect to agriculture and 
rural areas in the 1960s. Consequently, 
priority was given to a certain 
“technocratic” vision of development, 
because rather than challenge established 
order, it supported and defended it. The 
choices were therefore those of a certain 
elite, and the allocation of resources 
primarily served its interests. As a result, 
there were increasing disparities of all 
kinds, particularly at the territorial level. 
At a time when some “farm areas” 
witnessed relatively significant boom, most 
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of the rural areas sunk into under-
development and marginalization. 
Evaluated over a long period, this model 
does not seem to have achieved any of its 
declared objectives of adequate 
modernization of farms, nor profitability of 
investments, nor significant improvement 
of productivity, nor food self-sufficiency, 
nor surplus agrifood trade balance, etc. On 
the other hand, massive and costly state 
intervention was put in place, under which 
solid position advantages have been 
established throughout the agrifood 
sectors, from production to wholesale 
markets, including agro-industry, 
particularly for the processing of major 
staple foodstuffs. 
The adjustment policy, implemented in the 
1980s, changed the paradigm at the 
economic level, since it sought to replace 
the very strong power of the state with 
market economy and private initiative. 
However, at the level of governance, it 
basically sustained the same spirit and the 
same practices. This policy did not seek, 
more than the preceding policy, to 
associate the population concerned with its 
orientations or implementation, and above 
all it turned out to be even more “elitist” 
and more inegalitarian, generating wealth 
for a minority and impoverishing the 
majority. While it is true that efforts to 
provide basic infrastructure to rural areas 
started about ten years ago, it is also true 
that the initiative remains purely 
“technical” and is not in any way based on 
consultation with the populations 
concerned to meet their needs and desires. 
It should be said that, despite the existence 
of a parliament, the rural population is still 
“poorly represented” in a political system 
marked by the persistence of an “executive 
monarchy”. Professional representation is 
no better, when we know to what extent 
the professional organization is deficient in 
the agrifood sub-sectors. 
The problem is that, today, poor 
governance has, from an objective point of 
view, become an obstacle to development, 
to even the “liberal model” which is being 
promoted. How can liberalism be 
advocated at the economic level, and 
outdated governance practices maintained 
at the political level? How can the 
inadequacies of private and professional 
stakeholders be condemned, while every 
effort is made to maintain them under 
stifling political and administrative 
supervisory authority? How can free 
enterprise and private initiative be sought, 
while any “initiative” outside the “canons” 
of established order is severely repressed? 
How can free competition be encouraged 
on markets, while monopolies and rent-
seeking behaviors which drain the latter of 
its substance are maintained? How can 
advocacy for mobility of capital be 
conducted, while paralyzing the major 
capital in agriculture – land – for lack of 
the required land reforms? How can people 
be convinced of improvement of the 
“investment climate” when each person 
can at any time see the “dysfunction” of 
the judicial system, the central and local 
Administration, and even some 
“regulation” structures created precisely to 
address the risks of abuse on the liberalized 
markets? 
On the whole, these are issues with a 
“boomerang effect”, and it is where this 
dead end of the governance system has the 
most serious consequences. Today, it is 
patently obvious that economic 
liberalization suffers from a lack of 
political liberalization. 
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NICARAGUA REPORT 
Arturo H. Grigsby V., Francisco J. Perez, 
January 2007, 148p. 
 
i. Nicaragua is part of a trans-national 
analysis performed by the RuralStruc 
Program-World Bank. This program is 
intended to conduct a fresh analysis of the 
consequences of economic liberalization 
and integration on agriculture and the rural 
sector of developing countries, on the basis 
of structural changes (impacts of the new 
configuration of world markets and 
international competition on national 
production and marketing structures). 
ii. Nicaragua’s first phase report highlights 
the main characteristics of country trends 
and proposes a periodization by identifying 
the major processes which have shaped the 
evolution of agriculture, the key factors 
inducing change, the crucial structural 
factors which have significantly changed 
the country configuration and nature of 
relations between agriculture, the rural 
sector and the economy as a whole. The 
national databases from Central Bank and 
INEC were the main sources used for the 
analysis. At the same time, annual reports 
from Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and 
Trade, Finances and Credit and Central 
Bank were included as well. National 
information was compared with 
international databases from Economic 
Commission for Latin America and 
Caribbean, Food and Agriculture, and 
United Nations Development Program, 
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, 
and Inter-American Institute for 
Cooperation in Agriculture (OAS). The 
results were discussed with national studies 
and regional analysis, in topics such as 
Debt, CAFTA, Trade Liberalization, 
Clusters, Poverty, Migration, and 
Demography. 
iii. Understanding structural changes in 
Nicaragua means understanding the last 30 
years of political changes. Nicaragua’s 
political system has gone from a market-
oriented economy, before 1980s, to a state-
centered economy, in 1980s, with 
structural reforms on land tenure, trade 
system and employment. After 1990, 
Nicaragua returned to being a free market 
economy and monetary policy became the 
central action axis for public policies, with 
structural adjustment and privatization as 
the main tools. By 2007, Nicaragua had a 
left-oriented government that is opposed to 
a market-oriented economy and 
privatization process. 
Place and role of agriculture in the 
national configuration 
iv. Nicaragua’s path of development has 
been defined by its agricultural sector 
throughout history: cattle and indigo 
producers (before 1890), coffee producer 
(since 1890), agro-industrial country 
(bananas, cotton, coffee and sugar) (after 
1950s). Contrasting economic models have 
been implemented including the 
modernization of economy (1950-1979), 
state-centered model (1980 -1989), and 
free market-oriented economy (1990-
2006). Nowadays, it is expected to have a 
political and economical model change. By 
2000s, agriculture was the most important 
economic activity for its contribution to 
GDP (17 %), employment (34 %) and 
share of total exports (80 %). Agricultural 
share of total exports in the last 15 years 
(70 – 80 %) is a clear trend of the role that 
agriculture has played in the Nicaraguan 
economy. 
v. According to the National Census 
(2005), Nicaragua is in a demographic 
transition. Rural population represents 44 
% of total population and 40.4 % of total 
EAP. Based on the Agrarian Census 
(2001), there are 200,000 farms of which 
59 % are subsistence families, 31.7 % 
  
174 
peasants, 6.6 % farmers and 2.7 % agrarian 
capitalist. Nicaragua can be divided into 
six macro-regions with different 
socioeconomic dynamics, since productive 
infrastructure, land distribution and 
agricultural potential are specific for every 
one of them. By 2005, agriculture 
generates 570, 820 jobs which represents 
34 % of total occupied population and 33 
% of total EAP (INEC, 2006). 
vi. Nicaragua is part of the HIPC initiative 
and public policies are focused on poverty 
reduction and debt services. Expenditures 
in the agriculture sector represent 6 – 7 % 
of total public expenditures. A national 
strategy for development has been 
developed based on productive clusters, 
specifically: coffee, peanut and soybean, 
dairy, meat, vegetables, grains and shrimp. 
This strategy pretends to increase 
agriculture contribution to GDP, 
employment and exports as the main way 
to reduce rural poverty. 
vii. Trade liberation has opened regional 
markets, and Central America is the main 
partner for agricultural exports for 
Nicaragua. The USA is the second partner 
and a free trade agreement has been 
signed. Nicaraguan tariff protection is the 
second lowest in the region after El 
Salvador. By 2021, it is expected that the 
average tariff will be 1.6 %. Nicaragua has 
signed FTA with Mexico and Chile and it 
is negotiating with Canada, Taiwan and 
European Union. 
The structure and evolution of 
agricultural and agrifood markets 
viii. In the 1980s, there was a strong public 
intervention in order to control trade and 
distribution of products and inputs. The 
Sandinista government developed several 
institutions for trading coffee, rice, cotton, 
meat and sugar. After 1990, price controls 
were eliminated and market institutions 
were privatized; as a result, commercial 
chains were reconfigured. Currently, 
agricultural production is trade by market 
mechanisms of supply and demand. There 
are no controlled prices or direct public 
intervention for fixing prices. 
ix. Agricultural product prices have been 
unstable over the last 16 years. Gourmet 
and organic coffee have offered 
alternatives with higher prices. Meat, rice, 
peanut and sesame prices have been 
relatively stable, but the general tendency 
has been downward since 1999. The prices 
of inputs such as nitrogen-based fertilizers 
are linked to petroleum prices, which are 
currently rising. As a consequence, the 
terms of trade for agricultural production 
have been deteriorating with every passing 
year. 
x. Export products value chain such as 
coffee, meat, sugar, sesame and peanut 
tend to be monopolized either in the 
processing and/or exporting process. 
Infrastructure facilities for cleaning, 
peeling, parchment stage, cutting, and 
packing tend to be concentrated in few 
economic groups. There is a regional 
integration process through foreign 
investment in products such as peanut, 
sesame and cheese. There are initial levels 
of integration into global networks such as 
Starbucks (coffee), and Cargill (poultry 
and pork) and Walt-mart through Hortifruti 
(fruits and vegetables). 
xi. Traditional markets tend to dominate 
domestic trade; however, supermarkets are 
increasing their share of vegetable markets. 
Supermarkets are part of a global 
integration with USA network, mainly 
through Walt-mart. A regional company 
Horti-fruti tends to monopolize 
supermarket supply of fruit and vegetables. 
This company belongs to the Walt-mart 
group as well. 
xii. After 1990, the agricultural input 
market is controlled, an oligopoly imports 
and distributes 70 % of seeds, fertilizers 
and pesticides. Nitrogenous fertilizers and 
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pesticides are the main intermediate 
imports for agriculture. Financial markets 
are developed with commercial banks and 
microfinance institutions with 
approximately US$ 220 million in 
agriculture loans, covering between 15 and 
20 % of producers. However, credits are 
mainly for the short-term and with interest 
rate higher than 25 %. The new 
government will have a public intervention 
on rural finances market, but the 
implementation process is not clear. 
xiii. Nicaragua has a dynamic land market, 
although there are serious property 
conflicts. Land prices vary from US$ 4 – 
7,000/ha, at the well-connected pacific 
areas, to US$ 60 -80/ha, at the new 
agricultural frontier. In the next decade, 
land will be a scarce resource and an 
aggressive land concentration process will 
be trigged. 
xiv. Agricultural extension and agricultural 
insurances markets are not developed. 
Extension programs are subsidized by 
public funds and international cooperation. 
There are no public policies to create an 
insurance market, and this is a serious 
restriction for a farm-contracting system. 
xv. Approximately 30 to 40,000 persons 
from rural EAP find no job in agriculture, 
every year. According to the National 
Census (2005), approximately 9,000 new 
workers enter rural EAP every year. 
Agriculture should generate 40,000 new 
jobs every year in order to hire this new 
economic population. 
Segmentation of production structures: 
trends observed and consequences 
xvi. The agricultural sector has developed 
in an international context of prices crises 
(cotton, coffee, sesame, and peanut) and 
commercial liberalization (Economic 
Integration, Free Trade areas). At the same 
time, agriculture has adapted to internal 
factors, such as demographic transition, 
with a reduction in rural population share, 
land property conflicts due to several 
agrarian reform processes, climate change 
with high vulnerability to droughts, public 
policies focused on attracting investment to 
services and exporting production zones, 
and high level of open unemployment and 
informal sector. 
xvii. After 1990, international and 
domestic trade has been reconfigured since 
public institutions were dismantled. 
International prices crises, free market 
policies, property conflicts, high levels of 
unemployment, and large periods of 
droughts generated a new socioeconomic 
context for rural families. Nicaragua is in a 
transition phase, rural population growth 
has decreased, but it is not enough to 
reduce pressure on natural resources, thus, 
internal migration will continue. In the 
short-run, fertile land and water sources 
will be scarce. 
xviii. Depending on the social sector, (rural 
workers, subsistence families, peasants, 
farmers or agrarian capitalist), families 
have adapted their economic units to the 
new context. With some crops, such as 
coffee, peasant and subsistence families 
can benefit from NGOs, international 
cooperation and public institutions in order 
to integrate into alternative markets. In 
other products such as cheese, subsistence 
families, and even peasants, might be 
excluded from the quality value chains, 
since they have no capital to meet all 
requirements. They can have access to 
credit, but it is short-term and includes 
high interest rate, a situation that acts as a 
disincentive on investment in cattle. 
xix. It can be stated that there are processes 
of segmentation in rural families. There are 
social sectors that have been integrated 
into the new commercial circuits. There are 
social sectors, mainly subsistence families 
and peasant, who have been excluded from 
certain new commercial circuits. There is a 
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need for public policies to facilitate 
technical changes in order to accomplish 
quality requirements such as: vaccines, 
productive and gathering infrastructure. 
Identifiable risks and impasses, 
possibilities for adaptation and 
restructuring processes 
xx. Three main obstacles for rural families 
are discussed in this section: poverty, the 
extensive path of agriculture and 
migration. Rural poverty is a serious 
limitation for technical change, investment 
and market integration of rural families. 
Poverty is a condition that forces 
subsistence families to use labor-intensive 
practices and migrate. Internal migrations 
tend to be limited for limited access to 
land. The New agricultural frontier in at 
the limit of natural reserves cores, 
indigenous communities and swamps of 
the Caribbean areas. International 
migrations have been an exit for the urban 
and rural crisis; however, new regulations 
on Costa Rica and USA will block migrant 
flows. 
xxi. The extensive path of the agrarian 
system is incorporating 106,000 hectares 
each year into agriculture. It is an 
unsustainable path which is consuming all 
the fertile land. During the first stage, this 
factor will block internal migration. During 
the second stage, it will trigger an 
aggressive land concentration process in 
which subsistence families will be the most 
vulnerable. The extensive path is to 
produce an increase in yields without 
technical practices. Subsistence families 
tend to rely on natural soil fertility and 
after two or three years, yields decrease 
significantly. Public policies to restrain this 
extensive path, such as a progressive tax 
on land tenure, might force an 
intensification of cattle producers at the 
Old and new agricultural frontier. 
xx. Intensification is an important exit for 
rural families; depending on their 
system, families might be integrated into 
fair trade, quality and organic markets. 
Technical change will increase yields, 
producing higher volumes in the same 
area. It is necessary to norm quality 
standards for agricultural product and to 
promote environmental practices for 
production. At the same time, develop a 
series of minimum requirement 
(infrastructure, inputs, 
xxiii. Temporal migration has been an 
important exit for rural families. Temporal 
migration allows families to migrate in 
harvesting season to Costa Rica and/or El 
Salvador in order to obtain funds for 
sowing in May. For these activities, 
families organize their labor force and 
funds to take advantages of migration. 
Alternatives for saving and investment 
should be promoted by public policies, in 
order to generate accumulation process on 
families. 
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Meeting the Challenge of Youth 
Employment 
Senegal’s population grew in excess of 11 
million people in 2006 from 2 million in 
1950; this growth, however, has slowed. 
Currently, half of the population, largely 
young and un-schooled, lives in urban 
areas and nearly 70 % depend directly on 
the agricultural sector. By 2025, Senegal’s 
population is projected to be between 16 
and 17 million people. 
In the very near future, 200,000 youths will 
appear on the job market each year. A 
majority will come from farming families 
and will thus be ill-prepared to enter the 
economy. Meeting the challenge of youth 
employment will depend on the capacity of 
the country and its political and economic 
leaders to bring about agricultural 
transition. This will be based on an 
increasingly greater merger of the urban 
and rural farming economies. The drivers 
of this merger will include high and 
sustained productivity gains, and 
improvements in the incomes of the rural 
population. Success will depend first and 
foremost on the capacity of the state to 
formulate and implement a comprehensive 
policy, with the involvement of all the 
economic stakeholders. 
Persistence of an Economy Dominated 
by Groundnut Production 
Under French colonial rule, agriculture 
specialized in the production of a single 
crop. Colonial rule provided Senegal with 
an administrative, educational, health and 
transport infrastructure, and to a certain 
extent, industrialization. However, it also 
introduced a number of disadvantages: 
food production was abandoned in favor of 
rice and wheat imports for consumption in 
urban areas. Moreover, livestock 
production was not developed. Groundnut 
production led to the rapid clearing and 
occupation of farmlands; infrastructure 
was concentrated in the economic capital 
and in the groundnut-producing area, thus 
rendering the outlying regions inaccessible 
and more or less condemned to subsistence 
farming, in spite of attempts to develop the 
irrigation potential of the Senegal River 
valley. The attempts, shortly after 
independence in 1960, to reduce this heavy 
dependence on groundnut production 
ended in failure. The financial needs of the 
state, the end of preferential prices on the 
markets of the former colonial power, and 
the economic interests in the sector forced 
the state to blindly pursue this option, at a 
time when groundnut oil was becoming 
increasingly less competitive on the world 
market. 
Extroversion of the economy, based on 
groundnut production and exploitation of 
mineral and fishery resources led to low 
GDP growth, as it was subjected to the 
unstable climate and markets, and was 
often lower than population growth. 
Continued extensive and mining 
agriculture, in spite of remarkable success 
in the use of selected seeds and 
mechanization of farms, also resulted in 
very low contribution of food and cash 
crop production to economic growth. 
As from 1980, in view of the scale of the 
ensuing macroeconomic imbalances, 
Senegal embarked on a protracted 
structural adjustment process under the 
supervision of the IMF and World Bank. 
The early agricultural sector adjustment 
measures (stopping of the agricultural 
program and liquidation of the marketing 
board - ONCAD - in 1979 and 1980 and 
the New Agricultural Policy in 1984) did 
not produce the expected results with 
respect to agricultural supply. The PASA 
  
178 
and the devaluation of the CFA Franc in 
1994 had a positive impact on public 
finance and external trade, but it was short-
lived. Economic liberalization did not 
modify the orientation and structure of 
Senegal’s external trade. Exports were 
hardly diversified, and were based on 
fishery resources, by-products of 
phosphate, and groundnut oil. Imports 
were increasingly dominated by food 
products. The bulk of trade is still carried 
out with the European Union, though there 
has been some progress in trade with 
African countries. Liberalization enabled 
the state to clean up public finances, but it 
did not prevent an explosion of poverty, 
especially in rural areas (about seven out of 
ten households are poor, and 80 % of poor 
households live in rural areas), an 
extension of the informal sector, chronic 
under-employment, long-term 
unsustainable food dependency, the 
country’s dependence on official 
development assistance and remittances 
from abroad, and the subsistence of mining 
and extensive agriculture with very low 
productivity. 
Remarkable Capacity of Family Farms 
to Adapt to their Climate and Economic 
Environment 
Senegal’s agriculture is dominated by 
family farms. It is only in areas with 
possibilities of irrigation and easy access to 
the main urban market of Dakar and export 
that commercial and industrial farming are 
developing, but they occupy less than 5 % 
of the crop area. Family farms are 
predominantly rain-fed in a semi-arid zone, 
with irrigation limited to less than 2 % of 
the crop area; 19 % of the country’s 
surface area is arable land, which is 3.8 
million hectares, of which only 2.5 million 
hectares are effectively farmed (65 %). The 
heterogeneous nature of farming is mainly 
influenced by the level of rainfall, the soil 
type, possibilities of irrigation, and access 
to urban markets. 
In the groundnut-producing area, the 
farming systems associate groundnut, 
short-cycle cereals, and millet and 
sorghum—that have taken the place of 
long-cycle cereals—with the breeding of 
small ruminants and cattle. From 1960 to 
1998, the ratio of groundnut and 
millet/sorghum production was reversed. 
Groundnut, which hitherto occupied 64 % 
of the crop area as opposed to 29 % for 
millet, now covers only 28 %, down from 
64 %. Cattle breeding, which was as 
significant as sheep rearing, now 
represents only one quarter of total 
livestock, even though some progress has 
been made. Thus, farmers have adapted to 
droughts and market uncertainty by giving 
preference to short-cycle cereals and 
groundnuts, short-cycle livestock, and 
horse draught cultivation. They have also 
diversified their crops for the same 
reasons: cowpea, watermelon, bissap, and 
cassava. Remarkably, farmers have 
succeeded not only in increasing the area 
covered by cereals, but also in increasing 
yields, while groundnut output has 
dropped. 
- The groundnut-producing area has most 
of the “marabout farms” that have enjoyed 
easy access to land, agricultural inputs and 
loans, and that pursue religious, family and 
profit-making objectives. 
- In the southern regions, the agro-pastoral 
system is virtually the same as in the 
groundnut-producing area, but here, cotton 
competes with groundnut, whose cultivated 
area is nonetheless, on the increase. 
Available pastureland has made it possible 
to breed a sizeable number of cattle. Maize 
production is also increasing steadily in the 
region. Lowland rice is grown where the 
possibilities exist. There is also 
diversification into dairy farming and 
banana cultivation where water is 
prominent. 
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- In Lower, and part of Middle Casamance, 
the farming systems are traditionally based 
on mangrove rice farming, harvesting in 
bolongs, and unwatered cultivation of 
long-cycle cereals. Here also, there has 
been remarkable adaptation to change. The 
invasion of rice farms by salty water has 
led to a sharp decline in rice production, to 
the advantage of unwatered crops; 
groundnut, millet/sorghum, maize, and 
significant development of horticulture, in 
particular fruit-tree farming. Farmers, who 
traditionally limited themselves to the 
cultivation of bolongs, have also become 
sea-fishermen. 
- In the sylvo-pastoral zone, there is a 
dominance of livestock breeding, 
especially of cattle, which is associated 
with little millet and groundnut cultivation, 
and harvesting. The difficulties involved in 
moving cattle in the flooded pasturelands 
of the Senegal River and the southern-most 
regions have led to a reduction in the size 
of herds. 
- In the Senegal River valley, there are 
marked differences between the delta and 
the middle and upper valley. In the delta 
and around Guiers Lake, the farming 
system, with the pumping of water and 
mechanized cultivation, gives preference to 
the double cropping of rice over extensive 
areas, with full control of water flow. 
Diversification is developing with special 
varieties of rice (scented rice), industrial 
production of tomatoes, onions, potatoes, 
and sweet potatoes, increasingly on private 
smallholdings. Stockbreeding encounters 
difficulties here as a result of drastic 
reduction of the floodwater pasturelands. 
Commercial farming is developing with 
some difficulty. There are also two or three 
agro-industrial plants in the area. In the 
middle and upper valley, the small size of 
farms has forced the farmers to partially 
maintain their traditional systems which 
associate flood-recession crops with rain-
fed crops and stockbreeding, in addition to 
rice farming 
- In the Niayes zone, there is a great 
diversity of farming systems; family farms 
coexist with commercial farms and a few 
agro-industrial plants. The closer to the 
Dakar urban market, the more the family 
farms reduce in size and practice intensive 
market gardening targeting the city. 
Sharecropping, leasing and sale of land are 
normal practices, not to mention the flower 
growers who operate even in the tiny 
intervening spaces along the roads in the 
heart of the city. Moving from Dakar to 
Saint-Louis, the breeding of small 
ruminants and cultivation of rain-fed crops 
reappear, associated with market 
gardening. Some family farm systems also 
include artisanal fishing. In addition to 
family farm systems, commercial farming 
has also developed and diversified, with a 
few large units almost entirely oriented 
toward export to European markets; these 
units control the horticultural sector 
upstream and downstream and also 
conclude contracts with small-scale market 
gardeners. Enterprises specialized in fruit-
tree farming for the urban market and 
export are also developing, alongside 
enterprises specialized in intensive 
stockbreeding for meat and milk. This 
commercial farming has fostered the strong 
growth of a class of agricultural wage-
earners. 
For approximately 50 years now, 
Senegalese farmers have been trying to 
cope with a marked and generalized drop 
in rainfall over two to three months each 
year. This unfavorable climatic situation 
has had serious consequences on the 
farming systems and natural resources. The 
farmers also have to cope with the 
uncertainties of markets as the population 
growth rate remains high. The adaptation 
required forces them to exert growing 
pressure on natural resources, and thereby 
degrades these resources. The salty nature 
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of the land around the mouths of the 
Senegal, Sine Saloum and Casamance 
Rivers has led to substantial loss of soils 
and fishery resources. The effects of rain 
and wind erosion on the soil have 
worsened because of cultivation and 
breeding practices observed in the Niayes 
zone, where advancing coastal dunes have 
buried low-lying market garden farms. The 
steady increase in livestock population is 
causing a degradation of pasturelands, 
while the extension of cultivated areas 
reduces their size. The non-management of 
fishery resources has led to stagnation, and 
even reduction, of catches in the past few 
years, whereas they largely meet the 
animal protein requirements of the 
population. Extensive farming practices 
without organic replenishment have led to 
impoverishment and acidification of soils, 
and therefore a decline in crop yields. The 
pressure exerted on forest resources, 
mainly to meet the service and energy 
needs of the urban and rural population (90 
% of the energy needs of households) and 
government policies that favor land 
occupation for agricultural purposes, 
reduced wood potential by 9.2 % between 
1985 and 1995. 
Within this context, agricultural 
performance, in terms of production, has 
not fallen below expectations. Overall, the 
areas under cultivation have not changed 
much; they’ve increased by 3.9 % between 
1960-1970 and 1970-1980, and then 
dropped by 4 % between 1970-80 and 
1980-94. However, as observed above, the 
main crops have witnessed reverse growth 
trends; decline in groundnut production 
except in the south and growth in cereal 
(millet/sorghum, maize, and paddy rice), 
cotton and cowpea production. That 
represents a major break in the production 
strategy of farmers, who give preference to 
food security for their families. As 
observed, the break is accompanied by 
diversification of production in all 
farmland areas in response to climate 
change, land saturation, the demands of 
urban markets, and low investment in labor 
and inputs. 
In spite of its great vulnerability to climatic 
factors, stockbreeding, hitherto a safe 
investment, is increasingly becoming a 
speculative investment. Stockbreeding 
practices have diversified to include the 
development of cattle and sheep fattening 
to meet the demands of urban markets, 
intensive poultry farming in peri-urban 
areas, niche dairy production in peri-urban 
areas, development of cattle draught 
cultivation and above all, horse draught 
cultivation, which is a sound investment 
for farming and transport activities in rural 
and urban areas in the dry season. Farmers 
who have the means to invest in cattle 
breeding can, thanks to the production of 
manure, also engage in intensive cereal 
cultivation, with cereal by-products 
recycled into stockbreeding. Thus the 
development of stockbreeding 
demonstrates the capacity of farmers to 
protect themselves against risks, to secure 
financial incomes with increasingly regular 
earnings, and for the bigger farmers who 
often have substantial non-farming 
incomes, to make high profits in the 
intensification of their agro-pastoral 
system. 
Difficult Liberalization of the 
Agricultural Economy 
The Senegalese government has been very 
reluctant in completely liberalizing the 
agricultural economy and privatizing state-
owned enterprises. Some experts point out 
that “Senegal embarked on adjustment 
reluctantly.” Launched in 1980 with the 
liquidation of the Agricultural Products 
Marketing Board (ONCAD), the process 
ended only in 2006 with the privatization 
of the largest domestic oil processing plant, 
SONACOS. In spite of its commitment, 
the government is still hesitant about 
carrying out land reform and recognizing 
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the real rights of family farm holders. The 
horticulture, cattle/beef and fishery sectors 
have always been liberal, but the 
government has not given up its intention 
of subsidizing the price of groundnut paid 
to farmers, and applying protective 
measures to imports, even though facts 
show that such measures are not effective 
as they do not encourage productivity 
among the beneficiaries. 
Within this context, modifications and 
restructuring of the produce markets and 
factors of production, with the emergence 
of new stakeholders and institutional 
coordination mechanisms, are slowly 
taking place. Changes to the major cereal 
and cash crop sectors (groundnut, rice, 
cereals) have turned out to be inefficient 
due to a lack of or inadequacy of 
accompanying structural mechanisms. The 
market for inputs such as seed, fertilizer 
and agricultural equipment markets are not 
organized. The erosion of the groundnut 
seed capital is a good example. The 
horticulture sector is more dynamic, with 
the emergence of private firms in the 
supply of inputs and loans, and the 
development of production and marketing 
contracts. As a result of farmers’ 
diversification strategies, new sectors are 
also emerging. Upstream, new distribution 
circuits are developing, with the 
emergence of supermarkets and creation of 
processing SME/SMIs. However, this 
phenomenon is not documented. The same 
applies to the higher levels of the 
traditional cereal and harvested fruits 
sectors, where the informal sector holds 
sway, driven by the expansion of catering 
services. 
There is still no real land market, though 
sporadically in the peri-urban areas, legal 
transactions are commonplace. This 
situation has thwarted all attempts to 
restructure the farming systems, and 
increased pressure on natural resources. 
The market for harvested fruits, wood, and 
charcoal is still subject to drastic and 
ineffective regulations, with quotas for 
felling, transport licenses, etc. 
Regarding exports, only the horticulture 
and fishery sectors seem to be dynamic, 
because they need to adapt to the 
constraining standards of the European 
Union with respect to quality, pesticide 
residues and traceability. 
What are the implications of liberalization 
on production structures? Our analyses 
show many factors in the development of 
farm structures, and it is very difficult to 
separate them. 
Parcellation of Family Farms and 
Emergence of Commercial Farming 
The family farm system has led to a 
permanent process of fragmentation of the 
family farming unit. Within a context of 
subsistence farming and almost limitless 
availability of land, the structure of 
farming units depends mainly on the 
availability of labor. The size of the family 
is thus the main factor that determines the 
number of farms. However, social status is 
useful in mobilizing labor from collaterals 
and seasonal workers. Some people, who 
control forest lands because of their family 
status, are better off. The introduction of 
commercial crops has led to the 
individualization of plots, factors of 
production, production activities, incomes 
and consequently, decisions within family 
farms. Family dependants, especially men, 
but also women, are slowly becoming 
independent of the head of the family farm. 
The introduction and spread of animal 
draught cultivation in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and the land legislation of 1964 that 
abolished customary rights in favor of the 
state, accelerated the process. Animal 
draught cultivation makes it possible to 
expand the crop area per farmer, while the 
land legislation blocks any process to 
reallocate land. 
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Thus, where land is scarce, the 
segmentation of farm units brings about 
differentiation of family farms, since the 
process entails a sharing out of family land 
each time. This internal process is at the 
origin of the parcellation of family and 
forest lands, and the individualization of 
family farms. The outcome is that small 
family farms are common. Between the 
agricultural survey of 1960 and the 
agricultural census of 1998, the number of 
farms of less than 1 hectare declined from 
21.4 % to 20.9 %, and those of less than 3 
hectares 58 % to 50.7 %, but the average 
cultivated area per farmer for all family 
farms declined 1.07 hectares to 0.57 
hectares. The proliferation of micro-family 
farms is actually the most noticeable and 
most disturbing aspect of farming 
structures. On the assumption that a crop 
area of 4 hectares is required by each 
farmer for rain-fed and cattle draught 
cultivation to provide a good level of 
income for his family, which was the 
objective set by agricultural research in the 
1970s, it is noted that the majority of rain-
fed farm holdings cannot be viable without 
substantial livestock and non-agricultural 
activities. 
As we pointed out above, family farms in 
all the agricultural regions have developed 
great capacities to adapt to changes in their 
environment, such as reduction of 
available land, climatic conditions, and 
market liberalization. The studies we 
conducted in the Djourbel and Fatick 
regions confirm that non-farming activities 
are the main factor of differentiation of 
family farms. For smallholdings, such 
activities enable them, above all, to meet 
basic needs, and they probably provide 
means of survival to many farmers who 
have no capacity to invest in improving 
their agricultural productivity. On the other 
hand, for those who have sizeable land at 
their disposal and substantial non-farming 
incomes, investing part of such income in 
farming, intensive cattle and sheep 
breeding and intensive cereal cultivation 
may be profitable. This is all the more 
apparent as the availability of land and 
money makes it possible to keep family 
labor, hire seasonal workers or talibes 
(pupils of Coranic schools). Without in-
depth studies on the issue, we can believe 
that these are mainly marabout farm 
holdings or those owned by retired 
employees, transport operators and 
traders/farmers. 
The issue of segmentation or 
differentiation of farm holdings is viewed 
differently in peri-urban intensive and 
irrigated farming areas with easy access to 
markets. In the Niayes zone, and to a lesser 
extent the Senegal River delta and around 
Lake Guiers, commercial farming coexists 
with family farms. Such commercial 
farming tends to diversify. Alongside the 
major capital-intensive businesses that 
employ workers and are specialized in the 
export of fresh produce to the European 
Union, there are intensive breeding 
enterprises, dairy farms that provide 
supplies to urban markets, fruit-tree 
growing enterprises targeting a mixed, 
urban/export market and a few agro-
industrial concerns. Family farms 
themselves can be differentiated. One can 
distinguish between those that specialize in 
market gardening and sell part of their 
produce to exporters, those that target only 
urban markets for African market garden 
products, and those that grow flowers, etc, 
with various land use status (owner, 
sharecropper, or leaseholder). 
There are hardly any studies on the 
segmentation or differentiation of family 
farms. While existing studies underscore 
the structural importance of non-farming 
activities and incomes, they do not 
document such activities and incomes 
adequately and do not take account of them 
in the typologies proposed. One 
recommendation would be to conduct, in 
the short or medium-term, a 
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comprehensive census of farm holdings, 
irrespective of their status, while taking 
into consideration the land rights, the full 
range of activities and incomes: 
cultivation, breeding, harvesting and non-
farming activities. 
Multidisciplinary studies at the regional 
level are required to provide a better 
understanding of farm strategies. The 
resources for this study were not enough to 
systematically consult the relevant 
literature. 
The Agricultural Economy at a dead 
End 
The main conclusion of our study is that in 
spite of the development of highly 
effective strategies, tailored to the 
unfavorable climatic conditions, scarcity of 
land and difficult access to markets, 
farmers and the agricultural economy are 
at an impasse. We will consider the 
impasse in terms of the five main purposes 
of agriculture. 
-Providing income to farmers: Senegal’s 
agriculture today is only partially 
subsistence farming. Thus, it is expected to 
provide monetary income to households to 
enable them to meet their basic needs and 
make investments. Liberalization did not 
boost agricultural production, in terms of 
productivity gains for farm holdings. 
Family, rain-fed and extensive farms are 
still largely in the majority. Their 
diminishing incomes do not allow them to 
meet basic needs or make investments. 
Most poor farming households are in this 
category of farms. The procurement of 
animal draught equipment, fertilizers and 
selected seeds remains at an extremely low 
level, which does not guarantee the 
replacement of farm equipment, the 
maintenance of soil fertility or the 
maintenance of seed capital. 
- Feeding the population: Liberalization 
did not revive food production in the 
broader sense. Admittedly, family farmers 
refocused on cereal production and 
stockbreeding, but without a dynamic 
urban market, demand for their products 
remains low. Senegal continues to increase 
food imports to meet the needs of its urban 
and rural populations. The rate of cereal 
self-sufficiency has fallen below 50 %. As 
far as food self-sufficiency in West Africa 
is concerned, Senegal is the most 
dependent country per capita. Such 
dependence undermines its investment 
capacities, and consequently its 
development. 
- Creating jobs and self-employment: At 
this stage of the country’s development, 
the agricultural sector remains the leading 
sector in terms of creating jobs for youths 
who enter the labor market. Its 
development should generate job-creating 
processing services and activities both 
upstream and downstream. Yet in the rural 
areas, very few young people believe that 
their future lies in agriculture or in the 
village. Most of them dream of moving to 
towns or out of the country. 
- Providing foreign exchange to the 
economy: The decline in agricultural and 
fisheries exports, except for horticultural 
exports, at a time when food imports are on 
the increase, is a cause for concern. The 
devaluation of the CFA Franc in 1994 did 
not have a sustained impact on exports. 
- Managing natural resources in a 
sustainable manner: Farmers’ incomes do 
not permit them to adjust their extensive 
and mining agricultural practices, and thus 
maintain soil fertility. Soil salinization has 
not been checked. In spite of state 
subsidies for the use of butane gas in 
households, the felling of trees for timber 
and firewood continues to reduce the forest 
area. 
The root cause of the poor performance of 
Senegal’s agriculture lies in the gap, or 
rather the contradictions, between the 
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official agricultural policies and the reality 
on the ground and the farmers’ own 
strategies. As part of the structural 
adjustment policies, the state considerably 
divested itself from the groundnut 
producing area and the southern regions of 
the country, and concentrated its 
investments in irrigated farming, mainly in 
the Delta area of Senegal River. It also 
postponed the privatization of SONACOS, 
and consequently the restructuring of the 
groundnut sector. The option chosen for 
the main agricultural sector, which 
provides monetary income for most 
farmers, was to import vegetable oil for 
local consumption, and to export 
groundnut oil. The liquidation of 
SODEVA, hitherto in charge of 
agricultural extension in the groundnut-
producing area, only became effective in 
1999, just before the creation of ANCAR, 
which was thus delayed. The liberalization 
of rice imports was also postponed for 
some time. 
Apart from cotton farmers, farmers in the 
rain-fed system remained for nearly 20 
years with hardly any agricultural 
extension and effective research services. 
The state grew tired of sustaining valley 
rice cultivation and mangrove rice 
cultivation in Casamance, and of 
subsidizing prices in the groundnut sector. 
However, the farmers received no support 
in their efforts to adapt their agricultural 
strategies to new realities. The structural 
constraints of rain-fed farming were not 
diagnosed. 
The gap between the farmers’ strategies 
and official policies persists, and has 
probably widened. The issue of the 
structure of rain-fed farms has still not 
been taken into consideration. The required 
land reforms have been postponed. The 
REVA Plan (“Return to Agriculture”) 
launched in 2006 and the “Fast-track 
Growth Strategy” proposed by the present 
government lay emphasis on irrigated 
areas, mechanization and horticulture 
through the development of commercial 
agriculture, at a time when family farmers 
engaged in rain-fed cultivation are giving 
priority to dry cereals, stockbreeding and 
diversification. The infrastructure policy 
gives priority to the urban infrastructure of 
the capital, whereas the major constraint on 
the entire southern region - which has a 
good agricultural potential - is access to 
markets. Priority is given to horticultural 
exports, whereas the vast majority of 
farmers aim at home consumption and the 
local market. 
Getting out of the impasses 
Solutions to address this impasse, where 
the agricultural economy finds itself, 
require that the state revise its vision of 
agriculture. Most farmers are engaged in 
rain-fed farming, and will probably 
maintain that option for the foreseeable 
future. They make up the majority of poor 
farmers. They have no capacity to invest 
and improve on their productivity. They 
have demonstrated their capacity to adapt 
to drought and markets, but at the cost of 
the deterioration of their economic 
situation. They give priority to the 
production of cereals and livestock, that is, 
items consumed by the Senegalese. 
The state should target small-scale, rain-
fed farming as a priority. Instead of 
defining its own agenda and trying to 
develop a form of commercial farming, the 
state should concentrate on family farms 
that employ the majority of Senegalese 
citizens, so they can continue to supply the 
markets, generate income and offer 
employment opportunities to the younger 
people. The stakes are high, and that option 
could be more profitable than groundnut 
oil exports. In the long-term, Senegal could 
also carve out a niche for itself on the West 
African market as an exporter of quality 
beef. 
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